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Introduction
Taking Stock and Drawing Lessons from EU Cohesion Policy for the 
Future  
Central and Eastern European countries witnessed an artificial levelling of economic 
development, during a period of central planning, which lasted until the late 1980s. It 
revolved around both micro- and macro-economic levels that included regions within 
the countries. Nevertheless, disparities among such regions became increasingly 
critical during the transition period in the 1990s, due to the lack of a formal regional 
policy institutions definition at the time (Sucháček, 2018, p. 14). Polarization 
processes, relating to the development of growth poles and depopulation in some 
rural areas, made differences between capital cities and peripheral regions more 
pronounced (Smętkowski, 2018, p. 34). In turn, the regional policy evolved gradually 
into a standard policy tool to cope with discrepancies in economic development. 
 The Central and Eastern European countries were the next to cope with disparities 
after the countries and regions of Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal and Spain). The 
latter paved the way for the development of EU cohesion policy and other areas relating 
to a functioning common market. Accession to the European Union, for countries 
from geographic peripheries, brought new impulses for the institutionalization of 
regional policy in the countries in question. 
The EU budget spends one-third on EU cohesion policy. This high-budget share 
not only confirms the importance of policies aiming at regional disparities in the EU—
that is, in an attempt to make the EU cohesive—but it also made regional policy more 
interesting for national political elites. The EU Eastern and Southern peripheries are 
among the primary recipients of EU funding. For example, the Czech Republic has 
the highest allocation per capita (2007-2013), while Poland has the highest amounts 
allocated in each programming period compared to other member states. As a result, 
a multi-annual planning cycle has been drawn for individual programmes and 
implementation documents in these countries, based on programming documents 
from National Development Plans. Central public administration, representatives of 
regions, cities, municipalities, and representatives of non-governmental and non-
profit organizations took part in the whole preparation process; rendering it different 
from central planning (Potluka 2020). 
These analysed countries and regions tend to perform poorly across several 
rankings. This includes economic development, quality of government, social 
justice, and/or innovation potential (Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015). Despite this 
fact, these countries are the most in need of EU funds (ESIF), warranting the large 
amount of ESIF directed towards them to improve their rankings and make the EU 
more cohesive. This concentration forms a cohesion policy laboratory of peripheral 
countries.  
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2   Introduction
Successes and failures as a result of EU cohesion implementation, first from the 
southern part of the EU, and second from Central and Eastern Europe, are a valuable 
source of feedback for future plans. The whole implementation exercise is sometimes 
challenging to accomplish, as both the public and private sectors have low absorption 
capacity. In addition, side effects appeared as for example the creation of the so-called 
project-class, which based its economic activities primarily only on EU programmes 
(Kovách & Kučerova, 2009).
In contrast, positive experiences also emerged. Regions in Central and Eastern 
European countries witnessed improvements in the form of change in GDP per capita, 
benchmarked against the EU average during the years 2008-2015, while Southern 
Europe improved similarly between 2000-2008 (EC, 2017). This indicates that the 
concentration of funding was well allocated. In Central and Eastern European 
countries, ESIF makes up about half of all its public investment. In comparison, other 
EU countries, such as Portugal, Croatia, and Lithuania, public investment relies more 
heavily on ESIF (EC, 2017, p. xxii). If EU cohesion policy were ineffective, it would not 
be present on such a scale for decades.
In this volume, the authors cover a variety of aforementioned problems and 
experiences of either all member states, with special attention to peripheral countries, 
or to sectoral or regional problems in selected countries. The book begins with an 
overview of the issues of economic convergence and convergence of quality of life 
in all member states. It also addresses political aspects of cohesion policy, including 
involvement of civil society into this public policy, as well as relationships between 
cohesion policy support and EU identification.
Maciej Pietrzykowski (2020) analysed processes of economic convergence, 
focusing on cohesion policy, to demonstrate the results of examining the groups EU-13 
and EU-15. He argues that during the entire period between 2000-2015, inequalities in 
the level of economic development were decreasing, both at the level of countries and 
at the level of NUTS 2 regions (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics; level 2 
is also known as cohesion regions). The research confirms that convergence is more 
effective in smaller and less developed economies, which are the primary recipients 
of structural funds, even though they differ in pace of convergence. Not surprisingly, 
divergence appeared in the crisis years. However, regional and country economies 
started to converge by 2014. The author concludes with pointing out the relevance 
of the European Commission recommendations (EC, 2017) for the future. He asserts 
that only high absorption of structural funds combined strategically with constantly 
improving governance and administrative capacity can bring ongoing convergence in 
the EU. This must be supported with private and national funds’ investments focused 
on high value-added areas.
Marcin Dąbrowski, Dominic Stead, and Bardia Mashhoodi (2020) raise the 
question of whether cohesion policy matters in EU countries. They underline how the 
EU identification and cohesion policy may only partly depend on the strength of policy 
support to the regions (e.g. Poland and Romania). In the southern regions, as well as in 
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the Czech Republic, the image is neither clear nor is the perception of the EU strongly 
positive, which may suggest that effects of crisis and austerity measures, as well as 
other socio-economic factors are significant (as in the case of Greece, which was one 
of the biggest beneficiaries of EU cohesion policy). The weak relationship between 
the EU funding and EU identification highlights challenges for cohesion policy and 
its potential impact on citizens’ lives. Likewise, it highlights the weak communication 
of results from EU-co-financed investment in the regions. The problem needs further 
investigation with regards to the determinants of EU identification spatial patterns or 
factors influencing the examined relationship.
Panagiotis Liargovas and Stavroula Kratimenou (2020) investigate quality of 
life and convergence in composite indexes reflecting this important dimension that 
is undoubtedly supported by EU cohesion policy. From the analyses of all member 
states in the years between 1995-2015, two findings emerged: 1) Convergence stagnated 
between 1990-2000; and 2) that most of the countries achieved convergence between 
2005-2015. Sweden, Finland and Denmark hold the top the ranks in quality of life 
index, while the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe come in last. The 
authors recommend that European policy-makers should continue to provide financial 
resources to exert appropriate economic policies in countries facing difficulties and 
lagging behind in quality of life. This is in order to pursue a broader redistributive 
policy community. The designers of European Community policy should implement 
various financial assistance programs so as to diminish inequalities, support 
countries with low quality of life, and decrease regional disparities between member 
states. At regional level nonetheless, this may be a source of further political tensions. 
Oto Potluka (2020) analyses the political aspects of cohesion policy implementation 
and participation of civil society in the process. Partnership principle is one of the most 
important principles to overcome democratic deficit. Nevertheless, the experiences 
of countries that have applied cohesion policy implementation reveal that the role 
of civil society is not always present equally in programming and implementation 
phases. The Czech Republic case study can be a useful reference for all countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe, and candidate countries confronting the legacy of post-
communist or totalitarian regimes. It also underlines how pronounced involvement 
of non-governmental organisations in cohesion policy design will not improve the 
perception of the EU in a given country. To a degree, the findings correspond to 
the conclusions drawn by Dąbrowski, Stead, and Mashhoodi (2020). Moreover, the 
fragmentation of the organisations and relatively low capacities weakens the potential 
of partnership implementation. Therefore, one of the fundamental recommendations 
is the need for a strengthened long-lasting support from the European Commission 
towards civil society in the countries of Central Europe and their relationship with 
central governments.
The second part of the monograph presents a multidimensional view of EU 
cohesion policy on sectors, country case studies, and the use of financial instruments. 
It expounds subsidizing foreign investment process of the automotive sector in Central 
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and Eastern Europe with a special emphasis put on Romania and Poland. Gergő 
Medve-Bálint and Vera Šćepanović (2020) analyse under-researched relationship 
between foreign direct investment (FDI) and EU funds treated as investment 
incentives. The authors claim that the interaction between them is problematic 
because of the different purposes and logic of these two types of external funds. 
FDI is driven by market logic, while the EU funds are supposed to correct market 
failures. The authors examine whether the EU funds to the private (automotive) sector 
in Poland and Romania, between the years 2007 and 2013, are market-correcting or 
market-amplifying. The findings are twofold. First, there is some evidence for the 
market-correcting effects, because foreign multinationals receive a smaller portion 
of these funds relative to their share of employment and output of the sector, and 
there is no bias towards foreign companies once other firm characteristics are 
controlled for. Second, due to the peculiarities of the industry, where ownership, size, 
and productivity strongly coincide, half to three quarters of EU funds are spent on 
subsidies to multinationals. Moreover, the funds support routine capital investments 
instead of promoting innovative projects. The existence of a perverse mechanism in 
the distribution of EU funds in the region is therefore confirmed, and the use of “EU 
funds as investment incentives to foreign enterprises may also reinforce the negative 
developmental consequences of the dependent market economies” (Medve-Bálint & 
Šćepanović, 2020).
Györgyi Nyikos and Gábor Soós (2020) bring a broad perspective on the 
evolution of EU cohesion policy in Hungary. They underline the importance of the 
use of financial instruments as innovative tools introduced to complement grants. 
The authors see main problems and challenges leading to limited success of the 
policy in Hungary—one of the biggest beneficiaries of the policy. One of the main 
problems with the optimal use of EU support lies in “fundamental reorganizations 
of administration” (Nyikos & Soós, 2020). This has negative effects on the system, 
and high staff turnover remains a problem. Additionally, complex and frequent 
amendments of domestic legislation, aimed at simplifying matters, have created 
feelings of uncertainty. Pressure to expedite the use of funds, instead of choosing 
the best quality projects and potential corruption in granting EU funds, should be 
avoided to revitalize the economy of the country. Coping with the economic crisis has 
been another challenge in obtaining optimal results of the cohesion policy predicted 
in the development strategies. The authors formulate recommendations with regard 
to the use of financial instrument and draw a conclusion to prepare administration 
to work with this new type of instruments under cohesion policy as early as possible. 
Judit Kalman (2020) analyses the Hungarian case, putting public and private 
resources for regional development in the 33 least-developed and most deprived 
micro-regions in the heart of her study (corresponding to LAU1 level of administrative 
division). The paper assesses the success of allocating extra-resources to the 
disadvantaged micro-regions. Its novelty is relying on business financial data for a 
better estimation of private investment activities, and in the spatial scale oriented 
towards the micro-region level. Since the majority of funds were flowing to more 
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developed regions, the need emerged to support the least developed regions. The 
results show that the program for targeting 33 micro-regions has induced some 
positive changes in the fund absorption capacities of these laggard areas through 
facilitating connections among local development actors and institutions. There 
were differences noted in per capita allocations, compared to data of the other 14 
disadvantaged micro-regions not treated by this special program. Nevertheless, 
program coordination and execution need further improvements if continued. Proper 
targeting and a combination of public intervention with market forces, along with the 
strengthening of administrative reforms and human capital, seems to be crucial if the 
idea of space-sensitive and place-based territorial development and policy-making 
expressed by F. Barca (2009) is to be achieved in Hungary and other EU member states.
Finally, Piotr Idczak and Ida Musiałkowska (2020) add to the monograph presenting 
the experiences with the JESSICA initiative. It concerns revolving instrument designed 
for sustainable city development and regeneration processes. The chapter deeply 
analyse the results of implementation of all projects implemented in  five Polish 
regions that have decided to apply JESSICA. The authors constructed a model of 
assessment of JESSICA that is based off of 5 contexts for sustainable development in 
urban areas: financial, economic, social, spatial and horizontal, that were transformed 
into dimensions of evaluation. The results show that not all dimensions were taken 
into account during the appraisal and later during project implementation. The most 
represented dimensions were the financial, economic and spatial dimensions. The 
approach for particular regions differed in terms of both institutional structure of the 
regional operational programmes, which used the resources of JESSICA, and in terms 
of the results achieved. The Zachodniopomorskie region was the best performing 
in terms of adjusting the projects’ requirements to the theoretical assumption of 
the regeneration model. The Wielkopolskie, Mazowieckie and Śląskie regions were 
characterised by the projects of diverse quality, whilst the worst performer was the 
Pomorskie region. This diversification is an indirect result of a different approach to 
urban development funds towards selecting the projects. Another set of results show 
that projects that generate revenue are good representatives of the JESSICA-type 
interventions. The projects of higher value, generating revenue and coordinated by 
private entities are bringing more results in terms of all 5 aforementioned dimensions 
that assure the complexity of urban development. In any case, the authors assume 
that the institutional quality is significant with regards to programme and selection 
criteria design. However, this aspect needs further investigation. 
The set of the research papers, their conclusions, and policy recommendations 
can be a basis for thoughts in both academic communities and for policy-makers 
dealing with regional development and planning, especially at the wake of the new 
programming period confronting European Union.
6   Introduction
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1  The Effectiveness of the European Union’s 
Cohesion Policy in the Years 2000-2015
Maciej Pietrzykowski1
Abstract: The impact of the cohesion policy in the 2014-2020 framework is estimated to 
be approximately 450 billion euros. Such large intervention requires the effectiveness 
of high absorption and ongoing successes in achieving set goals. The aim of this 
paper is to examine the convergence of European Union economies at the national 
and regional levels (NUTS2), using the measure of unconditional convergence 
(β-convergence) and Pearson Correlation. Analysis was conducted for the periods 
covering the two most recent EU financial perspectives. A distinction has been 
made between convergence in “old” (core EU-15) and “new” (EU-13) Member States. 
Conclusions focus on discussing the results of the analysis and recommendations to 
enhance EU cohesion policy directions. 
Key Words: local economic development, cohesion policy, convergence, divergence
1.1  Introduction
Cohesion policy is one of the key investment policies in the European Union. 
It focuses on less developed countries and regions, supporting the process of 
reducing economic, social, and territorial disparities that continue to exist in the 
EU. As indicated by the latest (seventh) Report on Economic, Social and Territorial 
Cohesion, the financial crisis and following recessions stunted long-term growth in 
the cohesion of the European Union, which was manifested in the stratification of 
levels of such indicators as GDP, GDP per capita, employment rate and unemployment 
rate (European Commission, 2017). The subsequent progressive recovery began to 
reverse this unfavourable trend, but the question remains as to what extent the 
applied intervention instruments and adopted priorities are appropriate, whether 
the aid and policy instruments are correctly addressed to the beneficiaries, as well 
as whether we can indicate some outcomes in terms of sustainability of the policy’s 
implementation. Taking into account national contributions and private funds, 
the impact of the cohesion policy in the 2014-2020 framework is estimated to be 
approximately 450 billion euros, which includes cohesion policy funding of around 
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350 billion euros. For 7 out of 28 European Union countries (including Poland) in 
the years 2015-2017, cohesion policy accounted for over 50% of public investment 
(European Commission, 2017). Therefore, the effectiveness of cohesion policy from 
the point of view of overcoming development disparities is an important issue; one 
which for many years has been the subject of research by scientists as well as a 
point of reference for the actions of politicians. Examining the success as well as 
the territorial impact from the implementation of the EU cohesion policy requires 
exploring whether the convergence has taken place in European Countries and 
Regions and whether there is a correlation between cohesion policy assistance and 
GDP measures. 
1.2  Convergence in Research To-Date
Research into the convergence of countries had already begun in the 1980s. The classic 
and neo-classical growth theory suggests that rich and poor regions or countries will 
converge as they integrate, mainly due to diminishing returns to capital. Baumol 
(1986), who analysed data from 16 market economies, claimed that they were closer to 
one another compared to how they had been 100 years before. He also transferred his 
analysis to the sphere of politics, arguing that current economic phenomena cannot 
be considered without an in-depth analysis of historical facts. Additionally, he noted 
the ad hoc nature of economic policies, as these ignore certain long-term trends, 
which, in his opinion, are decisive for long-term sustainability. 
De Long (1988) disputed Baumol’s findings, claiming that they are not so 
obvious. He argued that economic processes, and in particular technology transfers, 
do not, in the long run, lead to complete convergence and a similar standard of 
living in all industrialized economies. What is more, as noted by Romer (1986), as 
early as in the 1980s, the gap between rich and poor countries may widen, which 
was later confirmed by further research (e.g. Razin 2007; Cingano, 2014). Already 
in the twentieth century research into economic convergence was used to assess 
the effectiveness of the European Union’s cohesion policy. Rogut and Roszkowska 
(2006) examined conditional convergence in transition economies, concluding that 
although there was convergence in the analysed groups of economies, considerable 
differences continued to exist between the countries in terms of the level of economic 
development and long-term growth rates. 
In addition, analyses of empirical data on labour productivity indicated that, 
in most cases, countries with a lower GDP per employee recorded a much higher 
growth rate in this macroeconomic variable than economies with fairly high labour 
productivity. In 2008, Esposti and Busoletti, analysing conditional convergence in 
206 EU regions (2008), estimated the impact of cohesion policy (Objective 1) on the 
cohesion of these regions. They argued that this policy had a significant impact on 
regional convergence. Similar conclusions were reached by Eckey, Dreger, and Türck 
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(2009), who argued that convergence can be accelerated in new member states. 
Monfort (2009) attested to the convergence of regions in his research. However, he 
also indicated the possibility of growth poles appearing due to the development of 
urban agglomerations and the drainage of development factors from surrounding 
areas. In 1995, 70% of development disparities in the EU reflected disproportions 
between EU countries, the rest being regional disparities. This share dropped to 
56% in 2005. In the EU-15, this figure decreased from 55% in 1980 to just 14% in 
2005 (Bouvet, 2005). 
In turn, Petrakos and Artelaris (2009) argued that opening markets and increasing 
competition must lead to the emergence of regional disparities. Therefore, there is 
room for applying intense regional policies within the national policies of individual 
countries, while cohesion policies should be responsible for cohesion at the level of 
countries. Smętkowski and Wójcik (2008) used β- and σ-convergence (vide Research 
method section) to analyse the convergence of regions, particularly in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. They pointed to rather weak regional convergence and 
stressed that in most countries the intensity of regional convergence processes is low, 
although in smaller countries their level remains stable. Łaźniewska, Górecki, and 
Chmielewski (2011), who analysed regional data for Central and Eastern European 
countries, also stated that although convergence does occur, it is accompanied by a 
high variance in GDP per capita, which may be a consequence of strong agglomeration 
effects. Mikulić et al. (2013) analysed regional data for the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 levels in 
the EU and Croatia in 2001 and 2008, indicating that national convergence is stronger 
than regional convergence. Jóźwik (2014), who analysed regional data, argued that 
the poorer regions of Central and Eastern Europe tend to develop faster than rich 
regions—although this principle is not universal in terms of either scope or time. 
Periods of economic crisis are characterized by an increasing standard deviation of 
the natural logarithms of regional GDP per capita, which amounts to a variation in 
GDP value and thus divergence.
On theoretical grounds, the effectiveness of cohesion policy is the subject of 
frequent disputes, mainly between the neoclassical school and advocates of the 
endogenous growth theory (cf. Beck and Grodzicki, 2014; Jóźwik, 2014; Kisiała, 
2016). The proponents of the neoclassical growth theory, based on the Solow 
models, assume diminishing marginal capital productivity, which should result in 
diminishing disproportions between rich and poor countries in the long term. On the 
other hand, the advocates of the endogenous theory, in particular the so-called new 
economic geography (Krugman, 1991), argue that in fact the majority of factors favour 
divergence processes. Trade integration can result in a “core-periphery” structure, 
with spatial concentration of increasing returns to scale industries in the core Europe 
and constant returns to scale industries at the peripheries (Rodokanakis, 2006). 
This concerns mainly the economies of agglomeration, which occur in three forms 
(Gawroński, 2010) as follows:
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 – Economies of scale – lowered production costs as a result of increased production 
levels,
 –  Localization economies – concentration of companies from the same industry/
sector in the same area leads to creating ‘place brands’,
 – Urbanization economies – diversity and availability of labour force and market, 
as well as technical, social and administrative infrastructure. 
Cities and metropolises tend to attract and concentrate investment as well as the 
factors of production that follow them. A consequence of this is the emergence of 
growth poles within these agglomerations and a shift of the development processes 
from peripheral areas, or even the draining of their resources (cf. Perroux, 1950; 
Hite, 2004; McCann and van Oort, 2009; Gaczek, 2010; Domański, 2012; Markowska-
Przybyła, 2010; Markowska & Strahl, 2012; Jabłoński, 2012; Kusideł, 2013). It is also 
emphasized that, because regions have strong links with their neighbours (both 
close and distant), they are much more susceptible to various shocks (e.g. cyclical). 
Also, the mobility of the factors of production is greater at the level of regions than 
countries (Beck & Grodzicki, 2014: 16), which intensifies the divergence processes that 
are additionally compounded by the consequences of reducing transaction costs as 
well as technological changes. Finally, Magrini (2004) argued that failure to include 
geographical factors in the analyses, and in particular spatial factors, must lead to 
false conclusions.
Thus, a solution seems possible, which to a certain extent combines the two 
theoretical approaches, namely—that there is a real convergence between the 
economies of countries, although at the level of regions differences may increase. This 
would largely justify the legitimacy of implementing a cohesion policy at the EU level, 
leaving the issues relating to reducing regional disparities to national politicians. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to review whether, during the European Union’s last 
two financial perspectives (2000-2006 and 2007-2013), convergence in the economies 
of the EU-28 countries and regions occurred, and consequently, whether a cohesion 
policy implemented in the form of significant fund-transfers to economically weaker 
countries and regions reduced economic discrepancies in particular countries and 
regions.
1.3  Research Method
Real economic convergence assumes that economies become similar in terms of their 
level of development, which can be measured in various ways. The most common 
measures are GDP per capita and average labour productivity. This approach to 
convergence is called σ-convergence and refers to a reduction in the dispersion of the 
examined feature (e.g. GDP per capita) in a given group of economies. The second 
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basic measure of convergence entails the relationship between the average rate of 
index growth determining the level of development and its initial value—which is 
connected with the concept of ‘catching up’ and closing the development gap between 
underdeveloped and developed economies. There are two types of this measure: 
first, unconditional (absolute) convergence, which assumes that all economies strive 
towards the same level of wealth within the long-term equilibrium; and second, 
conditional convergence, which assumes an individual path for each country, 
depending on the characteristics of its economy. The two concepts of convergence 
are interrelated: β-convergence is a necessary but an exclusive condition for the 
occurrence of σ-convergence (Nowak, 2007: 75).
The aim of this paper is to examine the convergence of European Union economies 
at the national and regional levels (NUTS2) using the measure of unconditional 
convergence (β-convergence). The analysis of β-convergence was popularized by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Barro, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a; Sala-
i-Martin, 2002). However, despite criticism from some researchers (eg. Friedman, 
1992; Quah, 1996; Wójcik, 2008) and some of its known limitations, β-convergence 
is still commonly used (Alexe, 2012; Czasonis, and Quinn, 2012; EEAG, 2010; Grzelak 
and Kujaczyńska, 2013; Kaitila et al., 2007; Schadler et al., 2006; Siwiński, 2012; 
Walczak, 2012). In order to verify the hypothesis about the occurrence of absolute 
β-convergence, the following equation was estimated (Matkowski & Próchniak, 2013):
Linear regression was used for the estimation of the equation, which makes it possible 
to estimate the conditional value of the expected explanatory variable for the specific 
values of the independent variables. The dependent variable was the average rate of 
growth of real GDP per capita in the period between T and 0; the independent variable 
was the logarithm of the initial value of GDP per capita; and εt was the random 
component. A negative and statistically significant value of the α1 parameter signifies 
the existence of β-convergence. If that is the case, the value of the β coefficient, which 
measures the convergence rate, can be calculated using the following formula:
The β parameter denotes the average rate of convergence/divergence over each 
period, expressed as a percentage. The higher the value of the parameter, the faster 
the differences disappear. Once the value of the β coefficient is known, it is possible 
to calculate the half-life coefficient, referred to as the half-convergence period and 
described by the formula hl=ln(2)/β. This coefficient shows how many years it takes 
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to reduce the differences in the set of observations by half. To prove that convergence 
occurs as a result of the intervention of the cohesion policy, Pearson Correlation has 
been calculated between cohesion policy intervention (CF, ERDF and ESF) and both 
real GDP per capita and GDP per capita based on PPS.
1.4  Results
Estimation of the regression model was performed in several variants. The first 
differentiating criterion was the level of data aggregation: the parameters were 
estimated separately for the 28 current EU member states and for the 276 regions of 
the NUTS2 level (The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 2013). The next 
criterion was the exchange rate: the parameters for nominal GDP per capita were 
estimated then converted to real terms using the GDP deflator at the level of prices 
for the year 2000; and in the second case, GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
standards (PPS) was used. Analysing purchasing power parity better reflects the 
nature of real economic processes as it takes into account the purchasing power of the 
population of a given country. In addition, different periods corresponding to specific 
financial frameworks were distinguished (using the n+2 rule): two EU financial 
frameworks together - the years 2000-2013 (Table 1); the 2000-2006 framework 
(Table 2); and the 2007-2013 framework (Table 3). The addition of two years to each 
framework is justified on the one hand, because of the adopted settlement period 
of investment projects, and on the other hand, due to the period of transmitting the 
effects of economic policy to the real sphere. As a result, several models have been 
estimated, which are presented below in Table 1.
The results presented in Table 1 indicate the occurrence of economic convergence 
for the analysed units in each variant, excluding “club convergence”—EU15 and EU13 
(the values of the convergence coefficient are in each case negative). The convergence 
process, in terms of purchasing power parity, occurs much faster than if the current 
exchange rate is taken into account. It is also confirmed that convergence at the 
level of countries, in each approach occurs faster than at the level of regions. All the 
observations are statistically significant (for EU-28 countries and regions), and the 
model explains approximately 45% of the variance for the model relating to the regions 
of EU countries, as well as about 2/3 of the variance for the model relating to the EU 
countries themselves. The Durbin-Watson test indicates a negative autocorrelation of 
the random component. Excluding observations relating to Luxembourg and Ireland, 
which showed the greatest deviation from the trend, increased the fit of the model 
to R2=0.830 (PPS). Similarly, excluding the three most divergent observations from 
the model, estimated at the regional level (Bucuresti-Ilfov, Bratislava Region, Inner 
London-West), increased the degree of fit to R2=0.507 (PPS). Additional calculations
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Table 1: Results of the estimation of the absolute β-convergence regression equation in EU countries 
between the years 2000-2015.
Regression model Absolute term Convergence 
coefficient
R2 β hl Durbin-
Watson 
statisticα0 p-value α1 p-value
NUTS2 regions (PPS) 3.404 0.000 -0.309 0.000 0.450 2.46% 28.130 0.845
NUTS2 regions (current 
exchange rate)
1.754 0.000 -0.164 0.000 0.443 1.19% 58.044 0.695
EU-28 countries (PPS) 4.498 0.000 -0.410 0.000 0.657 3.52% 19.705 1.740
EU-28 countries (current 
exchange rate)
2.229 0.000 -0.207 0.000 0.626 1.55% 44.829 1.758
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(PPS)
0.378 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.004 0.05% 1294.445 0.847
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(PPS)
3.136 0.000 -0.265 0.000 0.273 2.05% 33.770 1.389
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(current exchange rate) 
0.544 0.007 +0.064 0.002 0.004 - - 0.924
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(current exchange rate)
1.472 0.000 -0.120 0.001 0.160 0.85% 81.334 1.240
EU-15 countries (PPS) -2.103 0.110 +0.242 0.067 0.176 - - 1.958
EU-13 countries (PPS) 6.339 0.000 -0.609 0.000 0.827 6.26% 11.072 2.078
EU-15 countries (current 
exchange rate)
-1.417 0.104 +0.152 0.081 0.156 - - 1.822
EU-13 countries (current 
exchange rate)
2.931 0.000 -0.288 0.001 0.646 2.26% 30.609 2.053
Source: Own compilation based on Eurostat data
for the so-called “club convergence”, separating observations between the “old” (core 
EU-15) and “new” (EU-13) European Union countries were also done, adopting, as a 
turning point, the year 2004. 2004 in turn, marked the entry of 10 new countries into 
the EU with three more countries joining in subsequent years2. The results indicate a 
much greater fit for the country regression model of the new member states (R2=0.878 
vs. R2=0.117 for GDP based on PPS in the years 2000-2015). 
Moreover, in the case of the “old” (core) EU countries, divergence in economic 
development can be observed as evidenced by the positive value of the α1 coefficient. 
2  The three countries have not used the structural funds on a full scale, which has an impact on the 
analysis as well
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This confirms the results of earlier research, which showed that convergence occurs 
at a higher rate in smaller and less-economically developed countries. However, it 
must be noted that in most cases the results of the EU-15 analysis were statistically 
insignificant (p-value >0.05). In the case of country-level analysis for EU-15 and EU-13, 
we have a low sample size, which means that the results of regression analysis should 
be followed with caution. The results are similar to those presented in Table 2, where 
the period of the 2000-2008 financial perspective has been analysed Although, in this 
case, the value of the β coefficient indicates a faster catch-up rate for almost each of 
the analysed cases. Also, the fit of the model is particularly high, especially at the 
level of EU countries.
Table 2: Results for the estimation of the absolute β-convergence regression equation in EU 
countries in the years 2000-2008.
Regression model Absolute term Convergence 
coefficient
R2 β hl Durbin- 
Watson 
statisticα0 p-value α1 p-value
NUTS2 regions (PPS) 2.589 0.000 -0.234 0.000 0.493 3.33% 20.802 1.062
NUTS2 regions (current 
exchange rate)
1.464 0.000 -0.134 0.000 0.567 1.80% 38.543 1.033
EU-28 countries (PPS) 3.664 0.000 -0.337 0.000 0.772 5.14% 13.493 1.675
EU-28 countries (current 
exchange rate)
1.901 0.000 -0.175 0.000 0.776 2.40% 28.825 1.170
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(PPS)
1.048 0.000 -0.081 0.000 0.097 1.06% 65.647 0.968
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(PPS)
2.272 0.000 -0.192 0.001 0.173 2.66% 26.010 1.040
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(current exchange rate) 
0.537 0.000 -0.42 0.002 0.040 6.81% 10.180 0.989
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(current exchange rate)
1.184 0.000 -0.096 0.002 0.148 1.26% 54.943 1.190
EU-15 countries (PPS) 0.002 0.998 +0.026 0.690 0.063 - - 1.715
EU-13 countries (PPS) 0.110 0.800 +0.002 0.966 0.077 - - 1.708
EU-15 countries (current 
exchange rate)
3.821 0.023 -1.520 0.000 0.885 - - 1.428
EU-13 countries (current 
exchange rate)
2.277 0.000 -0.218 0.000 0.663 3.07% 22.590 1.572
Source: Own compilation based on Eurostat data
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The next Table presents results of the analysis for the 2007-2013 financial perspective. 
Table 3: Results for the estimation of the absolute β-convergence regression equation in EU 
countries in the years 2007-2015.
Regression model Absolute term Convergence 
coefficient
R2 β hl Durbin- 
Watson 
statisticα0 p-value α1 p-value
NUTS2 regions (PPS) 1.372 0.000 -0.127 0.000 0.152 1.70% 40.827 0.522
NUTS2 regions (current 
exchange rate)
0.536 0.000 -0.540 0.000 0.118 9.71% 7.141 0.516
EU-28 countries (PPS) 1.705 0.007 -0.156 0.011 0.221 2.12% 32.695 2.002
EU-28 countries (current 
exchange rate)
0.619 0.023 -0.061 0.029 0.171 0.79% 88.103 2.389
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(PPS)
-0.609 0.015 +0.065 0.008 0.027 - - 0.540
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(PPS)
1.405 0.000 -0.121 0.001 0.173 1.61% 42.966 1.019
NUTS2 Regions EU-15 
(current exchange rate) 
-1.056 0.000 +0.102 0.000 0.142 - - 0.742
NUTS2 Regions EU-13 
(current exchange rate)
0.527 0.010 -0.047 0.043 0.056 0.60% 115.188 0.753
EU-15 countries (PPS) -1.781 0.114 +0.179 0.100 0.132 - - 1.845
EU-13 countries (PPS) -1.278 0.103 +0.123 0.107 0.125 - - 2.496
EU-15 countries (current 
exchange rate)
3.942 0.003 -0.384 0.004 0.547 6.06% 11.445 1.304
EU-13 countries (current 
exchange rate)
1.157 0.041 -0.121 0.054 0.234 1.61% 42.996 1.206
Source: Own compilation based on Eurostat data
The values of the α1 convergence coefficient are negative. As such, also in this 
case, they indicate gradual convergence of the analysed units. However, it is worth 
noting the fit of the model analysed for this period is much lower than in the case 
of the previous financial framework. The results are still statistically significant (at 
EU-28 level), but the distribution of residuals indicates the presence of a significant 
disturbance in the model. One reason for this may be the repercussions from the 2008 
financial crisis, which caused considerable economic perturbations, affecting the real 
economic situation of individual countries in different ways. On one hand, there is 
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Poland, which suffered relatively mild consequences as a result of the crisis, but was 
also quick to recover. On the other hand, there are countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal and Italy (the so called PIIGS group), which severely experienced the 
effects of the crisis and fell into substantial debt; as well as countries such as Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, whose economies are based on exports for which the crisis 
meant a significant decline in GDP; and countries such as Latvia, which resorted to 
“internal devaluation” in order to regain long-term competitiveness, even though, in 
the short term, this resulted in a significant deterioration in the real standard of living 
of its population. To demonstrate the relation between cohesion policy intervention 
and the level of GDP of EU Countries and regions, the Pearson Correlation has been 
calculated separately for every country and region. Average rates are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4: Results for the estimation of average correlation between cohesion policy intervention and 
GDP per capita measures in EU Countries in the years 2000-2015.
Cohesion policy/real GDP 
per capita
Cohesion policy/ GDP per capita 
based on PPS
All Countries 0.355 0.412
“Old” Core Members (EU-15) 0.103 0.107
“New” Member States (EU-10, 
joined in 2004)
0.654 0.766
“New” Member States (EU-13) 0.646 0.763
Source: Own compilation based on cohesion data
Table 5: Results for the estimation of average correlation between cohesion policy intervention and 
GDP per capita measures in EU Regions (NUST2) in the years 2000-2015.
Cohesion policy/real GDP 
per capita
Cohesion policy/ GDP per capita 
based on PPS
All Regions 0.285 0.274
“Old” Core Members Regions (EU-15) 0.168 0.131
“New” Member States Regions (EU-10, 
joined in 2004)
0.735 0.820
“New” Member States Regions (EU-13) 0.726 0.813
Source: Own compilation based on cohesion data
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Taking all EU countries and regions into account, there is a weak correlation between 
cohesion policy intervention and GDP measures, which corresponds with conclusions 
of the report on Data Review and Mapping of Cohesion Policy Implementation and 
Performance (Gorzelak et. al, 2017). However, limiting calculations for the countries 
and regions that do receive significant structural and cohesion funds (EU-13, countries 
that joined after 2004), the correlation is quite significant: higher for GDP based on 
PPP, and also higher on the regional level. Exceptionally high correlation has been 
noticed in the case of Poland, the current largest beneficiary of cohesion assistance, 
respectively 0.903 and 0.902 for countries, and 0.836 and 0.834 average for regions.
1.5  Conclusion
In light of research results, it can be concluded that inequalities in the level of economic 
development were decreasing during the entire period between the years 2000-2015, 
as well as in the specific periods corresponding to EU financial frameworks; both 
occurring at the level of EU-28 countries and at the level of NUTS2 regions measured 
for EU-28. The research also confirms that convergence is more effective in smaller 
and less developed economies, which are the primary recipients of structural aid. One 
possible explanation is that the cohesion policy was effective in terms of the objectives 
it was designed to achieve, whereby correlation rates confirmed the possibility for 
“new” Member States. 
Nevertheless, the pace of economic convergence, at the level of both regions and 
countries, was substantially different, depending on the methodology used; although, 
in general, it can be considered weak or, at best, moderate. When considering GDP per 
capita, based on purchasing power parity, the catch-up time was much shorter than 
when using data calculated on the basis of the current exchange rate. The regression 
models calculated for the NUTS2 regions (EU-28) show a much lower level of fit, 
although they still remain statistically significant. This may indicate that a cohesion 
policy is considerably more effective on a macro scale than at a regional level. The 
lower rate of regional convergence can certainly be attributed to agglomeration 
economies, the emergence of growth poles, and the phenomena analysed within 
the scope of economic geography—or the integration of markets, globalization, 
technology transfer etc. Even so, further analysis would be necessary to confirm this 
assertion. 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing double recession in 2008 and 2011 
significantly distorted the models’ predictions, which can be clearly seen in the 
decreasing fit of the models estimated for the period 2007-2015. As indicated by the 
7th report on economic, social and territorial cohesion (European Commission, 2017) 
and empirical studies (e.g. Jóźwik 2014), long-term disproportions in GDP per capita 
increased during this period and started to decrease at the end of 2014, when the EU 
economy entered a phase of strong recovery. The heteroscedasticity of the random 
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component in most of the analysed cases indicates the need for further analysis in 
order to improve the model fit and take into account other factors. As so, conditional 
convergence merits consideration (c.f. Rogut and Roszkowska, 2006), which takes 
into account a number of other factors affecting the level of long-term equilibrium. For 
example, savings behaviour, migration, birth rate, access to technology, government 
economic policies and their effects, to list but a few. In further research, it may also be 
worth examining spatial aspects in order to determine the impact on economic results 
of operating in a specific location and a specific community. “Club convergence” 
leads us to less obvious conclusions: the convergence in the new member states is 
faster; in the case of the “old” EU countries we even notice divergence, but the results 
are not conclusive.
Recommendations from the 7th report on economic, social and territorial 
cohesion on directions for EU cohesion policy for the following years seem to 
be accurate (European Commission, 2017). A large portion of funds has been 
invested in infrastructure in new Member States. Now it is time, to focus on less-
infrastructural areas, where the highest EU value-added can be achieved, like social 
inclusion, healthcare, climate change, energy issues, employment skills, research 
and innovation. The cohesion can be boosted by further reforms on improving 
institutional quality, government and administrative capacity, which is indirectly 
linked to cohesion policy tools. Only by combining high absorption of structural 
funds with constantly improving governance and administrative capacity, supported 
with growing contribution of private and national funds’ investments focused on high 
value-added areas, can a desired effect and ongoing convergence be achieved.
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2  Regional Variation in EU Identification in the 
Southern and Eastern Peripheries of Europe:  
Does Cohesion Policy Matter? 
Marcin Dąbrowski, Dominic Stead, Bardia Mashhoodi3 
Abstract: EU cohesion policy, supporting a variety of projects that support regional 
economic development and contribute to betterment of quality of life, can be 
considered as a tool that is contributing to the development of a ‘sense of community’ 
among the EU citizens and shaping the perceptions of the EU. By investing in projects 
across the European territory, the policy has a direct impact on people’s daily lives 
and their environment. Whether and how exactly EU cohesion policy actually affects 
what people think about the EU remains unclear, particularly at the regional level 
where the policy has the most direct and palpable effects. The chapter addresses this 
knowledge gap by exploring the regional variation of EU identification across the 
regions of southern and eastern Europe. This focus is particularly relevant given that 
these countries are the main beneficiaries of EU cohesion policy. At the same time, 
many of these countries are experiencing tumultuous political developments tilting 
the governmental discourse towards sceptical or even hostile positions towards 
European integration, which is not necessarily in line with citizens’ views on the EU. 
The study uses Euro-barometer surveys from 2015 to explore how opinions about EU 
image and attachment to EU vary across southern and eastern Europe. The analysis 
identifies clusters of regions with similar patterns and then tries to relate these clusters 
to the possible role of cohesion policy in the emergence of these regional patterns.  
Keywords: European Union; identification; attachment; regions; citizens; Southern 
Europe; Eastern Europe.
2.1  Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been battered by a series of crises since the late 2000s: 
from the global economic crisis and its European aftershocks, to the Eurozone crisis, 
and from the migration crisis, to the rise of the anti-European populist movements. As 
a result, the tone of public debate on the EU has become more critical and pessimistic, 
denting support for European integration among citizens. Reflecting these shifts, 
3 Department of Urbanism, Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, Delft University of 
Technology, Julianalaan 134, 2628BL Delft, The Netherlands. Correspondence: m.m.dabrowski@tudelft.nl 
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the discourse on cohesion policy has also evolved from an emphasis on the need to 
reduce territorial disparities across the EU towards an emphasis on the improvement 
of daily lives for all EU citizens. 
Shortly after the ‘big bang’ Eastward enlargement of the EU, the then 
Commissioner for Regional Policy, Danuta Hübner, argued that “cohesion policy aims 
to facilitate structural change throughout Europe, and to enable regions to respond 
more effectively to the opportunities generated by the world’s largest single market 
[…] We cannot afford to leave behind even the smallest region. All of them should 
contribute to raising Europe’s growth and competitiveness.” More recently, in the 
post-crisis context, the discourse shifted dramatically, as illustrated by this quote 
from a speech by Commissioner Corina Creţu from 2017: 
[C]ohesion policy is the most visible, the most tangible illustration of a caring Europe. It improves 
the daily lives of all citizens, wherever they live […]. Cohesion policy is the cement that holds 
Europe together, because it cares for individuals, because its aim is to improve everybody’s life.4 
Corina Creţu, 2017
Echoing the discursive shift, the EU increased its efforts to make EU cohesion policy 
more visible to citizens, not least to counteract the declining support for European 
integration and combating the rise of anti-EU populism. For instance, in 2017, the 
Council of the EU adopted conclusions on “making Cohesion policy more effective, 
relevant and visible to our citizens,”5 while the European Parliament urged for greater 
visibility of cohesion policy “to fight against Euroscepticism” and “contribute to 
regaining citizens’ confidence and trust.”6
The actual impact of cohesion policy on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU 
remains unclear and contested. Early research by Duch and Taylor (1997) on this 
topic found that cohesion policy transfers did not translate into increased support 
for European integration, with the poorer regions benefiting from more substantial 
transfers remaining less ‘euro-enthusiastic,’ even if the data for this study predated 
the actual establishment of cohesion policy in 1988. In contrast, later studies painted 
an ambiguous picture. Positive effects of the size of allocation of structural funds on 
public support for the EU were found, albeit mediated by the degree of awareness of 
the EU funding, which in turn was related to the level of education (Osterloh, 2011). 
A more recent study found that there was no direct link between the size of European 
4  Commissioner Corina Creţu’s speech in Molenbeek, Belgium, 6 June 2017: https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/cretu/announcements/speech-commissioner-cretu-
molenbeek_en 
5  “Making Cohesion Policy more effective, relevant and visible to our citizens”, 8463/17, adopted by 
the Council of the EU on 25 May 2017.
6  “Report on Building Blocks for a Post-2020 EU Cohesion Policy”, 2016/2326(INI), European 
Parliament, 24 May 2017. 
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Regional Development Fund allocation and EU support, and that the effect of this 
funding was, at best, conditional upon pre-existing EU identification and education 
levels (Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015).
More importantly, cohesion policy offers support for regional development and 
is, to a large extent, managed and implemented at the regional level, with varying 
sizes of allocation, governance approaches, thematic focus of spending, absorption 
rates and effectiveness. Consequently, one may expect differentiation in the 
impacts of cohesion policy on the citizen’s attitudes vis-à-vis the EU across different 
regional settings. Before one considers whether and how cohesion policy affects EU 
identification, therefore, we need a clearer understanding of the regional dimension 
of that phenomenon, while most studies and surveys on EU identity to date tend to 
focus on the national level. 
Before unpacking EU identification at the regional level, the nature of the concept 
is briefly outlined. Broadly, scholars investigating the notion tend to consider three 
dimensions of EU identification: (i) cognitive; (ii) evaluative; and (iii) affective (for 
a review, see for example Mendez & Bachtler, 2016). The cognitive dimension refers 
to the perception of one’s self as European. The evaluative aspect refers to the more 
‘utilitarian’ dimension of support based on the perceived benefits stemming from 
European integration. Finally, the affective dimension corresponds to the ‘we-feeling,’ 
or feelings of belonging to a (European) community. 
What factors can shape EU identification along those two dimensions? Can EU 
cohesion policy be an important factor? The evaluative dimension of EU identification 
can in fact be related to EU policies that have a direct impact on citizens’ lives. The 
most prominent example of this could indeed be cohesion policy, supporting a variety 
of projects that support regional economic development and contribute to betterment 
of quality of life. Investments in regions, where the project sites are marked with 
banners with EU flags and acknowledgement of EU funding, are perhaps the most 
visible and physical manifestation of benefits that the EU can bring to citizens’ daily 
lives and their immediate living environment. At the same time however, EU cohesion 
policy can be considered as a tool that is contributing to the development of a ‘sense 
of community’ among the EU citizens and thus shaping the affective aspect of EU 
identification. Even so, whether and how exactly EU cohesion policy actually affects 
what people think about the EU remains unclear, particularly at the regional level 
where the policy has the most direct and palpable effects. 
Clearly, cohesion policy is just one among many other EU policies and rules 
that may have an impact on EU identification. A few examples of other EU policies 
and rules are briefly illustrated here. First, the Common Market and its freedom of 
movement of people and labour, which offers unprecedented opportunities for 
mobility, tourism, and improvement of living conditions through working and 
living in another EU country, could potentially have impacts both on the affective 
and evaluative dimensions of EU identification. Second, the Erasmus programme, 
which supports student mobility and gives its beneficiaries often a first experience of 
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learning, socialising, and living in a different European country at a critical formative 
period of life, could have impacts on the affective dimension of EU identification. 
Third, EU regulations related to cellular phone roaming charges within the EU, 
allowing citizens to pay the same rate for mobile telecommunication services across 
the EU as they do in their home country, is a material benefit for citizens that may 
influence the evaluative dimension of identification. 
Meanwhile, the EU’s actions, and developments related to it, may also have 
negative impacts on how the citizens identify with it. Here, the most prominent 
example is the territorially uneven impact of the global economic crisis and the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis and austerity measures in the Eurozone, affecting 
mostly the Southern Member States and especially the less resilient regions within 
them—as was the case in Greece, for instance (Yannis, Dimitris, & Panagiotis, 2014). 
EU image in the areas most affected by these developments, such as Greece, has 
severely deteriorated, as evidenced by the raise of Eurosceptic populist movements 
across European regions (Dijkstra et al. 2019, Smętkowski & Dąbrowski, 2019).
The strength of the influence of many of the above actions on citizens’ identification 
is very likely to be differentiated across the European member states and, critically, 
across territories. It might be expected that cohesion policy could have the most 
impact on what people think about the EU in the less developed regions that receive 
substantial allocations of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), mainly 
concentrated in the Southern and Eastern EU Member States. At the same time, the 
negative effects of the economic post-2008 meltdown and the Eurozone crisis (with 
the subsequent EU-induced austerity measures), as well as of the migration crisis, are 
also felt more in certain regions, depending on their socio-economic situation and 
location on or off the main migration routes from the Middle East or Africa. 
This chapter explores and classifies EU identification at the regional level. In other 
words, it seeks to shed light on how identification varies across the regions of the EU’s 
28 Member States and to identify the patterns in this variation. The study draws on the 
H2020 COHESIFY7 project and uses Eurobarometer surveys as a source of data for the 
analysis.  The typology of regional EU identification produced by this research offers 
a more nuanced view than in most studies on EU identification focusing on national 
level by: (1) investigating, for the first time how citizens view the EU at the regional 
level in a post-crisis context, and (2) by bringing together the two perspectives on EU 
identification, the evaluative (rationalist) perspective and the affective one. Beyond 
this, the typology allows for comparing EU identification patterns across European 
regions. This allows for pondering the extent to which positive identification with 
the EU is predominant in regions that have been the biggest beneficiaries of cohesion 
7  The Horizon 2020 COHESIFY project investigated how EU identification varies across the 
differentiated regional contexts of the 28 EU member states. For more information see www.cohesify.
eu. 
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policy, either in the past or at present. An important caveat is that, in this study, we 
do not carry out statistical analysis on the linkages between the EU identification 
types and EU cohesion policy variables, such as size of allocation, thematic focus of 
spending, or absorption rate. This is an obvious limitation of this research, pointing 
to the need for further research.  
The chapter is divided into four parts. The next part outlines the conceptual 
framework for the research, drawing on the different dimensions of EU identification 
as conceptualised in the literature. Then, the analytical methods used are briefly 
outlined. The subsequent part of the chapter presents the results discusses their 
implications. The chapter closes with concluding observations together with an 
outline of additional research questions that the results open up.
2.2  EU Identification: What Determines it and Why Do We Expect 
Cohesion Policy to Matter?
A range of literature sources provides some clues about the factors that may shape 
identification with the EU among citizens. Some of these may be related to the costs 
and benefits associated with European integration, whereby the winners of this 
process are more likely to view the EU in a positive light than those who lose out from 
this process (Bellucci, Sanders, & Serricchio, 2012; Fligstein, 2008; 2009). Against this 
background, it is not surprising that studies covering the period of late 1990s, when 
cohesion spending was increasing, indicated a positive impact of Structural Funds on 
the positive perceptions of the EU (Brinegar, Jolly, & Kitschelt, 2004; Osterloh, 2011), 
particularly among the direct recipients of funding. Previous research has shown 
that an increase of per capita transfer from the EU to a region by 100 Euro boosts the 
likelihood of one being positive about the EU by approximately 5 to 15% (Osterloh, 
2011). 
 Beyond the size of the allocation of EU funds for a particular territory, another 
factor behind EU identification among citizens are transnational experiences and 
social interactions across borders. Previous research indicates that such interactions 
across borders can positively affect identification with the EU (Bellucci et al., 2012; 
Fligstein, 2009). One can thus assume that EU cohesion policy funding for territorial 
cooperation could be a factor facilitating such transnational experiences and, hence, 
boosting positive views on the EU. This can be particularly relevant in the case of 
cross-border cooperation programmes offering arguably most tangible opportunities 
to interact with the neighbouring region—as opposed to less tangible transnational or 
macro-regional programmes of territorial cooperation covering larger territories.
 Other factors behind EU identification among citizens relate less directly to 
cohesion policy. There are studies that indicate that the strength of pre-existing 
territorial identities at national or sub-national level also affects, either positively 
or negatively, European identification (Bruter, 2009; Chacha, 2013; Duchesne & 
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Frognier, 1995; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Marks, 1999; Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001). 
These identities are deeply rooted in long-standing nation-building, sociological, and 
geopolitical processes that go far beyond the time horizon of cohesion policy (which 
was established in 1988). Another factor, equally deeply rooted in socio-institutional 
legacies of specific territories, is the degree of trust in national political institutions 
that the citizens have. When trust in national institutions is low, then the trust in 
the EU tends to be higher, as it provides alternative—arguably, less corrupt—locus 
of identification to citizens disgruntled by their governments (Bellucci et al., 2012). 
Finally, literature on ‘cognitive mobilisation’ suggests that socio-demographic 
characteristics may also play a role in determining positive identification with the 
EU, with key factors favouring it being higher income, occupational status, and 
educational attainment (Citrin & Sides, 2004; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995; Fligstein, 
2009; Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001). These findings seem to be related to those from 
studies on the Structural Funds impacts indicating that awareness of EU funding is 
related to socio-economic background and translated into support for the EU (Osterloh, 
2011); and that education level plays a mediating role in the effect of EU transfers 
on the perceptions of the European integration project (Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015). 
Thus, citizens in poorer regions, where education levels are relatively low, may be 
less aware of EU funding invested in their surroundings and hence less likely to have 
positive views on the EU.
2.3  Data and Methodology
A typology of EU identification is constructed in this chapter with the focus on Southern 
and Eastern regions of the EU, the main recipients of cohesion policy funding. The 
typology is used to examine whether the amount of regional development funding is 
related to how positive citizens feel about the EU. The research draws on data from 
Standard Eurobarometer surveys from 2015 to describe and compare the differences 
in attitudes to EU identification across Europe. Two sorts of questions from the 
Eurobarometer surveys were used to construct a typology of EU identification. The 
first of these questions relates to public opinions about EU’s image8; the second relates 
to attachment to it9. These two variables correspond well to the two dimensions of EU 
identification: EU image variable, or probing the citizens’ general impression of the 
8  The question about EU image is typically phrased (in the local language) as follows: “In general, 
does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative 
image?”
9  The question about EU attachment is typically phrased (in the local language) as follows: “Please 
tell me how attached you feel to the European Union (very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, 
not at all attached).”
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EU, reflects well the evaluative dimension (How well does the EU work for me? How 
much do I benefit from it?), while the attachment variable, or probing the intensity of 
positive feelings towards the EU, allows for measuring the affective dimension (How 
do I feel towards the EU?). In this study, the cognitive dimension of EU identification 
is not considered, focusing only on the evaluative and affective dimensions.
Figure 1: Dimensions of EU identification and variables used to measure them.
Source: Own elaboration, variables and the related survey questions adapted from Eurobarometer.
Although questions concerning the EU’s image appear regularly in Eurobarometer 
surveys, fewer waves contain questions on attachment to the European Union. For 
the purpose of the typology developed in this study, regionally coded waves of the 
Eurobarometer survey from 2015 were used (see table 1).
Surveys used Variables
Eurobarometer 84.4 November - December 2015 EU image
Eurobarometer 84.3 November 2015 EU image and attachment to the EU
Eurobarometer 84.1 September 2015 EU image and attachment to the EU
Source: Authors
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In order to construct a composite typology of EU identification, hierarchical 
cluster analysis was used to identify groupings of EU image and attachment across 
258 NUTS 2 regions for which data was available. Cluster analysis is a method that 
allows for exploring complex data sets in search for homogenous grouping of objects 
based on multivariate similarity (see for example Gore Jr., 2000). The analysis is widely 
used across various disciplines to build classification systems or typologies. The 
hierarchical method for cluster analysis allows for identifying a hierarchy of nested 
clusters that can be represented graphically in a tree structure. In this particular case, 
a decision was made to identify five clusters, striking a balance between the accuracy 
of clustering and legibility of the typology.  
 As with all research methods, there are certain limitations which need to be 
acknowledged. First, while offering a useful categorisation along the relevant 
variables, the typology is based on inevitably arbitrary decisions that had to be made 
to define the boundaries between the types. This invites caution in interpreting the 
differences between the types. Second, there are limitations stemming from the 
dataset. In Eurobarometer surveys, the number of respondents in particular regions 
may be relatively small, which limits the validity of the data on the regional scale. To 
mitigate this limitation, several waves of Eurobarometer surveys were combined from 
the same year (2015) to increase the sample size and validity. Finally, our analysis 
focuses on a single year, compiling several surveys from 2015, and therefore cannot 
account for change of EU identification in regions over time. It should also be noted 
at this point that some caution is required when interpreting the typology since it is 
not based on extensive statistical analysis over time and does not explore the role of 
other factors shaping EU identification mentioned above, such as education levels or 
socio-economic situation of citizens.
2.4  Results
Five clusters of regions were identified using hierarchical cluster analysis: 
1.1. “Positive on both counts” (positive-attached): Regions in which opinions among 
citizens are higher than average about the image of the EU and attachment to it.
2.1. “Neutral EU image but still attached” (neutral-attached): Regions in which the 
image of the EU is neutral among citizens but attachment to the EU is above 
average.
2.2. “Neutral on both counts” (neutral-neutral): Regions in which the image of the EU 
is moderate (or neutral) among citizens, as is attachment to the EU.
3.1. “Negative image but still attached” (negative-attached): Regions in which the 
image of the EU is predominantly negative among citizens but they nevertheless 
feel some attachment to the EU.
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3.2. “Negative image and half attached” (negative-neutral): Regions in which 
the image of the EU is predominantly negative among citizens and feelings of 
attachment are neutral. 
The main characteristics of these clusters are summarised in Table 2. Figure 3 shows 
the distribution of the types across the EU, while Figure 4 indicates the Southern and 
Eastern European regions that are the focus of this chapter.
Table 2: Characteristics of the five types of regions according to citizens’ opinions on the image of 
the EU and attachment to it.
Cluster 1.1 Cluster 2.1 Cluster 2.2 Cluster 3.1 Cluster 3.2
“Positive on 
both counts” 
(positive-
attached
“Neutral EU 
image but 
still attached” 
(neutral-
attached)
“Neutral on 
both counts” 
(neutral-
neutral)
“Negative 
image but 
still attached” 
(negative-
attached)
“Negative 
image and 
half attached” 
(negative-
neutral)
Number of regions 35 86 57 56 24
Proportion of regions 13.6% 33.3% 22% 22% 9%
Image of the EU among citizens
% positive 47% 35% 35% 23% 23%
% neutral 39% 41% 41% 37% 37%
% negative 9% 21% 21% 36% 36%
Citizens’ attachment to EU
% attached 63% 55% 42% 40% 30%
% neutral 24% 31% 37% 34% 41%
% unattached 9% 10% 17% 22% 26%
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Eurobarometer data.
2.5  Discussion
The first striking observation from the typology is that there are no regions with a 
predominantly negative image of the EU and no attachment to the EU. Thus, citizens 
tend to be attached to or at least neutral towards the EU even if they disapprove 
of what it does. In other words, the affective aspects of EU identification are more 
deeply rooted and stronger than the utilitarian aspects. As illustrated in figures 5 
and 6, among Southern and Eastern European regions the types with more positive
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Figure 3: EU identification typology map - EU28.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Eurobarometer data.
EU identification, particularly in terms of EU image, tend to be predominant, as 
compared to the all EU28 regions. It is also striking, that the positive-positive type 
corresponds to as much as 26% of Southern and Eastern regions, as compared to 14% 
for the whole EU. Conversely, there are fewer regions in the types with predominantly 
negative EU image (negative-neutral and negative-attached) in Southern and Eastern 
Europe as compared to EU28.
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Figure 4: EU identification typology – Southern and Eastern European regions (focus of the analysis).
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Eurobarometer data.
Looking at the Southern member states (i.e. the countries that previously benefited 
from substantial allocations of EU Cohesion funds but have seen the amount of 
funding decline), there appears to be divergence between the regions of Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal, on the one hand, and the Greek regions and Cyprus, on the other hand. 
In the first group of countries, most regions belong to the neutral-attached, neutral-
neutral, or positive-attached types. The positive-attached type can be found in the 
Lisbon region in Portugal, and Castilla y Leon, Cantabria and the Balearic Islands in 
Spain. None of these regions are or were recently within a category of lagging regions 
receiving the highest allocations of EU Cohesion funding (i.e. none of them are within 
the ‘Less developed regions’ objective in 2014-2020 period, or the ‘Convergence’ 
objective in 2007-2013). The Italian and Spanish regions that have, or continue
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Figure 5: Share of types of regional EU identification in the EU as a whole.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Eurobarometer data.
Figure 6: Share of types of regional EU identification in the Southern and Eastern European regions.
Source: own elaboration on the basis of Eurobarometer data.
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to benefit from substantial funding under ‘Less developed regions/Convergence’ 
objective (e.g. Calabria and Sicily or Extremadura and Andalusia) remain either in 
the neutral-attached or neutral-neutral category. This means that EU identification in 
its evaluative dimension remains neutral, but varies from neutral to positive in the 
affective dimension. Therefore, it seems that EU cohesion policy has not generated 
much ‘love’ for the EU in the regions in which it has supported investment over many 
years and that other factors must be at play in determining citizens’ views on the EU. 
 In the case of Greece, a country that has been a long-standing beneficiary of EU 
cohesion policy, with most of its regions falling under the ‘Less developed regions/
Convergence’ objective, it is striking that EU identification is predominantly negative 
(only Western Macedonia remains neutral-attached, Crete and Thessaly negative-
attached, and the majority of regions negative-neutral,). The same applies to Cyprus, 
which is in the negative-neutral cluster. One can speculate that in the case of these 
two countries, negative EU identification may have little to do with cohesion policy. 
In fact, it most likely deteriorated in recent years due to the particularly acute effects 
of the economic crisis starting in 2008, the Eurozone tensions, and the EU-imposed 
austerity measures, which substantially impoverished the society and led to political 
and social unrest. Positive type regions cluster in some of the Eastern member states 
that currently benefit from an enormous inflow of EU funding, such as Poland and 
Romania. These two countries stand out amongst the Eastern EU Member States, by 
having the most regions in the positive-attached category. This seems to confirm that 
there is a relationship between the importance of EU cohesion funding for a given 
region, and a more positive outlook on the EU among its citizens. That being said, 
many of the regions that have benefited from substantial support from the EU cohesion 
policy, qualified under Convergence/Less developed or Phasing-out /Transition 
objectives, are not necessarily characterised by more positive EU identification. In 
countries like the Czech Republic, there is a greater diversity of types, with Northwest 
and Moravia-Silesia characterised by the most negative EU identification (negative-
neutral), and the rest of the regions split between neutral-neutral type, where 
predominantly the image of the EU is neither good nor bad and people tend to be 
lukewarm in terms of their attachment to the EU, and negative-attached type, where 
negative views on the EU prevail, but citizens nonetheless tend to be attached to the 
European integration project. 
 Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the relationships between the size of cohesion funds 
allocation for a given region and its type with respect to EU identification. This 
relationship is not straightforward. However, some interesting observations can 
be made. Regions that are classified as positive-attached in the EU identification 
typology have a relatively high average size of allocation per capita in the 2007-2013 
period—much higher than the neutral-attached and neutral-neutral, let alone negative-
neutral. What is puzzling is that the average allocation is even higher in regions in the 
negative-neutral type. Considering the average size of allocation as a ratio of regional 
GDP, the relationship between positive EU identification and the amount of funding 
    39Regional Variation in EU Identification in the Southern  and Eastern Peripheries of Europe
flowing into a given region is clearer. Regions in the positive-attached and neutral-
attached categories have the highest allocations in relation to their GDP, respectively 
14.63% and 13.99%, which contrasts with 11.96% for the negative-neutral type and 
more significantly with 3.5% in the negative-attached type. 
Figure 7: Allocation of EU Cohesion funding per capita (Euro) in Southern and Eastern European 
regions.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from DG Region and Eurobarometer.
Figure 8: Allocation of EU Cohesion funding as a share (%) of regional GDP in Southern and Eastern 
European regions.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from DG Region and Eurobarometer.
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The most striking observation, perhaps, concerns the relationship between 
eligibility for EU cohesion policy, distinguishing between less developed regions, 
transition regions, and more developed regions, which is based mainly on GDP per 
capita in relation to EU average (see figures 9,10, 11). In fact, it is clear, as indicated 
in figures 9 and 10, that the positive-attached type is much more prominent among 
less developed regions (36%), compared to more developed regions (22%). The 
regions with a predominantly negative profile of EU identification (negative-neutral 
and negative-attached) add up to 7% of less developed regions, as compared to 28% 
of more developed regions. All in all, this seems to indicate that should there be a 
relationship between the intensity of EU cohesion policy’s support for regions and 
EU identification, it is in the less developed regions, where most of EU funding is 
allocated. This relationship, however, would need to be explored in further research 
to shed more light on causality.
Figure 9: Distribution of EU identification types across the ‘Less Developed’ Southern and Eastern 
European regions.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from DG Region and Eurobarometer.
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Figure 10: Distribution of EU identification types across the ‘More Developed’ Southern and Eastern 
European regions.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from DG Region and Eurobarometer.
Figure 11: Distribution of EU identification types across ‘Transition’ Southern and Eastern European 
regions.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from DG Region and Eurobarometer.
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 Finally, the typology map (Figure 4) shows that there is a large variation in EU 
identification across border regions. In some border regions, citizens do not appear 
particularly positive about, or attached to, the EU, despite the fact that one could 
expect that the experience of interacting with countries across the border would 
strengthen EU identification. Many of the border regions—such as the Greek Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace (bordering Bulgaria and Turkey) or the aforementioned Czech 
regions (Northwest, bordering Germany; and Moravia-Silesia bordering Poland and 
Slovakia)—fall under the negative-neutral category. This seems to put into question 
the claim that interactions across borders or transnational experience favour more 
positive attitudes towards the EU, as indicated in the literature. This may cast doubts 
on the claims on the positive impacts of territorial cooperation as part of EU cohesion 
policy on EU identification.
2.6  Conclusion
The typology presented in this study is an attempt to shed more light on the variation 
of EU identification at the regional level. Providing more clarity on the patterns of 
the evaluative and affective dimensions of EU identification across the extremely 
differentiated regions in Southern and Eastern European countries is a crucial first 
step towards understanding of the role of cohesion policy in shaping those patterns, 
which will require more in-depth statistical analysis probing of the determinants of 
the regional identification types. 
 The evidence in this study suggests that strong EU cohesion policy support in 
Eastern European regions seems to be related to positive EU identification, such as 
in Polish or Romanian regions. However, this is not always the case in the Southern 
Member States. In the south, a strong differentiation of regional types can be observed. 
In economically-lagging regions, which have benefitted from strong cohesion policy 
support, citizens are often less positive about the EU.  The same applies to the Czech 
Republic, whose regions are particularly polarized in terms of EU identification, 
even though most of them are major beneficiaries of cohesion policy. These findings 
indicate that EU funding does not always tie into citizens’ EU identification, which in 
turn suggests that other factors may be more important (e.g. socio-economic factors). 
This is particularly striking in the case of Greece, engulfed in economic crisis and 
coerced into an extremely controversial austerity programme by the EU, eroding 
positive identification despite substantial cohesion funding allocations to Greek 
regions. 
 The ostensibly weak relationship between EU funding and EU identification 
requires further study. At the same time, it points to several challenges for cohesion 
policy. In some regions, cohesion policy does not appear to have much impact on EU 
identification, or perhaps this impact is offset by other factors. This may be due to the 
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policy making little difference on the lives of the citizens of those regions and/or the 
result of EU investment not being communicated well enough. 
 The observations in this study open up new avenues for further investigation 
into the determinants of the spatial patterns of EU identification across the European 
territory. What is the role of EU cohesion policy in this? Is it relevant or perhaps other 
policy or territorial, socio-economic or institutional factors are at play (e.g. size of 
allocation of EU funds, focus of spending on infrastructure or human resources, or 
the level of education of citizens)? Moreover, even in regions with a predominantly 
negative image of the EU, most citizens tend to identify with the EU or be neutral 
towards it. This dichotomy needs further investigation in future case study research, 
with particular attention to the cohesion policy support as a factor in shaping those 
perceptions. Finally, the limitation of this work is its focus on data spanning one 
year,  thus future research could shed more light on the regional dimension of EU 
identification by comparing results from Eurobarometer surveys over the span of 
several years, providing more details about changing attitudes towards the EU over 
time. 
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3  Quality of Life Convergence in the EU: Do Eastern 
and Southern European States Lag Behind?
Panagiotis Liargovas and Stavroula Kratimenou10
Αbstract: Currently, there is renewed interest for convergence process in the EU. 
According to the EU Five Presidents’ Report, convergence towards more resilient 
economic and social structures in Member States is an essential element for the 
successful performance of EMU in the long run. The purpose of this paper is twofold: 
First, to investigate convergence between the countries of the European Union (EU-
28), as well as the evolution of inequalities in the period 1990 to 2015, with more 
emphasis in Eastern and Southern Europe. Second, to use Quality of Life indicators in 
the empirical analysis. It measures convergence or divergence of the 28 EU member-
countries using two complementary approaches, the first based on coefficient of 
variation and the second based on the values of a composite index of Quality of Life 
for each EU Member-State. This exercise will be useful in drawing lessons from the 
successes and failures of cohesion policy in the Eastern, South Eastern, and Southern 
periphery. It is also a useful tool for EU policy-makers. 
Keywords: Disparities, Quality of Life Indices, Convergence 
3.1  Introduction
The empirical assessment of convergence is controversial. Most of the controversy 
has centred on the level of convergence—i.e. between regions or between countries. 
In both cases, the more rigorous analyses of convergence have tended to focus on 
economic phenomena, neglecting social and quality of life phenomena. However, 
comparisons of quality of life between nations have received special attention, 
because of their all-inclusive nature, which focuses on region-specific amenities. The 
contention is that individual well being, depends upon quality of life factors such as 
infrastructure, environmental quality, healthcare, crime rates and public services, as 
well as the more traditional pecuniary factors such as money income and the prices 
of goods, which determine cost of living. 
 Only a few studies have analysed the convergence of countries in terms of a 
set of quality-of-life variables, such as Giannias, Liargovas, & Manolas, (1999) for 
Europe; Hobijn & Franses, (2001) and Mazumdar (2003) in a wider international 
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Abstract: In the concept of the aesthetic formation of knowledge and its as soon 
as possible and success-oriented application, insights and profits without the 
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framework; E O’Leary  (2001) for Ireland; Marchante, Ortega and Sánchez  (2006) for 
Spain; Liargovas and Fotopoulos (2008) for Greece; Royuela and García (2015) for 
Colombia, and Royuela and Artís   (2006) for Barcelona. Finally, the local scope is 
much less analysed in the literature: O’Donoghue, (2000) analyses the convergence 
of employment structures in the British urban system; Royuela and Artís (2006) for 
Barcelona, and Pack (2004) studies the determinants of regional growth and its 
determinants jointly with the existence of convergence across US Metropolitan areas. 
 The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to investigate convergence between 
the countries of the European Union (EU-28), as well as the evolution of inequalities 
in the period between 1990 to 2015, with more emphasis on Eastern and Southern 
Europe. Second, to use Quality of Life indicators in our empirical analysis. We 
measure real convergence or divergence of the 28 EU member countries using two 
complementary approaches, the first based on coefficient of variation and the second 
based on the values of a composite index of Quality of Life for each EU member-state. 
Our proposed methodology has three main advantages: Firstly, it focuses on real 
convergence, which is convergence beyond per capita income that takes into account 
various aspects of the quality of life. Secondly, it uses a simple and robust measure 
of convergence, the coefficient of variation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
use sophisticated methodologies of convergence (e.g. Bunyaratavej & Hahn, 2005). 
Rather, we try to apply a simple method of convergence on Quality of Life indices. 
Finally, we construct a composite Quality of Life index to observe disparities between 
EU countries and their evolution over time. Based on these results, country rankings 
can be determined. This exercise allows us to make an assessment of the effectiveness 
of cohesion policy in the Eastern, South Eastern and Southern periphery. Policy 
makers have shown a great concern for the variations in the economic and social 
performance of the different EU Member States in recent years. 
The preamble of the Treaty of Rome calls for a reduction of the “differences existing 
between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions”, while 
Article 2 of the Treaty refers to the goal of “harmonious development, of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion”.11 With respect to regional equality 
and convergence, the EU cohesion policy is a key policy area. This policy is the second 
biggest policy field in the EU and also represents a significant portion of the budget. 
Cohesion and structural funds comprise almost a third of the total EU budget. In the 
current programme period of 2014–2020, budget allocation was 351.8 billion euros. 
 The second section of this study discusses the measures of convergence and 
investigates the evolution of relative inequalities between countries within the 
identified convergence or divergence process. The third section presents the empirical 
results and discusses some possible explanations behind observed patterns. A final 
section offers some conclusions.
11  See  https://ec.europa.eu/romania/sites/romania/files/tratatul_de_la_roma.pdf 
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3.2  The Concept of Quality of Life: Selecting Indicators
Giving a precise definition of the concept of Quality of Life is far from easy. The notion 
is highly intuitive for the population at large. Yet, from a scientific standpoint, it 
proves extremely difficult to detail in essence. The problem is further complicated 
when considering that Quality of Life is closely linked to other related concepts, such 
as standard of living, or wellbeing. By way of an initial approach, it can be said that 
Quality of Life is the substantive element, whilst standard of living is the situation in 
which Quality of Life finds itself at a given moment; wellbeing is the consequence of 
the two previously mentioned concepts. Thus, Quality of Life may be deemed as stock, 
while standard of living and wellbeing are fluxes that require a complex measuring 
process. Although no exact definition is required for the purpose of the present study, 
it does seem appropriate to choose a useful definition that can bring us as close as 
possible to the concept. In this vein, and as a result of the research conducted by 
authors of this present work, we adopt the following definition:
Quality of life is the result of complex interactions of a set of objective and subjective factors: 
objective factors refer to external conditions of an economic, sociopolitical, environmental, and 
cultural nature, while subjective factors refer to individuals’ perception of their own life and the 
satisfaction reached in its various dimensions.
 (Somarriba, 2008)
The above definition refers to both objective and subjective factors as integral parts 
of the concept under scrutiny. Choosing such a definition with the goal of measuring 
the concept of Quality of Life thus entails determining what these factors are, and 
selecting and constructing a system of indicators which serve to gauge Quality of Life 
in the various EU countries from a time-related perspective.
Our concept of Quality of Life quality of life is similar to the one found in European 
Surveys, carried out every four years. These surveys examine both the objective 
circumstances of European citizens’ lives and how they feel about those circumstances 
and their lives in general. They look at a range of issues, such as employment, income, 
education (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2000), housing, family, health and work-life balance 
(Von Dem Knesebeck et al., 2007). They also look at subjective topics, such as people’s 
levels of happiness, how satisfied they are with their lives, and how they perceive 
the quality of their societies. Our own concept of Quality of Life quality distinguishes 
between five main levels: 1) Population Density; 2) Economy and Development; 3) 
Services; 4) Natural and Urban Environment, and 5) Infrastructure, which are delineated 
in the following subsections. Data were taken from World Bank.12
12  See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/462341468766204683/World-development-
indicators-2000 
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3.2.1  Population Density
Population density is defined as the number of people per unit area (usually per 
square kilometre) and occasionally refers to the geographical boundaries of a city, 
a country, or the entire globe. The importance of this indicator is significant because 
knowledge of the population density in a region and the monitoring of its evolution 
contribute significantly to various sectors. As the population density increases, so do 
the environmental pressures and the quality of life of the overall population of the 
study area. Among other things, subsequent to the increase of population density is the 
increase in requirements for logistics infrastructure (schools, hospitals, residences… 
etc.), the need for infrastructure (electricity, water and telecommunications networks), 
increased traffic load and intensity, lack of parking space, greater and more intensive 
need for cleanliness and care to reduce pollutants of all kinds, and the need for new 
jobs (increasing unemployment rates). The indicator is an indirect measurement of 
the environmental pressure and includes the exploitation of natural resources as well 
as the pollution of air and water.
3.2.2  Economy & Development
Economic growth is central and essential for a country’s economic development. 
As the national income grows, people benefit. A country’s economic development 
undoubtedly leads to the improvement of its quality of life and people are more 
satisfied in their everyday-lives. Since there is no formula for stimulating economic 
growth, data can help policymakers further understand their country’s economic 
situation to guide any work towards improvement. In terms of economic growth, we 
include indices that reflect economic growth, equity, consumption, employment, 
savings, government spending, imports/exports. In this study, we focus on Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, long-term unemployment, final consumption 
expenditure, and electric power consumption (kWh per capita).
3.2.3  GDP Per Capita
Socio-economic indicators are undoubtedly the focus of interest in any study on quality 
of life. It helps identify the possibilities that individuals have in order to improve 
their standard of living. In general, the main socio-economic indicators include 
income, housing, employment and consumption. Of these, income is an important 
factor in the quality of life, because it determines the personal financial situation. 
Income per capita is the average income for each resident, regardless of his/her/their 
participation in the production process. The level of income per capita is the most 
important criterion for the standard of people’s living. The main index that reflects 
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the income situation of residents of an area, and subsequently used in this study, is 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP). GDP per capita is the sum of the value of the 
final products, produced by society in a given time. It includes all the incomes of the 
spatial unit of measurement, even of foreigners, but excludes the salaries and profits 
earned by citizens from sources outside the specified time unit. The advantage of GDP 
is that includes the entire economic activity for the area being studied. The limitations 
of the indicator, on the contrary, are its complexity and that it is based on statistical 
data, which must be reliable. Even so, this is often underestimated by developing 
countries, due to self-consumption, domestic work and informal economy trends. It 
also gives a rough account of the level of development of a country in matters relating 
to the distribution of wealth, but also of individual characteristics such as education, 
health… etc.
3.2.4  Long-Term Unemployment
The existence of unemployment corresponds with reduced initial resources and, 
consequently, to the deterioration of the quality of life. Accurate plotting of the 
importance of employment long-term unemployment rates are used. Long-term 
unemployment refers to the number of people with continuous unemployment for 
a period of one year or more, expressed as a percentage of the total unemployed. 
The long-term unemployment rate is an index showing the economic level and the 
quality of life within a country. Long-term unemployment is widely considered to be 
the basic cause of poverty. Moreover, in times of prolonged recession, the social cost 
of unemployment is further magnified by increasing crime and violence, the crisis of 
institutions, and the general decline of social cohesion. The deprivation of the right 
to work undermines confidence in the state and encourages indifference to political 
and social events. Unemployment has always been the most important problem in 
modern economies of capitalist systems. Even if an economy rebounds, because 
of GDP, it does not meet its citizens’ demands, where there is a high proportion of 
unemployed, especially in the youth population. This is because unemployment has 
serious repercussions and effects on those who are unemployed and have no source 
of income. In addition, unemployment means a loss of productive labour, the most 
important factor in a modern economy, which means a further reduction in demand, 
and therefore the variety of products produced and offered in an economy.
3.2.5  Household Consumption Expenditure per Capita & Electric Power Consumption
For the determination of consumer expenditure, we use final household consumption 
expenditure (per capita) and the electric power consumption (kWh per capita) 
as indicators. Final consumption expenditure is the market value of all goods and 
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services, including durable products (such as cars, washing machines, and home 
computers), purchased by households.
3.2.6  Services
A person’s quality of life depends on available services that exist in each country 
between EU-28, which meet basic needs. It should be noted however, that the range 
of services among the countries of the European Union is not homogeneous. There 
are significant differences between them. It is appropriate to use a large number of 
indicators to describe the services of an area. The most important areas in this respect 
are the sector of health, education, transport, communications, security, and culture.
3.2.7  Health
Health is an essential element of the quality of life of a country’s citizens. Poor 
health can affect the overall progress of society, as well as the subjective wellbeing 
of individuals. Improving health is vital for the Millennium Development Goals13 and 
the public sector is a major provider of healthcare in developing countries. Sanitary 
protection and medical care are vital inputs to ensure the health of residents of a 
country. With the main goal of reducing inequality, many countries have focused 
on primary healthcare, including immunization, sanitation, access to safe drinking 
water, and safe motherhood initiatives. In the present work, the indices that are used 
to carry out the conclusions in the health sector are: 
The first index is (a) Life Expectancy. Life expectancy is the number of years a 
person is expected to live, starting from birth (life expectancy at birth). A widely used 
index of population health, life expectancy measures the quantity rather than quality 
of life. The significance of the index: Life expectancy at birth reflects the overall 
mortality rate of the population. It summarizes the evolution of mortality among all 
age groups - children and adolescents, adults and the elderly. In addition, the data on 
healthy life years—or life expectancy without disabilities—indicates the number of 
years that a person of a certain age is expected to live without disabilities. The Healthy 
Life Year Index is at the heart of the European Structural Indicators, as its importance 
is recognized in the Treaty of Lisbon. The index is used to monitor health as a factor 
of productivity/economy, introducing the concept of quality of life, measuring the 
13  The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty 
rates to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target 
date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading 
development institutions. See https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
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employability of older workers, as well as monitoring the progress made in terms of 
quality and sustainability of healthcare and access to it. The second index is (b) the 
number of doctors per 1000 physicians (per 1,000 people). This includes general and 
qualified doctors, and a mortality rate under five (5) years  (per 1,000 live births), 
which shows the probability that in 1,000 births, a new-born baby will die before the 
age of five.
3.2.8  Education
In all economies, education plays a vital role in the progress of citizens’ lives. 
Education levels may determine the profession of each person. People with limited 
capabilities and skills are often excluded from a wide range of jobs, sometimes 
missing opportunities to achieve remarkable goals within society. Such citizens may 
also have fewer prospects for economic prosperity. In Europe, education indices 
that are important for quality of life are: the educational level of the population, the 
number of people enrolled in primary and secondary education, the number of early 
school dropouts, self-estimation, as well as lifelong learning. Education is one of the 
most powerful means to reduce poverty and inequality between countries. It sets the 
foundations for sustainable economic growth. 
The indices used in this survey on the education sector are: (a) the percentage of 
primary school enrolment, irrespective of age, expressed as a percentage of the total 
population. This indicator may be over 100% due to the inclusion of primary over-
aged or under-aged pupils in primary education, given their early or late entry into 
the primary education system. Second,  (b) the percentage of secondary education 
school enrolment, which corresponds to the total enrolment in secondary education, 
irrespective of age, and expressed as the percentage of the total population from the 
official age of the secondary school education. This index may also exceed 100% due 
to the inclusion of over-aged or under-aged students in secondary education. 
3.2.9  Natural & Urban Environment
Environmental protection has been very important on the European agenda over 
the last decades. The overwhelming majority of European citizens believe that 
environmental protection is imperative with significant impact on people’s quality 
of life. Exposure to air, noise pollution, and water pollution can have a direct impact 
on the health of citizens and the economic wellbeing of communities. Environmental 
indicators are very important for assessing the quality of life not only in Europe, but 
also in the rest of the world. In most studies, environmental indices determine the 
amount of environmental damage done by factors such as pollution, CO2 emissions… 
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etc. Environmental indices also include quantitative surveys on the quality of open 
land, water areas, and indicators associated with the climate. 
In this paper the indices used are: First, (a) Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (metric 
tonnes per capita). It is an index that measures carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion and cement production. CO2 is now known as greenhouse gas. CO2 
emission comes from human activity, ultimately creating a phenomenon known as 
climate change, i.e. the long-term alteration in earth’s climate and weather patterns. 
Nowadays, a great deal of effort is being made to reduce global CO2 emissions. Carbon 
footprint measurement is a common practice for many organizations worldwide and 
is usually accompanied by a specific climate change strategy. Second, (b) the index 
that reflects forest area (% of land area) refers to tree clusters, located in urban parks 
or gardens, with the exception of those trees belonging to agricultural production 
systems (for example, fruit plantations and agro-forestry systems).
3.2.10  Infrastructure
Infrastructure helps the success of production and agricultural activities. Investment 
in areas such as water, sanitation, energy, housing, and transport help reduce poverty. 
New electronic and communication technologies also promote growth, improve 
health services, extend learning opportunities, and support social and cultural 
developments. Information is an indispensable element for access to physical and 
intangible resources that belong to the infrastructure sector. The index used involve 
cellular mobile telephone subscriptions/devices per 100 people, as well as the number 
of Internet users per 100 people. Mobile-phone subscriptions refer to the number of 
subscriptions to public cellular network services that provide access to the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) using cellular technology. The index includes 
the number of subscription contracts and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. 
lines used within three months). The index applies to all mobile subscriptions that 
offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, 
subscriptions to public mobile data services, private flip-flop mobile telephony, Tele-
text, radiotelephone, and telemetry services. This index is calculated as the number 
of mobile-phone subscriptions divided by the population and multiplied by 100.
Another index is the number of Internet users per 100 people. Over the last 
decade, the Internet has changed the way people work, retrieve information, and 
communicate. Today there is hardly an aspect of human life not mediated by the 
flow of available information on the hundreds of millions of websites that make up 
the internet, and of course its affordance to keep people in touch with one another 
through technologies such as e-mail (Henderson, 2001). The Internet has the ability to 
connect people to each other, simplify their lives, and make it easier in many ways. So 
at the dawn of the 21st century, it plays an important role in the perception of people’s 
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quality of life. According to the World Bank,14 Internet users are made up of people 
who have access to the Internet. Analysing the data from the World Bank shows 
that in 1990, the number of Internet users was insignificant. For example, although 
Sweden occupies first place in the quality of life Index, the percentage of online users 
was just 0.5841 in 1990 (see Table 3).
Table 1: Indices Quality Of Life.
Index Source
Population density (people per sq. km of land area) World Bank Group 2000
GDP per capita (current US$) World Bank Group 2000
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) World Bank Group 2000
Long-term unemployment World Bank Group 2000
Household final consumption expenditure per capita 
(constant 2005 US$)
World Bank Group 2000
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1.000 live births) World Bank Group 2000
Physicians (per 1.000 people) World Bank Group 2000
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank Group 2000
School enrolment, primary (% gross) World Bank Group 2000
School enrolment, secondary (% gross) World Bank Group 2000
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank Group 2000
Forest area (% of land area) World Bank Group 2000
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions World Bank Group 2000
Internet users (per 100 people) World Bank Group 2000
Source: Own elaboration
14  See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/462341468766204683/World-development-
indicators-2000 
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3.3  Measuring Convergence 
In this research the evolution of inequalities between EU-28 is explored using 
two different approaches. First, the use of fourteen different variables related to a 
country’s general socio-economic situation, health, education, and services are 
utilized. The analysis is based on six different time periods 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010, and 2015. The variables included in the analysis refer to the 28 countries of 
the EU, namely: The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Malta, Portugal, 
Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. We calculate for each variable the 
time difference between the EU-28. The exact form of the modulation factor is as 
follows: 
C.V =
i=1
i=n
å ( iX - X 2)
N
X
Xi is the value of each variable; X is the average of the values  of the variable; n is 
the number of countries (i.e. EU-28), and N is the number of observations. For each 
time period, and for each variable, a value of coefficient of variation is determined, 
which shows the evolution of the relative degree of inequality between the EU-28 
countries. Reducing inequalities between countries occurs when the modulation 
factor is diminishing over time. When the coefficient of variation of all, or most of, the 
variables examined is decreasing, the result reveals that there is convergence between 
EU-28 countries. The coefficient of variation for the variables examined are shown in 
Table 2, while their evolution over time is shown in Figure 2.15 Figures 3 and 4 show 
the coefficient of variation for the same period, for the sub-group of Eurozone (EU-19) 
and PIIGSC (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Cyprus).
 The problem with the above-mentioned classical approach to the quantification 
of inequalities between the EU-28 and EU-19 countries, is that it does not lead to 
conclusions if a significant part of the variables examined point in one direction 
(e.g. convergence) and the balance to another (e.g. deviation). For this reason, the 
empirical analysis at hand calculates and supports the conclusions on the average 
coefficient of differentiation of all variables (see Table 2).
15  This method has been used by Liargovas, G.Manolas, D.Giannias (1999).
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Table 2: Volatility indices for EU-28 member states.
Volatility Indices EU-28 VOLATILITY
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Population density (people per 
sq. km of land area)
1.3737 1.3399 1.3344 1.3715 1.3787 1.4122
CO2 emissions (metric tons per 
capita)
0.4889 0.4041 0.4077 0.4589 0.4502 0.4729
Long-term unemployment 0.3909 0.2776 0.3651 0.3169 0.3040 0.2786
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1.000 live births)
0.4771 0.5754 0.5960 0.5611 0.4945 0.4761
Physicians (per 1.000 people) 0.2573 0.2209 0.2229 0.2137 0.2335 0.2539
Mobile cellular telephone 
subscriptions
1.9620 1.2492 0.4743 0.1627 0.1466 0.1251
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years)
0.0362 0.0468 0.0394 0.0398 0.0371 0.0355
Internet users (per 100 people 2.1187 1.3998 0.6442 0.3746 0.2074 0.1665
Household final consumption 
expenditure per capita (constant 
2005 US$
0.6072 0.6260 0.6025 0.5471 0.5205 0.4512
GDP per capita (current US$) 0.7837 0.7991 0.7388 0.6926 0.6600 0.6596
Electric power consumption 
(kWh per capita
0.5923 0.6318 0.6099 0.5472 0.5460 0.4886
School enrolment, primary (% 
gross)
0.0856 0.0676 0.0531 0.0449 0.0421 0.0535
School enrolment, secondary 
(% gross)
0.1461 0.1756 0.1696 0.0898 0.0885 0.1570
Forest area (% of land area) 0.5430 0.5349 0.5278 0.5181 0.5108 0.5010
Coefficient of Variation (CV) 0.7045 0.5963 0.4847 0.4242 0.4014 0.3951
Source: own calculations
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Figure 4. Average Volatility Indices 1995-2015 –various country groups 
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Related to the concept of convergence is the issue of disparities between EU countries 
and their evolution over time. The question of the temporal evolution of inequalities is 
investigated by country-ranking tables, based on the quality of life index. The quality 
of life index takes the following form:
Where,
αki   = the kth indicator of country i
wk = the weights for the k indicator
N = the number of indcators considered
m = the number of countries being examined
The weights wk can equal 1/N or be assigned a theoretically using principal component 
or survey results. It is worth pointing out that, in this investigation, the use of weights 
of individual variables has not been included with appropriate shaped questionnaires. 
Even so, it could be the subject of a future research. As is commonly established, 
people’s needs and priorities have changed in recent years. As so, the specific weight 
of individual indicators may not remain stable, but change over the period of two 
decades. Likewise, this may be an element of the utmost importance for the quality of 
life in Southern European countries, which does not equally apply to improving the 
quality of life in Northern European countries due to the diversity of their needs. The 
quality of life index in a country is the middle value of the modified (scaled) variables. 
The modified value of a variable X, X * is between 0-100 and is defined as follows: 
X * = 100 (X-Xmin) / (Xmax-Xmin)
Where X is the value of the variables, and Xmin and Xmax are the minimum  and 
maximum values respectively. X * is the modified value of the variable, only for 
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variables that are positively related to the quality of life and X * = 100- [100 (X-Xmin) 
/ (Xmax-Xmin)]  for variables that are negatively related to the quality of life index 
(e.g. long-term unemployment, carbon dioxide emissions, population density, and 
mortality below 5 years). Results appear in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3: Indices of Living Standards: Scaled index rating for the EU-28.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Sweden 1 1 1 2 1 1
Finland 2 2 3 1 2 2
Austria 3 5 5 5 4 4
Denmark 4 3 7 4 5 5
France 5 6 10 9 8 8
Netherlands 6 7 4 6 7 10
Germany 7 10 12 12 11 9
Belgium 8 9 8 13 13 6
Luxembourg 9 4 6 3 3 3
Italy 10 12 9 10 10 11
Spain 11 13 2 7 6 7
U.K 12 14 13 8 22 23
Latvia 13 27 26 22 20 20
Greece 14 15 18 15 12 18
Lithuania 15 16 21 20 16 16
Estonia 16 22 17 17 17 14
Czech Republic 17 17 19 19 15 17
Portugal 18 11 11 14 14 21
Ireland 19 18 14 11 9 12
Slovenia 20 19 15 18 19 15
Slovakia 21 23 22 23 24 24
Cyprus 22 8 16 16 18 22
Croatia 23 20 20 24 25 26
Bulgaria 24 26 27 27 26 27
Malta 25 21 24 25 27 19
Hungary 26 24 23 21 23 25
Poland 27 25 25 26 21 21
Romania 28 28 28 28 28 28
Source: own calculations
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Table 4: Countries with a higher, equal or lower Life Quality Index (ascending classification) EU-28.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Countries with 
QOL > Average
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark
Sweden Sweden Sweden Ireland Ireland Sweden
United 
Kingdom
France United 
Kingdom
Sweden Sweden France
France Luxembourg France United 
Kingdom
France Luxembourg
Luxembourg Belgium Luxembourg France Luxembourg Belgium
Belgium Austria Belgium Luxembourg Belgium Austria
Austria Finland Austria Belgium Austria Finland
Finland Italy Finland Austria Finland Italy
Italy Spain Italy Finland Italy Spain
Spain Cyprus Spain Italy Spain  
Latvia Portugal Portugal Spain Greece  
      Portugal Portugal  
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Countries with 
QOL =Average
Greece United 
Kingdom
Ireland Greece   Ireland
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Countries with 
QOL <Average
Ireland Ireland Slovenia Slovenia United 
Kingdom
United 
Kingdom
Slovenia Slovenia Czech Republic Czech Republic Slovenia Slovenia
Czech Republic Czech Republic Greece Cyprus Czech Republic Czech 
Republic
Cyprus Greece Cyprus Estonia Cyprus Greece
Estonia Estonia Estonia Poland Estonia Cyprus
Poland Poland Poland Lithuania Poland Estonia
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Slovakia Lithuania Poland
Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Malta Slovakia Lithuania
Malta Malta Malta Hungary Malta Slovakia
Portugal Hungary Portugal Croatia Hungary Malta
Hungary Croatia Hungary Latvia Croatia Portugal
Croatia Latvia Croatia Romania Latvia Hungary
Romania Romania Latvia Bulgaria Romania Croatia
Bulgaria Bulgaria Romania   Bulgaria Latvia
    Bulgaria     Romania
          Bulgaria
Source: own calculations
3.4  Discussion  
Two statistical measures have been used to assess convergence and the evolutionary 
process of inequalities among EU-Member States between 1995 and 2015. Unlike 
previous studies, this research concentrates on measuring convergence in terms of 
a combination of economic and quality of life variables; indices that are consistent 
with the spirit of the Lisbon European Council and in accordance with the structural 
indices for nominated or real convergence between EU countries. The results of the 
first approach are presented in Figures 1 through 3 as well as in the Table 2, while the 
results of the second approach are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
More specifically, in examining Table 2, it is easy to conclude that, between 1990 
and 2015, there is a low trend for convergence between EU-28. Inequalities have been 
reduced sufficiently since the average rate of coefficient of variation was 0.70454, 
0.59639, 0.48475, 0.42426 0.40146 and 0.3951 in the years 1995-2015 respectively. The 
average coefficient of variation is constantly decreasing, which confirms the tendency 
for convergence. The conclusion remains the same for EU-19 (see Table 3). Figure 1 
illustrates the changes in the coefficient of variation for the fourteen relevant 
variables for EU-28. First, the real convergence was achieved during the period 1990-
2005 for all variables used in this study. For some of them, the process of convergence 
continued until 2010. This is the case for GDP per capita, primary, and secondary 
ContinuedTable 4: Countries with a higher, equal or lower Life Quality Index (ascending classification) EU-28.
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school enrolment for EU-2816. Household final consumption expenditure per capita, 
mobile cellular telephone subscriptions, and forest area (% of land area) converged 
even after 2015, not only for EU-28, but also for EU-19.
Second, it appears that disparities increased mostly after 2010. Disparities in the 
field of education (secondary school enrolment), in healthcare (physicians per 1,000 
people), mortality rate, and population density increased after 2005. The evolution of 
disparities can be related to business cycles, and the global economic crisis. A number 
of arguments can be put forth to explain the idea that “convergence tends to dominate 
in periods of strong growth, and to recede in periods of stagnation”.17
Third, since 1995, a decrease in economic and social disparities among Member 
States is detected, especially in the field of infrastructures (forest area and CO2 
emissions), and communication (Internet users, mobile-cellular and telephone 
subscriptions), as well as in population density, long-term unemployment, physicians 
per 1000 people and primary school enrolment for ΕU-28, EU-19, and PIIGSC. GDP 
per capita shows a trend for convergence until 1995 only for PIIGS (the results are 
opposite to those of EU-28 and EU-19).18 However, monetary convergence was not 
achieved during the 1990s. Economic and social convergence can be attributed to the 
EU policies followed, especially after 1990. At the European Council of Brussels in 
February 1988, a decision was made to double the resources of the three structural 
funds (European Social Fund, European Regional Fund, FEOGA (guidance section)) 
and to change the Common Agricultural Policy. Additionally, the Delors Package was 
recognized as necessary for the successful implementation of the Internal Market 
programme.
The graph illustrating the average of the 14 variables reveals that inequalities 
and differences in quality of life between the 28 countries of Europe have declined 
throughout the 25 years—i.e. between 1990-2015—resulting in greater convergence 
between countries. This convergence appears to be more concentrated in the period 
between 2010-2015 in the field of infrastructures and in the field of economy and 
development not only for EU-28 but for EU-19. However, the indices for primary and 
secondary education, with a sharp divergence in 2015, are outlined. In reducing 
disparities, the policies of the European Union played a major role: First, in (a) 
agricultural policy with the main objective of increasing agricultural productivity, 
and thus ensuring a fair basic level in the agricultural sector, stabilizing markets 
and ensuring fair prices. Second, in (b) industrial policy so as to create competitive, 
16  The results remain the same for EU-19, with exception the index secondary school enrolment 
where after 2015 there is a sharp divergence.
17  See Commission of the European Communities 1990, p. 216. However, recent results for the UK 
(for the period 1977-1991) suggest that this might not always be the case (Chatterji & Dewhurst, 1996).
18 With the exception of the secondary school enrollment (% gross), mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1,000 live births), and life expectancy at birth.
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efficient, and targeted markets, favourable climate—especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises—to promote research and development, networking, and business 
cooperation. Third, in (c) regional and economic policy of the European Union, 
where according to the preamble of the treaty establishing the EEC, it is a common 
concern for strengthening and ensuring harmonious development by reducing the 
differences between the various regions and achieving the development of backward 
and less favoured regions. This was one of the main reasons for the creation of the 
EEC decision. Fourth, (d) technological policy. The contribution of research and 
technology to regional development, as well as to the cohesion of the European 
community, has been highlighted many times. Community technology policy is 
directly aimed at enhancing the role of research competitiveness, comparing with 
US and Japan, as well as strengthening community cohesion and balancing regional 
differences between the Member States of the European Union. Fifth, and finally, the 
EU played a major role in e) the European Social Policy.
Table 3 shows the average of the rankings made based off of the modified value 
of the variables that affect the quality of life among the 28 countries of the European 
Union. It reveals that between 1990 and 2015, Nordic countries such as Sweden, 
Finland, Austria and Denmark were among the countries that possess the top five 
positions in terms of living standards. At the opposite end of the scale, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Latvia occupy the last three positions. These figures do not show a 
uniform convergence movement between Southern and Northern European member 
states. The position of Greece shows deterioration, especially for the period between 
1990-2005: where, ranking as 13th in 1990, it dropped to 15th in 2005. From then on, 
it continued to improve until 2010, where it held 12th statically. In 2015 however, it 
dropped again to its lowest position at 18th, thus indicating a decrease in the quality 
of life index. Spain and Ireland, on the other hand, have significantly improved their 
positions respectively between 2000-2015. 
Table 4 illustrates countries that have a higher than average quality of life index, 
equal, or less than average for each time period. Sweden ranks first for the whole 
period of the survey, with the exception of 2005, where it drops to 2nd place after 
Finland, followed by Denmark, Austria, and Luxembourg. Contrastingly, Hungary, 
Malta, Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania are among the lowest. Greece between 
1990 and 2005 presents an average life-quality index, while in the period 2015 it 
drops to lower than average. For the same period (1995), Cyprus and the UK also show 
a declining trend. This may be due to the economic crisis of 2008 and the painful 
austerity programs implemented. As reflected in the Eurofound report, entitled The 
quality of life in Europe: The impact of the crisis (2013), the EU witnessed a growing 
trend in unemployment rates, social exclusion, worsening social conditions, coupled 
with an increase in citizens’ mistrust of public institutions, particularly governments 
and national parliaments reproached for being at the centre of political corruption. 
Understandably, all of this has led to increased social tension, both amongst racial 
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groups as well as socio-economic classes. What was initially a financial crisis has, in 
some countries, given way to a social crisis.
 One of the main consequences of the economic crisis is the high unemployment 
rate, particularly long-term and youth unemployment, which has had undoubtedly 
grievous ramifications on working conditions in Europe as a whole. It has also been 
particularly detrimental to certain aspects of society, including work-life balance. 
Even so, the impact of the crisis in the European Union has varied from country to 
country. The downturn in GDP, coupled with increasing unemployment, has taken 
its toll, particularly on Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain; although, certain northern European countries, such as Ireland, have also felt 
the backlash. 
Convergence has also been assessed separately for the 19 member states 
(Eurozone), as well as for the PIIGSC countries19 and represented in Figures 2 and 3. 
These figures are similar to the previous graphs (Figure 1). The latter, however, are more 
intensified in terms of convergence, implying that EU regional policy has had some 
pertinent effects. Figures 2 and 3 contrastingly, show that EU-19 countries are more 
homogenous in terms of economic, monetary, and social indicators. A noteworthy 
pattern is also determined over time for the two groups in terms of residents enrolled 
in primary education. It is obvious that there is a strong trend for divergence for EU-28 
countries in the period 2010-2015 (during the financial crisis), whilst the opposite is 
observed for EU-19 and PIIGSC during the same period. In comparison, there is a trend 
for convergence in the proportion of residents enrolled in secondary education for all 
the sub-groups in the same period.
There are many explanations for the increase in regional inequalities observed 
in Southern Europe in the second part of the 1990s. One factor involves the effects 
of trade liberalization as a result of the internal market programme. In the presence 
of increasing returns and agglomeration economies, such liberalization increased 
disparities between member states (Krugman & Venables, 1990), where Southern 
Europe was negatively impacted by the process of trade liberalization across 
Europe. According to another explanation, there are structural differences between 
Southern and Northern European states and, therefore, the adjustment process 
is different. Blanchard et al. (1992) concentrate on production factor-movements 
and labour-movements in particular. They observe large and persistent disparities 
in employment growth across states. They also show that when regions are hit by 
negative shock, unemployment initially increases, leading to an exit of workers from 
the specific markets and regions. Accordingly, the difference between Northern and 
Southern regions could be attributed to different migration patterns due to increased 
unemployment rates in specific regions.
19  These are countries: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Cyprus. 
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3.5  Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate convergence and test it empirically across 
countries of the EU between 1995 and 2015. Convergence was defined not only in 
terms of economic indicators, but also in terms of social and quality of life indicators. 
We computed real convergence by evaluating a coefficient of variation based on 
economic and quality of life variables. Given this convergence/divergence process, 
some countries may improve or worsen their position, relative to others. This was 
analysed by looking at the evolution of a quality-of-life-based ranking. It is confirmed 
that real convergence was achieved during the period 2005-2015 for most of the 
countries. Convergence stagnated in 1990-2000 before increasing again. We noticed 
that Sweden, Finland and Denmark occupy the top positions in quality of life index. 
Countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe place last in quality of life index. 
This analysis may be an indispensable tool for European policy-makers to make 
significant financial resources available to apply appropriate economic policies in 
countries facing significant difficulties and lagging behind in a quality of life. This 
can lead to a broader redistributive policy community. The creators and designers 
of European Community policy should implement various financial assistance 
programs in order to achieve normalization of inequalities and to upgrade countries 
with low quality of life. This has the potential to eliminate regional disparities and 
imbalances both between member states and at a regional level, which in turn may 
prevent political tensions and frictions. Moreover, the analysis should be extended 
when additional data on the quality of life become available to determine whether our 
conclusions can be reconfirmed.
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4  Cohesion Policy or Politics? A Case on the 
Participation of Civil Society
Oto Potluka20
4.1  Introduction
Partnership principle and participation help increase relevancy of policies. It also 
concerns the EU cohesion policy – one of the largest EU investment policies. Our study 
concentrates on the role of non-profit organisations in partnership and their added 
value in the Czech Republic, a country with very low perception concerning non-
profit organisations in policy-making among population. Based on 48 interviews with 
stakeholders from both the non-profit and the public sectors, who took active part 
in designing EU cohesion policy programmes, we draw our findings on capacities, 
relevance, and barriers of an effective participation of non-profit organisations in 
partnership processes in the Czech Republic.
Designing and implementing programmes, financed by the European Union (EU) 
cohesion policy, enhances partnership among sectors. Partners vary between firms, 
associations, non-profit organizations (NPOs), and public sectors at all levels. Though 
such partnership diversity brings different views on policy, it also helps achieve long-
term sustainability and relevance of policies overall (OECD, 2001b: 18)21. Partnerships 
also involve EU cohesion policy objectives, especially as it relates to the dichotomy 
between social and economic development (Kalman, 2020). The European Union 
provides a legal framework for partnership implementation. The EU Regulation No. 
1303/2013, Article 5, states that NPOs must take part in designing and implementing 
the EU cohesion policy as social partners. This policy covers the main fields of activity 
that NPOs are engaged in. Thus, it can be expected that NPOs will take an active role 
in this policy.
Involving partners with relevant knowledge and skills enables policy-makers to 
respond to peoples’ needs. To identify these needs, relevant partners could be invited 
to provide the policy-makers and programme managers such knowledge. This can 
increase the relevance of selected solutions according to perceived societal needs. 
Moreover, in the case of the EU cohesion policy, satisfaction in needs that have been 
met could cause positive perceptions on territorial identity (Capello, 2018)—or EU 
identity and EU integration process. The current situation does not seem to reflect this 
20  CEPS, University of Basel. Correspondence : oto.potluka@unibas.ch
21  See the cases of health policy, social policy, educational policy, or environmental policy in OECD 
(2001a).
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as the EU territorial identity has not been clearly created (Capello, 2018). This raises 
several questions: Do the NPOs efficiently add to the cohesion policy design and 
implementation when they take part? What is the added value of NPOs in cohesion 
policy? Would intense participation in NPOs increase positive perception of the EU 
cohesion policy and the EU? Does it increase the relevance of the policy? Beyond 
these questions, the present paper investigates the following two key questions: What 
lessons can be drawn from the successes and failures of cohesion policy through 
involving NPOs in the design and implementation of this policy? What determines 
success and failure of programming when NPOs take part in it? 
The added value this chapter contributes to the partnership theme is that the Czech 
Republic belongs to the countries with very low public sector support provisioned to 
other stakeholders when they take part in the design and implementation of public 
policies. Moreover, the Czech society tackles similar post-communist problems 
as other EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, even though it has 
been almost three decades since the totalitarian regime collapsed. This study also 
concerns the perception of the population in these countries relating to the EU and 
integration processes. Thus, the Czech experience can reveal relevant solutions for 
the implementation of the EU cohesion policy in other EU member states.
The chapter is structured into five sections as follows: following the introduction, 
the next section outlines the partnership principle from the perspective of participation 
of NPOs in political decision-making and its relevance for the EU cohesion policy with 
respect to Czech NPOs. Section three is devoted to methodological issues, including 
data collection. Section four presents the results and discussion in seven parts 
according to the characteristics of the ideal partnership process. Finally, section five 
presents the conclusion drawn from the data analysis of our findings. 
4.2  Partnership Principle
4.2.1  NPOs in Political Decision-making
The current disengagement of the electorate from participating in the political 
process between elections accentuates the significance of integrating the social 
partners including NPOs into the policy-creation process. While 12% of EU citizens 
perceive joining a political party as a means to influence public policies, 6% of them 
see the membership, or the support of an NPO, as a means to influence the political 
decision-making process (TNS Opinion & Social, 2012: 44). The main difference is 
that the sole purpose of the political parties’ existence is the facilitation of popular 
participation in politics and policy-making, while NPOs occupy completely different 
roles. Interestingly, according to 41% of European citizens, NPOs are not necessary 
(TNS Political & Social, 2013: 9).
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Although Czechs view NPOs as being necessary (54% pro; 40% contra), their 
confidence in NPOs’ capabilities to influence political decision-making is the lowest 
among all EU member states (TNS Opinion & Social, 2012). The European perception 
of NPOs in politics differs. Among Europeans, 70% of them see NPOs as capable of 
influencing political decision-making at a national level (TNS Political & Social, 2013: 
13). Only 55% of Czech respondents hold this to be the case. Comparatively, on an 
EU-wide basis, the disparity is very similar with respectively 53% (EU) and 37% (Czech 
Republic). Moreover, less than half of Czechs share values or interests with NPOs 
and trust their capabilities to be effective political agents to influence politics (TNS 
Political & Social, 2013: 9).
Such circumstances are unique for a study of the main barriers that NPOs must 
tackle with when attempting to change policies. Moreover, the Czech Republic 
represents a case of a country belonging to the EU member states with the highest per 
capita allocations of EU cohesion policy funding. Thus, an analysis of the partnership 
principle implementation in such an environment can serve to highlight hidden 
barriers and help promote the effective implementation of this policy. 
4.2.2  Partnership Importance in EU Cohesion Policy 
The EU cohesion policy with a budget of EUR 351.8 bn. (EC, 2015) plays an important 
role in the EU investment policies, especially for development of regions lagging 
behind. Among the main objectives of the policy are the creation of jobs; an increase 
in competitiveness and economic growth at regional and company levels; sustainable 
development, and the improvement of quality of life standards (EC, 2015). These 
objectives make this policy interesting for many stakeholders, and are welcomed 
by the EC. Social partners, including civil society, European, national, regional and 
local-level partners should participate in the programming process, which includes 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation activities.
The partnership principle is not a recent issue for the EU cohesion policy. 
Previous programming periods, starting from 1994-1999, also encountered this in the 
past. For example, the partnership has been referred to in Article 4 of the Regulation 
2081/1993. The member states implemented partnership “within the framework of 
each Member State’s national rules and current practices” and “in full compliance 
with the respective institutional, legal and financial powers of each the partners.” 
During that time, the European Union used the approach more extensively (Piattoni, 
2009).
The scope of partnership principle implementation was more on consultancy 
level, but it had been further refined and broadened. Later, in the period between 
2000–2006, a requirement on highest possible representativeness at all levels had 
been added to the Regulation 1260/1999 (the Article 8). Direct reference to civil society 
appeared in the Regulation 1083/2006, Article 11. Thus, the importance of civil society 
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as partner for the EU cohesion policy grew in the programming period of 2007–
2013. Moreover, the regulation required involvement of the partners in designing, 
implementing, and monitoring of all levels of policy-making (within the respective 
national strategic reference framework and all operational programmes).
The recent development goes further. Not only does Regulation 1303/2013 define 
partnership in a broader scope, but it also introduces a tool on how to implement 
it in Article 5. The European Code of Conduct on Partnership (EC, 2014) further 
provides elaborated guidelines on how to implement this principle. The partnership 
principle has undergone numerous developments ever since it has been introduced 
for the first time in the cohesion policy. Although the partnership is strongly rooted 
in the EU regulations, these regulations permit its implementation in accordance 
with national rules and practices. The size and role of civil society organizations also 
varies among Western European societies (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; or Sissenich, 
2010) depending on traditions and political culture. Constitutional arrangements 
influence the form of partnership in member states (Baun & Marek, 2008: 33). This 
has a crucial consequence for partnership implementation in countries with low 
participative cultures or with a centralized public administration. It concerns mainly 
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). In these countries, partnership 
is an informative process, rather than a consultation. As a result, a low level of 
involvement from NPOs on partnership is still prevalent in the EU cohesion policy 
(Kendall & Anheier, 1999).
According to the social origins theory (Anheier, 2014; Salamon & Anheier, 1998; 
Salamon, Sokolowski, & Haddock, 2017), the CEECs have a statist non-profit sector 
model with less important civic engagement, volunteer input, and lower labour force 
working for civil society. Though the Czech Republic and Hungary have moved out of 
the statist group, they still do not have the same dominating patterns as other groups 
(Salamon et al., 2017). Taking into account the societal characteristics, our research 
results are applicable to countries with a similar non-profit sector model; especially 
those in the CEECs (Baun & Marek, 2008: 11-12). 
The ease of setting up a partnership is evident through the implementation of the 
acquis communitaire in accessing countries. Reasonably, the European Commission 
(EC) required implementing it, but within a short timeframe it had been implemented 
without accessing countries enabling partnership. These countries did not have the 
options to negotiate the scope and form of implemented policies (Grosse, 2010; Kutter 
& Trappmann, 2010). Thus, the partnership processes and means were not ready for 
application in the shortened programming period 2004-2006 for that time accessing 
countries. One exception is the case of Eastern Germany, where the participative 
experience was introduced to the public administration from Western Germany in 
1990 (Perron, 2014).
The implementation of the partnership principle developed throughout the two 
periods 2007–2013, and 2014–2020. All partners gained some experience (Potluka, 
Špaček, & Remr, 2017). The progress in development is evident in the whole system 
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and relates to capacities of both the managing authorities and beneficiaries. The 
approach to implementation of partnership, selected during the accession and post-
accession period as political processes, results in a top-down approach to partnership 
implementation. Moreover, NPOs do not possess adequate financial and personnel 
capacities in the post-communist countries. 
4.2.3  Partnership & Policy Relevance 
In democratic countries, political parties offer their programmes to attract the 
attention of voters. This means that, at least before elections, they are interested 
in voters’ opinions22. What happens in the timeframe between elections? Are the 
public needs so irrelevant as to be unknown to politicians? For long-term relevance, 
acceptance and sustainability of public policies, knowledge of the public’s needs 
is crucial (EC, 2004: 9; Kelleher, Batterbury, & Stern, 1999: 16). Public participation 
is not only important because programmes have to help solve public problems, 
but also because of the co-financing the EU cohesion policy programmes from the 
national public budgets. Neglecting these needs may cause problems for programme 
ownership, which can lead to further issues, risking the programmes’ outcomes. From 
this point of view, Mairate (2006) identified partnership as a condition influencing 
greater effectiveness in the EU cohesion policy.
On one side, even partnership may cause some problems. Milio (2014) and Perron 
(2014) pointed out that rent-seeking and democratic deficit are issues that also 
concern EU cohesion policy implementation. In such cases, it is necessary to be aware 
of the defining aspects of a partnership. They cover whether or not the partnership 
is successful as well as the following seven issues: First, clarity and sharing of the 
partnership’s goals by all partners, where partners perceive the goals the same way 
and their attempt to achieve them. Second, partnership provides benefits to all 
partners, where partnership provides positive internal value to each partner. Third, 
long-term cooperation of partners, where partnership is not only limited to one short-
term project. Fourth, acceptance of the form of partnership, partners understand and 
accept the means of work. Fifth, added value of each partner, where each partner 
contributes added value and what would otherwise be missing. Sixth, positive 
external value of partnership, where synergy in the total effects of partnership is 
higher than the sum of separate effects of each partner. Seventh and finally, decisions 
are made by all partners, where decision is based on the consent of all partners.
 The EU cohesion policy is specific in its programming cycle. The managing 
authorities collect needs about three or two years before the programming period 
22  Consult the literature about political-business cycle in CEECs in Hallerberg, Vinhas de Souza, and 
Clark (2002).
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starts. The programming period is seven years long. Together with the rule, N+2 (two-
year period to finalize the payments), it initiates 11 years of implementation. It is clear 
that it is a long time for the needs to remain unchanged. 
4.2.4  Development of Civil Societies’ Capacities in CEECs: Focus on The Czech 
Republic
Although partnership studies are mainly from a political point of view, the civil 
society development has two aspects: economic and political (Lane, 2010). Eastern 
and Western European countries witnessed different developments. The Western 
European countries developed economically first which allowed civil societies in these 
countries to take part in social and political life. Post-socialist countries were under 
a time pressure in the 1990s, thus trying to transform their societies simultaneously 
in both dimensions. As a result, the economic foundations of civil society in post-
communist countries are not sufficiently strong to provide political activism. As such, 
the political parties remain the core decision-makers in politics (Frič, 2004). Positions 
of former president, Vaclav Havel, and the Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, reflected 
such a clash of attitudes towards civil society in the Czech Republic (Potůček, 1999). 
While Havel was a proponent of civil society, Klaus supported the role of political 
parties as core brokers in political decision-making without participation of any other 
agents, especially civil society organisations.
In theory, the partnership principle allows NPOs to take part in political decision-
making. From this perspective, the accession of the Czech Republic into the European 
Union in 2004 offered new opportunities to Czech NPOs, especially in the field of the 
EU cohesion policy23. There was quite a high awareness among Czech NPOs about 
partnership and requirements for participation in the political decision-making 
process, including EU cohesion policy (Černá & Marek, 2003: 174-175). In contrast, 
NPOs suffered from insufficient capacities, either economic or socio-political (Frič, 
2004; Rose-Ackerman, 2007).
Heterogeneity and missing support of umbrella associations had caused a 
need for the public sector to cooperate with heterogeneous groups of NPOs (Černá 
& Marek, 2003). Together with low awareness on how to participate in partnership 
and capacities among NPOs, this resulted in the selection of NPOs’ representatives for 
monitoring committees to be based on willingness of these people to take part. Thus, 
the selection process was criticized for its lack of transparency. 
Soon after the accession, disillusionment among civil society organisations 
followed expectations in all new member states (Harvey, 2004). The crucial issue in 
23  These expectations concerned all Central and Eastern European countries. For details, see 
Sudbery (2010).
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NPO capacities to take effective part in partnership is the lack of sufficient capacities. 
Most importantly are the financial capacities, which would enable NPOs to get 
personnel, equipment, and so on (Bowman, 2011; Carmin, 2010). Lack of funding 
has led NPOs to sacrifice planning long-term strategic objectives and, instead, focus 
on achieving short-term operational goals (Chin, 2017). It caused a shift from NPO 
objectives and issues to providing parts of public-policy programmes. The situation 
did not improve much in the second nor in the third programming period after 
accession (Polverari & Michie, 2009; Potluka, Špaček, et al., 2017).
The lack of strategic approach from the civil society sector is also evident in its 
inability to set up self-governing bodies until the beginning of the 2000s. These would 
be representatives in negotiations with the public sector. Such roof associations 
would represent the civil society sector in partnership with the public sector. Too 
many individual stakeholders make the policy discussion difficult to manage. Thus, 
pre-negotiation within associations could settle these complications and sort out 
heterogeneous ideas.
Two types of associations appeared in the 2000s. First, national associations 
that unified civil society as a generic sector and creating self-administration in the 
sector. Such a case is the Association of NPOs in the Czech Republic (ANNO). Second, 
a group of associations represent interests on their field of specialisation. Some 
regional associations became members of the ANNO, making it difficult in turn, for 
public servants to ascertain representativeness of the ANNO24. Another deficiency of 
this umbrella organization is that it does not cover sport and environmental NPOs 
(Pospíšilová, 2014: 7). Moreover, a new association has been set up in 2010, The 
Association of Public Benefit Organizations in the Czech Republic. 
4.3  Data & Methodology 
We base the current study on a combination of information derived from official 
documents, data collected via in-depth interviews, and focus-group methods. By 
applying this approach, we cover not only the providers of the opportunity to take 
part in designing public policy (managing authorities), but also on those that benefit 
from this opportunity (NPOs). 
Two groups of interviewees took part in the data collection. Czech NPO managers 
and experts constitute the first group. To be invited in the interviews, they had to 
have experience from the monitoring committees during the programming period 
2007-2013, or be members of working groups set up by NPOs for the programming 
period 2014-2020. Employees of the managing authorities compose the second group 
24  For an overview of representation among associations see Potluka, Špaček, et al. (2017).
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(see below). Some of the interviewees had sufficient experience with the partnership 
and knowledge relating to the EU cohesion policy. 
4.3.1  First Group of Interviewees
First, we collected a list of contacts of NPO representatives who were members of the 
Monitoring Committees (MCs) and working groups. The Czech Republic’s Committee 
for the EU of the Government Council for Non-Governmental Non-profit Organisations 
and the ANNO provided us with the list of contacts. The websites of the particular 
operational programmes provided us with additional information and contacts. 
We succeeded in collecting contact information for the 94 NPO representatives 
participating in the partnership for design and implementation of the EU funded 
programmes in the Czech Republic in the periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. Based on 
this, we succeeded in conducting 48 interviews with NPO representatives between 
July and September 2014. The associations’ representatives were the main targets of 
our interviews, as they could provide information about other NPOs. Together with 15 
national, and 10 regional, associations, six influential NPOs were represented in this 
sample. The other interviewees represented small NPOs (17), individuals who act as 
NPO position-makers, and experts from NPOs with an expertise in EU cohesion policy. 
4.3.2  The Second Group of Interviewees
Representatives of managing authorities of regional and thematic operational 
programmes represent the second group of interviewees. From the 17 programmes 
implemented in the Czech Republic in the periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, we 
selected those who are the most interesting for the NPOs. Those are either programmes 
funded by the European Social Fund (ESF) or regional programmes. Among them, 
three interviewees were from the public sector representing programmes at regional 
level and five from national level. Moreover, interviews were conducted with 
two employees of the Committee for the EU of the Government Council for Non-
Governmental Non-profit Organisations. These interviews were conducted between 
September and October 2014. 
4.3.3  Interviews
During the interviews, we have discussed questions relating to ideal form of 
partnership and experience with it, participation of NPOs in the EU cohesion policy 
designing and implementation, and vision on how to implement this principle. We 
have defined questions according to the previous studies on partnership in the EU 
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cohesion policy by Adshead (2014); Gazley (2010); Milio (2014); Potluka and Liddle 
(2014). If needed, further questions also concerned personal expectations of the 
partners and their fulfilment.
 To triangulate findings from different methods, we used (i) official documentation, 
(ii) in-depth-interviews, (iii) a focus group (held in October 2014 with 12 participants), 
and (iv) two rounds of peer-reviews (October and November 2014). This approach 
allowed us to construct a problem tree (EC, 2004) with the cause-effect relationships 
in the process of implementation of the partnership (see the Figures 1-3). 
4.4  Results & Discussion 
The analysis was conducted as though the partnership principle would be 
implemented in an ideal form, where partners benefit according to the core principles 
of the partnership principle (see the seven core aspects in the methodological section). 
It reveals what the main barriers to management of partnership principle in the Czech 
Republic are, but also that the capacities are developing on both the civil and public 
sectors levels. The particular results are discussed in the following subsection. The 
main issues, causes, and effects are visualised in the problem trees.
4.4.1  Clarity And Acceptance Of Goals By All Partners
Public sector has a clear goal in the EU cohesion policy: to prepare programming 
documentation and ensure that the programmes achieve a high absorption capacity. 
To achieve this goal, compliance with the demand-side of the programmes is needed. 
In the case of the public sector (municipalities, self-governing regions, and central 
public sector), the coordination mechanisms are given by the political system. For 
private companies and NPOs, it is given by partnership. 
Variety of NPOs in their type, size, and activity-orientation belongs to their core 
characteristics (Pestoff, 2014). It also brings fragmentation of opinions and objectives. 
As so, it is quite difficult to make a consensus among NPOs. Participation of NPOs in 
particular working groups in which they are specialists solves such a situation. In 
specific fields, NPOs are capable of achieving consent as they are able to communicate 
similar issues. Another issue is the missing leaders among NPOs (contrary to political 
parties), who would be able to organise the sector and help set objectives. Hence, a 
lack of mutual communication about themes and common interests of civil society was 
missing. Likewise, the sharing of workload has transformed into a problem. Contrary 
to this statement, some interviewees declared positive practice in communication 
among NPOs; echoing a similar situation happening in the previous programming 
periods (Polverari & Michie, 2009).
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Both the public administration and the civil society sectors perceive fragmentation 
among NPOs as an important barrier in implementation of the partnership principle. 
Three quarters of interviewees see particular interests as a problem of the civil society 
sector (Table 1). This situation is very similar to Hungary, Poland, and Romania for 
which Börzel and Buzogány (2010: 175-176) explain that, for environmental policies, 
there are missing stable relations among stakeholders.
Table 1: Particular interests as a barrier of partnership principle implementation.
Do you see particular interests of NPOs as a barrier of 
partnership principle implementation  
in the Czech Republic?
Frequency
(N)
All 
Interviewees
(%)
Valid 
responses
(%)
Valid 
responses
No 9 18.8 24.3
Yes 28 58.3 75.7
Total 37 77.1 100.0
Missing 
responses
Interviewee could not decide 4 8.3
No answer at all 7 14.6
Total 11 22.9
 Total 48 100.0
Source: In-depth interviews with NPOs’ representatives.
Among NPOs active in designing EU cohesion policy programmes and project 
management, there are four groups cooperating closely only when they see their 
particular benefit from the cooperation. As Potluka, Špaček, et al. (2017) point out, 
these groups are usually gathered around a strong entity (an NPO or a network) both 
formal and informal, of which ANNO comes first. As an organisation disposing of a 
number of contacts among the top managers of other member associations (47, of 
which 17 other associations, mainly regional), it is capable of mobilizing other NPOs 
to actively participate. This is evident from the process of nominations of the NPOs 
representatives in the EU cohesion policy partnership. This mobilization is done 
through regional associations. The importance of this group is underlined by the 
Platform 2014+, organised by ANNO, together with other organisations. Seven out of 
ten elected candidates for the MCs, are members of the Partnership Platform 2014+. 
In contrast, this association is criticized by other NPOs because of its consistent lack 
of respect to other civil society groups when performing its activities. 
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The second group has formed around an official public administration body, the 
Committee for the EU of the Government Council for Non-Governmental Non-profit 
Organisations. Being an advisory body of the Czech government, it has an advantage 
to communicate directly about EU issues between the Czech government and the 
civil society sector. Thus, other NPO representatives see it as a body representing the 
public sector interests and not of civil society. 
The third group is a national network of local action groups. The local action 
groups engaged in their own way in the implementation of the EU cohesion policy 
in the programming period 2004-2006. They play the role of intermediary bodies, 
providing small-scale grants to micro-regional applicants. The decisions were made 
according to the partnership principle applied to the LEADER initiative, involving 
all key local stakeholders. Their position forms a partnership platform acting as an 
implementation structure. However, participation in the implementation process 
allowed the local action groups not only to gain experience, but also to be seen by 
their stakeholders as an element implementing the principle of partnership, achieving 
in turn, a respected position. The access to institutional funding, though not a large 
amount of money, makes the other groups of NPOs classify these groups as a part of 
the public sector. 
The fourth group is the least structured, and consists of representatives of 
strong NPOs who bear their issues and promote them at any appropriate occasion. 
Preparation of new programming documents for the period 2014-2020 caused the 
NPOs to be able to unify across all platforms and groups and nominate representatives 
for all programmes. For a period of several months, they were able to create a great 
coalition in the Partnership Platform 2014+. Figure 1 (on the right side) shows the 
causes and effects of fragmentation among NPOs. 
4.4.2  Benefit for All Partners: Positive Internal Value 
Internal value gained from the partnership is an issue of relationship between 
activities and funding. If the NPOs have to provide their advocacy activities in the 
EU cohesion policy funded only by them, they have to find a counter-value to justify 
funding of its participation. This means that they must try to find information about 
future funding for their core activities from the new operational programmes, or the 
change in the system has to pay off their effort.
For the managing authorities, the internal value consists of formal and informal 
issues. This formal partnership enables them to fill the requirement of the European 
Commission on participation of social partners as stakeholders. The expertise, effort, 
and ideas provided by partners provides informal value added to the managing 
authorities. It varies according to partners involved, their experience, and effort. As Chin 
(2017) points out, policy advocacy in NPOs is the strongest at policy implementation
 Cohesion Policy or Politics? A Case on the Participation of Civil Society   79
Figure 1. Causes and effects of problems in partnership of civil society and public sectors in the EU cohesion policy in the Czech Republic: Dependence on 
capacities and fragmentation of the civil society sector 
 
Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration. 
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Figure 1. Causes and effects of problems in partnership of civil society and public sectors in the EU 
cohesion policy in the Czech Republic: Dependence on capacities and fragmentation of the civil 
society sector.
Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration.
and administrative level within advisory and working groups in comparison to macro-
policy level. Thus, the managing authorities could gain expertise and internal value 
according to the partners selected. It relates to the selection process in which the best 
appropriate partners are selected into the partnership. 
Previous experience (programming periods 2004-2006, and 2007-2013) shows low 
knowledge of NPO sector within the public sector and lack of skilled experts to offer by 
the NPOs sector. Such a situation resulted in the selection of NPO representatives known 
to managing authorities without a selection process among NPO representatives. For 
the period 2014-2020, the selection process differed substantially. The NPOs selected 
their own candidates to represent them in Partnership Platform 2014+. This platform 
existed since 2012 and organized the nomination process within a few weeks in late 
2012 and early 2013 to offer candidates of NPOs to all working groups in all operational 
programmes. This process was led by the ANNO. The initiative succeeded to collect 120 
volunteering representatives from NPOs. Thus, 54 NPO representatives were actually 
selected, receiving the opportunity to participate in the partnership. This involvement 
proves high internal value for NPOs when they participate in designing the cohesion 
policy programmes.
As Potluka, Špaček, et al. (2017) found, representatives of both NPO and the 
public sector considered the system of pre-selection of NPO representatives by 
NPOs as efficient and transparent enough. It provides these representatives with 
a much stronger mandate and legitimacy in comparison to previous programming 
periods. NPOs were satisfied mainly with the bottom-up process, while the managing 
authorities with the representativeness of the participating NPOs. This process 
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brought new experience as an unprecedented number of NPOs engaged in it. This 
variety entails the involvement of experienced NPO representatives, but also those 
who have no previous experience with the partnership principle and little knowledge 
of the EU funds management at all. 
4.4.3  Long-Term Cooperation Among Partners
Reiterating from the section on internal value of partnership, the NPOs´ highest effort 
concerned the creation of new priorities in the operational programmes. Partnership 
for following seven years enables partners to receive information directly on the 
focus of the operational programmes, if they fail to persuade managing authorities 
to accept their own proposals. As Potluka, Špaček, et al. (2017) point out, NPO initial 
interest declines gradually as they carry out their work in the working groups and 
MCs as volunteers. The authors mention that only two of all NPO representatives in 
the monitoring committees were willing to continue in their work for these bodies.
Moreover, the low ability of non-profit organizations to promote their intentions 
on the long-term causes disillusionment and diminished willingness to continue the 
partnership with the public administration. In combination with the fact that the 
costs (of work and transportation) of the NPO representatives are covered either by 
themselves or by their respective organizations, it is clear that this is not an interesting 
approach for the NPOs. Importance of funding to support the advocacy activities 
lead NPOs to convert their activities again to their previous day-to-day service 
provision to clients (Chin, 2017). According to the interviewees, about 26.7% of NPO 
representatives lost their initial enthusiasm. This caused high fluctuation among the 
NPO representatives, as they did not a perceive long-term value for their participation. 
Fluctuation does not concern only the NPO representatives, but also the 
management in the public sector. Here, the turnover is stronger due to change of 
government top managers after each election. From this perspective, long-term 
cooperation among partners seems to be a problematic issue. It is more or less formal 
as it lasts officially at macro-level, but at micro-level, changes appear and long-term 
memory disappears as people who left usually take their social know-how with them. 
4.4.4  Accepted Form of Cooperation
The form of cooperation influences willingness of partners to cooperate. According 
to interviewees from NPOs, the form of partnership is impersonal. They were able to 
discuss some issues with the public sector, but it required more intense discussion. 
Even when proposing changes, it is not clear to many representatives of NPOs how 
the public sector addressed their comments. Comments with low importance (such as 
phrasing) were usually accepted. Some working groups have succeeded in persuading 
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the Managing Authorities to expand the potential beneficiaries by NPOs. On the 
contrary, suggestions have been rejected on reallocation of support to NPO priorities.
NPOs entered the partnership process when the programming documents already 
existed. Representatives of new NPOs did not have much time to understand and to 
influence the focus of the upcoming programs. Working group meetings were often held 
in response to developments at national level or negotiations with the EC, without the 
possibility of producing strategic documents. This was partly due to the fragmented 
civil society sector. Already in 2011, representatives of the National Coordination Unit 
asked ANNO, which is considered to be a non-profit sector representative, to start the 
partnership process for NPOs. The ANNO did not share this information with other 
NPOs. The change in its attitude came with the change of the board of directors in 
ANNO. This has delayed the partnership process by several months.
Fragmentation of perception of the NPO representatives is evident as they see 
open communication with public sector. Opinions have emerged that have evaluated 
the positive attitude of the public sector as well as some criticisms of the form and 
content of the communication. Such a communication and participation resulted in a 
lacking long-term plan among NPOs on their participation. Figure 2 summarizes the 
causes and effects of the problematic attitude to the partnership process. Figure 2. Causes and effects of problems in partnership of the civil society and public sectors in the EU cohesion policy in the Czech Republic: partnership process 
 
Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration 
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Figure 2: Causes and effects of problems in partnership of the civil society and public sectors in the 
EU cohesion policy in the Czech Republic: partnership process.
Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration.
4.4.5  Added Value of Each Partner: Adding to the Mosaic 
The majority of the implemented partnerships in the EU cohesion policy in the Czech 
Republic are still rather formal. There are three reasons for such a situation. First, 
the heritage of the statist system with a centralized political system (Salamon et al., 
2017) lessens the role of the civil society in formulating public policies. Second, a 
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need to meet the formal requirements of the EC and avoid any mistake in public 
administration results in a cautious approach to the public administration (opinion 
of 61.5% NPOs respondents). Third, even the member countries cannot fully apply 
partnership principle when negotiating with the European Commission. It concerns 
especially countries willing to access the EU (Grosse, 2010; Kutter & Trappmann, 
2010).
This general picture varies according to size and position of a body in the 
hierarchy of the implementation of the EU-funded operational programmes. 
Monitoring Committees are especially characteristic with their very formal procedures 
(Cartwright & Batory, 2012), as they are large bodies meeting only a few times a year. 
The NPO representatives perceive the value added of each partner contentiously. 
The issue concerns their opinion about high skills and expertise among the NPO 
representatives who are not capable of persuading public administration in favour of 
their opinions. In contrast, they simultaneously appraise increasing openness of the 
public sector in the programming period 2014-2020.
Responses provide information that major issues appear in the partnership 
decision-making. Detailed analysis of responses shows that NPO representatives 
expected to influence the objectives of newly created operational programs, but 
the partnership process was more about commenting on documents than creating 
and prioritizing them. Still, they were able to provide the managing authorities with 
valuable information about local needs. The capacity to implement the partnership 
successfully depends on the personal approach of people from governing bodies and 
representatives of NPOs. To invite only relevant partners and avoid redundancy, the 
managing authorities invited only five NPO representatives to participate in working 
groups of each programme. Thus, all participating partners were able to provide 
missing information to the partnership process.
4.4.6  Synergy of Partners: Positive External Value 
Fragmentation of the civil society sector results partially from lacking communication 
system among NPOs. Mutual communication among NPOs would not only raise 
awareness of the issues solved, but it would also increase the sharing of experiences 
and values within the whole sector. Such a system existed at the beginning of the 
Partnership Platform of NPOs 2014+ work with the aim to transform information about 
the process of operational programmes preparation and updates to NPOs. Each group 
had its coordinator responsible for sharing the information with the whole platform. 
It could help to increase absorption capacity of the operational programmes aimed at 
actual needs in society. 
Such a system worked only in 2013, at the beginning of the existence of the 
Platform. Almost 60% of all interviewees pointed out that the discussion was not 
properly coordinated and NPOs were promoting their own interests without any
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Figure 3. Causes and effects of problems in partnership of the civil society and public sectors in the EU cohesion policy in the Czech Republic: Unawareness 
and Fluctuation 
 
Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration. 
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Source: in-depth interviews, own elaboration.
attempts to find consensus among NPOs. Sharing of information quickly disappeared 
when the amount of work and documents increased significantly. Some representatives 
of NPOs did not communicate even within the same working group. As a result, the 
participating NPOs were able to forward the information to a limited number of 
stakeholders only (Figure 3). Therefore, the positive external value of the partnership 
has decreased in this case, where it is uncertain whether or not it was missing entirely.
Another issue that reduces the external value of the partnership concerns timing. 
The beginning of the partnership principle with existing programming documents 
did not enable NPOs to interfere with the preparation of programming documents, 
but only when the first draft operational programs were prepared (Figure 3). 
Furthermore, due to procedural issues, the process was delayed and insufficient time 
was devoted to expert discussions and discussions with NPOs. In addition, only about 
half of NPO representatives were aware of the time-consuming process of seeking 
consensus among partners who have been involved in partner structures only in the 
recent programming period.
In addition to the lack of information on actual needs, delaying the timing of 
the intervention has caused barriers to the preparation of programming documents. 
Delays lead to insufficient time to comment on documents. This could be solved either 
by involving more employees or by lowering the output quality of the partnership 
process. Given that the overwhelming majority of NPOs have insufficient staffing 
capacity (Potluka, Špaček, et al., 2017; Potluka, Spacek, & von Schnurbein, 2017) 
(reported by 75.0% of all NPO representatives), the only option was to reduce the 
quality of the inputs into partnership. Not only did the insufficient time capacities 
of NPOs cause a weak consultation process (58.3% of respondents), the very short 
time to read and comment on documents was also perceived as the main problem. 
The special expertise of grass-root NPOs in the partnership is a general issue (Kohler-
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Koch, 2009), but the perceived lack of capacity among Czech NPOs is striking. Thus, 
the value created by participation could be higher if the NPOs had more capacities.
4.4.7  Consensus Decisions 
Civil society is perceived to be among the necessary preconditions for democratization. 
They are brokers of ideas between the general public and public administration 
(Frič, Goulli, & Vyskočilová, 2004; Kárníková, 2012; Quigley, 1996; Regulska, 1999). 
Relatively low level of political participation in the Central and Eastern European 
countries shows that one of the features of democratization in Eastern Europe is the 
low connection between civil society and citizens on one hand, and political parties 
on the other (Lewis, 2001). Enyedi and Linek (2008) mentioned that the reason for 
such a low membership in political parties in Central and Eastern European countries 
is the fact that parties are more oriented to an electoral logic. They mobilize their 
electorate and do not mobilize much of their internal sources.
Citizens cannot govern directly in contemporary large-scale societies (Strøm & 
Müller, 2009: 25). According to Mair (1997: 97) the classic mass parties were a part 
of civil society as they grew from civil society and movements at the end of the 19th, 
and beginning of the 20th centuries. The political parties’ position has changed as the 
catch–all parties moved into a position between the civil society and the state. 
 Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2006: 225) point out little stabilization of political 
parties in post-communist Europe. There continues to be a diminishing role of political 
parties however, in political decision-making in Central Europe as social movements 
gain influence (Maškarinec & Klimovský, 2016; Šebík, 2016). Still, politicians are the 
decisive players in politics. Furthermore, almost half of interviewees see the resistance 
of the Czech public administration against the involvement of other partners in 
decision-making25. To sum up, although the political parties do not have sufficient 
internal capacities, they do not want to allow participation of other stakeholders in 
political decision-making.
Representatives of NPOs expected high openness in the partnership process 
when partnership is a requirement of the European Commission. About 50% of 
interviewees among NPO representatives perceive that there is no actual interest in 
the public sector to apply partnership principles. Moreover, more than 60% of them 
did not see the factual participation in decision-making. 
Politics is predominant over policy in working group output implementation. 
Workgroup outputs are problem-oriented. It is therefore possible to find solutions to 
specific problems of the operational programmes proposed by the working groups’ 
25  For long-term reasons see Laboutkova (2009); Potuček (1999).
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experts. However, the transition of the output of the working groups into the political 
decision-making process reveals low actual implementation in real policy. 
Another issue is a weak relationship between NPOs to political decision-making 
and politicians. NPO roles in the society are in agenda setting at the beginning of 
political decision-making, not in political decision-making as setting final decisions—
even in a system which supports their active involvement as is the case for the EU 
cohesion policy (Kohler-Koch, 2009). Thus, the partnership principle also reflects this 
issue.
4.5  Conclusion
The practice of partnership process between NPOs and the public sector, as it is 
implemented in the Czech Republic, shows long-term improvement. Though there 
are improvements, there are still issues reducing its effects. We conclude that bigger 
participation of NPOs in policy design would not help increase popular perception of 
the EU cohesion policy and the EU among the population. There are two arguments for 
this. First, as the political parties and civil society are not connected any more (Mair, 
1997), NPOs do not play an important role in political processes (Potluka, Špaček, et 
al., 2017). NPOs only have a chance to change policies in cases when they mobilize the 
masses for political action. In the whole post-communist region, NPOs are capable of 
developing a transactional capacity that seems to surpass the capacity to mobilize 
citizens in organized collective action (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Second, ineffective 
communication channels among NPOs results in information not being provided to 
NPO target groups and the wider public. Thus, for the long-term change of the EU 
perception, narrowed communication channels are more beneficial than NPOs. 
The NPOs are brokers of their target groups’ needs, but they suffer from the lack 
of legitimacy to convince officials to take them seriously in policy-making processes. 
Thus, even though they have information on policy needs; their contribution to the 
policy relevance is limited. For the NPOs, it is thus better to stay outside the political 
process as a sector. If there were individual politicians being recruited as non-profit 
leaders, they would be able to lobby for the policy solutions suitable for NPOs—since 
there are still limited numbers of non-profit leaders willing to take an active part in 
politics and represent NPO values, even at local levels (Potluka & Perez, 2019). Without 
such political engagement, NPOs would not be capable of improving relevance 
of implemented policies. In short, Table 2 summarizes the recent determinants, 
successes, and failures of Czech NPOs to implement the partnership process. 
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Table 2: Summary of successes and failures of NPOs in the partnership process.
Strengths
• High effort of NPOs with regard to help 
with to design the EU programmes 
• Knowledge of needs of specific target 
groups
Weaknesses
• Low persuasive capacity of NPOs (lack of data 
and rigorous analysis)
• Fluctuation and loss of skilled people in NPOs
• Fragmented civil society sector
• Low coordination and communication among 
NPOs
Opportunities
• High willingness of NPOs to participate 
in programming 
• Transparent process of NPOs’ 
representatives selection
• Partnership process is more open than 
in previous programming periods
Threats
• Low NPOs’ capacities (personnel, financial, 
time)
• Low acceptance of partnership in public sector
Source: Own elaboration based on Potluka, Špaček, et al. (2017).
We have found a long-term positive development in the partnership principle, which 
satisfies both governing bodies and NPOs. Still, the implementation of partnership 
shows suboptimal interaction between the non-profit and public sector. The main 
obstacles to successful implementation of the partnership principle in the Czech 
Republic are the following four issues. The first and main problem relates to a huge 
fragmentation of the civil society sector in the Czech Republic. Fragmentation among 
NPOs is a natural process, thus it is not surprising that it prevents the creation of 
priorities and joint actions in this sector and requires more effort and time to 
achieve consensus. Uncoordinated activities sometimes reflect trends that concern 
the process, but do not add to improvement of public policies. If NPOs put in place 
coordination tools (such as a communication system or leaders capable of leading the 
process), they will achieve better results in the policy-making process.
The second important issue relates to the low capacities of NPOs in the partnership. 
The NPO representatives usually work at the expense of their own organisations. 
Sometimes, they work in their spare time and cover the financial costs of meetings 
from their own resources. Without successful results, such partners simply leave the 
partnership or stop being active. On the other hand, the partnership will acquire 
a formal, ineffective form that does not increase the importance of implemented 
policies. Supporting NPOs from cohesion policy (EC, 2014) would help them with low 
working and time capacities and could afford full-time experts to provide expertise 
for the sector as a whole (not to particular NPOs).
Thirdly, the fluctuation of civil society representatives hinders a functional 
partnership. However, fluctuations also concern public administration due to 
common changes in governing bodies for political reasons. Rotation in policy-
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making is the principle of democracy, but in this case, it also affects administrative 
staff. Fluctuations lead to the loss of previously established personal contacts, 
and partnerships not only become unsustainable, but requires reassembling. The 
problem is the lack of continuous long-term memory in working groups and the 
sharing of results among partners. This means that the situation does not meet the 
long-term relationship requirement. As noted above, capacity building would reduce 
the fluctuation of NPO representatives in MCs and working groups, and ultimately 
increase the ability of NPOs to operate.
The last question is the timing of the partnership. Late start and lack of time in 
partnership for prioritizing consultations lead to low quality outputs. It is in line 
with the three limitations of project management: cost, time and quality. It is simply 
not possible to achieve a high-quality partnership with a lack of time and financial 
resources in NPOs. From this perspective, it is up to the governing bodies to start 
a wider debate with reliable policy partners three years before the EC submission. 
Furthermore, improvement in the cooperation and a general rise in spirit among the 
NPOs themselves are of crucial importance. Creation of a working group of NPOs, 
which dealt with the issue of the EU cohesion policy, resulted in an increased activity 
and interest by NPOs in the Czech Republic. The ambitions of NPOs were one of the key 
factors that have led to a greater NPO representatives involvement in the preparation 
of programmes in the current programming period of 2014-2020. 
What lessons can be drawn from the successes and failures of cohesion policy 
in involving NPOs in the design and implementation of this policy? Providing the 
opportunity to take part in the process without providing relevant sources does 
not help. NPOs were not able efficiently add to the cohesion policy design and 
implementation when they took part too late and with low capacities. The support 
of the European Commission in this process is essential and must be long-lasting; 
otherwise it will not continue in countries with centralized public administration. 
The support must be substantial, especially in relation to the current political 
development of the relationship of the central governments with civil society in the 
countries of Central Europe.
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Abstract: After many years of being touted as success, the foreign direct investment 
(FDI)-oriented development model of East-Central Europe (ECE) has recently 
come under fire. The controversy is closely linked to discussions on the effects of 
EU integration for the development of poorer Eastern member states. Our paper 
contributes to these debates by investigating the neglected relationship between 
FDI and EU funds, where EU funds are used as investment incentives for FDI. The 
interaction between them is problematic, as these two types of external funds have 
fundamentally different purposes. Whereas FDI is driven by market logic, the EU funds 
are supposed to correct market inequalities and failures. However, we argue that, due 
to a combination of the ECE’s structural dependence on foreign capital and design of 
funding allocation mechanisms, the EU funds may in fact amplify the existing market 
inequalities. To examine whether the EU funds to the private sector in ECE are market 
correcting or market amplifying, we analyse allocation of EU funds to the automotive 
industry in Poland and Romania in the 2007-13 programming period. We find some 
evidence for the market-correcting effects, in that foreign multinationals receive 
a smaller portion of these funds, relative to their share of employment and output 
of the sector, and that there is no bias towards foreign companies once we control 
for other firm characteristics. However, we also find that due to the peculiarities of 
the industry, where ownership, size, and productivity strongly overlap, a very large 
portion of EU funds —one half to three quarters—is nevertheless spent on subsidies to 
multinationals. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of these funds support routine 
capital investments instead of promoting innovative projects. We thus confirm the 
existence of a perverse mechanism in the distribution of EU funds in ECE, whereby 
the least developed regions of Europe spend the EU’s development monies to 
support some of the richest firms in the world. We conclude that using EU funds as 
investment incentives to foreign enterprises is wasteful and may reinforce the negative 
developmental consequences of the dependent market economies.
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1.1  Introduction
The debate over East-Central Europe’s (ECE) “dependent development” is in full 
swing. That most of the region’s export and much of its output rely on foreign owned-
firms has been well known for over a decade, but has only recently become a matter 
of heated controversy. This is somewhat surprising given that, until well into the 
2000s, foreign direct investment (FDI) had been considered the silver bullet for all 
of the region’s development problems. FDI was supposed to be the cheapest source 
of capital and know-how, and the fastest way to raise a country’s productivity and 
attain export competitiveness. Across the region, governments of all stripes competed 
fiercely for external capital, courting foreign firms with attractive incentive packages, 
“competitive” taxes and “most flexible labour codes in Europe” (Drahokoupil 2008; 
Šćepanović 2013; 2015). In the years before the 2004 enlargement, the EU itself 
actively promoted this approach to development (Medve-Bálint 2014).
This is not to say that the downsides have been completely invisible. Academic 
literature is rife with warnings about the heavy reliance on FDI, potentially leading to 
limited upgrading prospects, the lack of spill-overs to domestic firms, the persistent 
wage gap with Western Europe, and the mounting fiscal burden of the region’s 
“dependent market economies” (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Bohle & Greskovits, 
2012; Pavlínek & Žížalová, 2016). Yet, it was not until the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis that these concerns took political centre stage. Right-wing governments 
have led the way, complaining about “colonization” by Western European firms, but 
even more moderate politicians have voiced dissatisfaction with the multinationals’ 
reluctance to share their profits more widely and reduce the wage gap between the 
new and old EU member states (Bloomberg, 2017; Morawiecki, 2017).  
The debate over the economic consequences of EU integration bloomed again in 
early 2018, in response to a blog post published by the French star economist, Thomas 
Piketty. In it, he compares profit outflows from East-Central Europe to inflows from 
EU funds, and concludes that the ECE governments may be right to challenge the 
narrative of benevolent integration, as the balance of these two external sources of 
finance actually show that ECE economies have transferred more value to Western 
Europe than they received (Piketty, 2018). This is certainly an oversimplification—the 
comparison leaves out all other benefits that have accrued to the region from foreign 
investment, and offers little justification for the conceptual leap that compares public 
transfers to private profits (see e.g. Darvas 2018). Even so, Piketty’s numbers do 
raise some important questions about the relationship between FDI and EU funds—
questions that allow us to depart from the political dispute and reengage in an honest 
and constructive debate on the benefits and costs of economic integration for East-
Central Europe.
In theory, FDI and EU funds have very little in common. FDI consists of private 
capital inflows driven by business decisions that follow market advantage and go 
wherever they perceive a profit opportunity. The EU funds, meanwhile, are public 
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transfers from the EU’s cohesion policy intended to benefit the least developed 
member states by generating projects in areas neglected by private investors. Yet, in 
practice they are linked through the EU’s investment incentive framework, which, 
as we demonstrate in this study, allows the EU funds in ECE to be granted to the 
multinationals. In this way, the funds intended for developing the poorest areas of the 
EU are instead used to augment the returns on FDI. This practice is problematic for 
a variety of reasons. First, there is no evidence that these subsidies are necessary to 
secure investments. Incentives are usually justified as a way to compensate investors 
for the perceived disadvantages of a location. Yet, several studies have shown that 
they are rarely effective when real competitive disadvantages are at play (Blomström 
& Kokko, 2003; Oman, 2000). In fact, the value of incentives balloons precisely when 
the competition for investment takes place between most similar locations—in other 
words, where the relative disadvantages are the smallest, and the incentives least 
necessary (Klemm & Van Parys, 2012; Morisset & Pirnia, 2000; Thomas, 2011), which 
is exactly the case across ECE. The incentives are thus not an expression of economic 
necessity, but of the bargaining power of the multinationals: in other words, rents 
(Bohle, 2009; Medve-Bálint, 2015). Second, far from being simply wasteful, such 
subsidies also represent a significant fiscal and opportunity-cost to the host countries, 
absorbing resources that could be more effectively used elsewhere. 
This is all the more obvious in the case of the EU funds, whose purpose would 
precisely be to compensate for lack of private investment either in less developed 
regions or in activities such as research, innovation, and environment protection. 
However, if they simply amplify the profitability of those investments that would have 
taken place anyway, instead of driving investors to areas and activities where they 
would not otherwise go, then the EU funds will, contrary to their original purpose, 
contribute to rising territorial disparities and inequality between foreign and domestic 
firms. This effect is exactly the opposite of what EU policy makers intended: the poorest 
countries and regions of the EU may end up paying for investments that would have 
happened anyway, and instead of levelling the playing field for the weakest players, 
EU funds are channelled into the pockets of some of the continents’ wealthiest firms.
If the use of EU funds as investment incentives is both wasteful and 
counterproductive, then why does it occur? We argue that the combination of ECE’s 
structural dependence on foreign companies and the regulatory flexibility of the 
European competition policy allows for this outcome. We demonstrate the mechanism 
both conceptually and empirically. First, we show how the European regulatory 
conditions for offering state aid as investment incentives enable ECE-governments 
to grant subsidies to large multinational firms, and how EU funds may become part 
of these incentives. Next, by tracing the allocation of EU funds to the automotive 
industry in two ECE-countries—Poland and Romania—we examine the extent to 
which EU funds support investments of multinational firms, and whether those 
grants incentivize innovative or routine investments. In doing so, we also contribute 
to the larger debate on how EU policies affect development in its peripheries. As 
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we argued elsewhere (Medve-Bálint & Šćepanović 2019), the EU’s competition and 
cohesion policy are also among the most powerful tools that the dependent market 
economies have at their disposal to overcome the semi-peripheral position in the 
European and global economy. Nevertheless, while this transnational industrial 
policy has the potential to bring considerable developmental benefits, there are also 
important limitations. In this chapter we focus on these limitations, and highlight 
ways in which the policy should be adjusted to truly serve its purpose.  
While subsidies to FDI in ECE have often been subject to controversy over the 
years, both in the region itself and in the EU, there has been surprisingly little 
research into the extent to which EU funds have become part of this incentive system. 
In this research, we offer an exploratory analysis of this problem, by highlighting how 
Poland and Romania distribute EU funds to private firms in the automotive sector. We 
seek to answer the following questions: (1) to what extent are EU funds distributed to 
foreign firms and (2) to what extent are these funds used to stimulate new investment, 
as opposed to providing routine subsidies to investments that would have happened 
even in the absence of incentives? 
Our analysis builds on a unique dataset compiled by cross-referencing information 
on the distribution of EU funds in the 2007-2013 programming period to private 
companies in Poland and Romania, with information on company characteristics 
such as size, ownership, and market performance. As this is an exploratory analysis, 
we limit our dataset to one industry, the automotive, which is a leading sector in 
both countries, and one in which pressure to provide incentives is large, due to its 
oligopolistic structure and fierce competition between different production locations 
(Kolesár, 2006; Thomas, 2011). It is, however, also an industry in which foreign 
companies are dominant and where domestic firms have been struggling to break 
in to even the lower tiers of the value chains (Pavlínek & Janák, 2007; Pavlínek & 
Žížalová, 2016; Šćepanović, 2013), which is why one would expect the governments 
to use the EU funds’ in-built preference for small and medium companies to support 
domestic firms. The two country cases thus also help to see how the balance between 
the promotion of domestic and foreign firms is struck in different domestic contexts.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the EU 
regulations on the use of EU funds to support private investment in order to gauge 
theoretically the extent to which these can be used as means to attract FDI. The first 
part of Section 2 looks into the distribution of EU funds to private companies in Poland 
and Romania, and evaluates the effect of ownership on the distribution of funding. 
The quantitative analysis is then complemented in the second part of Section 2 by 
qualitative information on the projects that received funding. The final section details 
our conclusions.
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1.2  The EU’s Approach to Subsidies: Market-Preserving, Market-
Correcting, or Market-Amplifying?
We have argued above that the use of public funds to attract mobile multinational 
firms has significant economic downsides. We should also stress that the EU is well 
aware of these problems and has, over the years, built a system of regulations to 
minimize them. The cornerstone of this framework is the EU’s state-aid regime, one of 
the key pillars of the common competition policy. The main purpose of the policy is to 
preserve the integrity of the single market, by prohibiting any state aid that may distort 
intra-EU competition by “favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods” (Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union)28. The 
same article, however, relaxes this market-preserving logic by introducing a number 
of caveats. The aid “may be considered to be compatible with the single market” if 
it is given to “promote economic development” in backward regions, or those with 
high unemployment; promote “projects of common European interest”; or “remedy 
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”29—in other words, in order 
to correct the market’s failure to ensure sufficient investment in certain activities or 
regions.
The phrasing of Article 107 gives the Commission significant discretion to decide 
on how to strike the balance between the two principles of state aid. Starting in the late 
1980s, the Commission had assumed an activist attitude, interpreting the meaning of 
“state aid” very broadly (Wishlade, 2015a), and applying it with zeal. Until 1998 for 
instance, the member states were expected to clear all instances of state aid with DG 
Competition. This was partly driven by an ideological opposition to industrial policy, 
and partly by the types of state aid that became most prominent in the wake of the 
two oil crises and which the Commission considered particularly distortionary: aid to 
uncompetitive sectors, or rescue and restructuring aid to the “national champions.” 
Since the late 1990s, the idea that the states are responsible for promoting economic 
growth has returned, at least as it concerns “horizontal” forms of aid, such as those 
granted in accordance with general criteria, instead of targeting specific sectors or 
firms. The obligation to notify all individual instances of aid has been replaced by 
the so-called Block Exemption Regulations (BER) and Regional Aid Guidelines (RAG). 
These schemes must be vetted and approved in advance by the Commission, and the 
Commission reserves the right to periodically review their application, but as long as 
they fall within these schemes, individual cases need no longer be notified30.
28  Article 107(1) of the TFEU replaced the substantially identical Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
29  Article 107(3) of the TFEU.
30  Large investment projects receiving aid are still subject to notification. The thresholds, above 
which an investment is considered large, are set at the regional level (NUTS 3) by the Commission.
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The market-correcting logic of these schemes is reflected in the Commission’s 
efforts to encourage investments that are considered “additive”—i.e. those unlikely 
to take place without public support: investment by small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), in research and innovation, training, and in environmentally-friendly 
technologies (Blauberger, 2009). By contrast, aid to “traditional” investments—
i.e. investment in buildings and equipment, especially by large firms—has been 
increasingly subjected to tighter conditions31. Finally, to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour by companies, recipients of state aid must promise to retain operation for 
at least 5 years or repay the aid; and they may not receive aid for a project if they had 
recently closed a similar operation in another EU country (European Commission, 
2013). 
In spite of its soft market-correcting element applied to less developed member 
states, the EU’s state aid regime relies primarily on the market-preserving logic of the 
competition policy, which seeks to preserve the integrity of the market by discouraging 
public support to private firms. The EU funds, on the contrary, are predominantly 
driven by a market-correcting logic, which attempts to prevent growing disparities 
between countries and regions by compensating for the failure of private funding 
in reaching backward areas of the EU. This is also why the EU funding for private 
firms emphatically favours support to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which—
unlike most large firms—have a more difficult time accessing private capital markets. 
The market-correcting principles and safeguards applied by the EU funds are broadly 
similar to those stipulated in the state aid regulations. For example, majority of the 
funds are only available in the least developed areas (those with GDP per capita under 
75% of EU average) and are thus expressly used to promote economic development 
and address market-induced inequality. However, the funds are also meant to promote 
horizontal and additive investment objectives through special funding lines dedicated 
to SMEs, R&D, innovation, and environment. Most of these funding lines exclude 
large firms as beneficiaries. To prevent circumvention of this rule by multinationals, 
capital connections are inspected to determine the size of the firm: its global size (i.e. 
number of employees/turnover worldwide) is taken into account and not merely its 
size in the country of application. 
All things considered, the market-preserving approach, which ensures that 
uncompetitive firms and sectors are not artificially propped up by public funds, and 
the market-correcting approach, which addresses low supply of private investment 
31  The 2002 Multi-sectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects introduced a 
formula that progressively reduces the applicable aid ceilings for all investments exceeding EUR 50 
million (European Commission 2002). The subsequent Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-
2013 also introduced the requirement that the state must be able to demonstrate “incentive effect” of 
aid measure (i.e. that aid would not otherwise take place) as well as “proportionality” of aid and the 
lack of “negative effect” on EU’s economy (European Commission, 2006). 
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in certain areas and activities, include enough safeguards to successfully contain the 
negative effects of subsidy competition among the EU member states. Nevertheless, 
there are still a few reasons why, in the Eastern member states, the EU may not be 
fully effective at minimizing the misuse of investment incentives, including through 
its own funds.
First, the state aid regime allows poorer member states and regions to grant 
higher subsidies to private firms relative to the size of the investment, even when 
specific features of the location such as labour costs or agglomeration effects would 
in themselves guarantee profitability32. Nearly all regions in ECE fall below the EU 
deprivation threshold, which means that they are allowed to offer both national state 
aid and EU funds to prospective investors. Second, large foreign investors have become 
accustomed to receive incentives, and do not shy away from extracting them by 
orchestrating “beauty contests” between different shortlisted locations. At the same 
time, the ECE’s structural dependence on FDI has ensured that their governments 
try to work around the system’s limitations in order to offer as much aid as possible. 
Third, although in principle the Commission favours SMEs and additive investments 
as targets of EU funds, in practice the process of funding allocation has created 
pressures on the member states to absorb the EU funds as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. In absence of adequate domestic institutional structures, contracting the 
funds to large companies can serve as a solution to the absorption problem because 
it is easier to manage a small number of big contracts with large foreign firms than to 
administer a high number of small grants signed with SMEs. This is reflected in the 
fact that the ECE governments had insisted that traditional investments, including 
those by large firms, remain eligible for the EU funds.33 Fourth, the competitive 
allocation of EU funds—though it ensures efficiency of spending and increases overall 
fund “absorption capacity”—also implies that funds are awarded to the already 
most competitive and best prepared firms. In the context of the ECE dependent 
market economies, where public policy is already geared towards attracting mobile 
transnational capital, this means that public subsidies will be allocated according 
to the market power of the applicant, and diverted from domestic SMEs to foreign 
multinationals. This effect is likely to arise even without intentional manipulation on 
the governments’ part, as the internal capacities of large firms allow them to submit 
better fund applications than most of the domestic SMEs. Consequently, with these 
mechanisms at play, the main market-correcting instrument of EU-integration may—
32  In the years prior to the ECE’s accession to the EU, the companies were actually asked to calculate 
the cost difference between investing in the “disadvantaged” areas of EU-15 and investing in the 
candidate countries in order to obtain support in the former. In all of these cases, the calculations 
showed a significant cost advantage to investing in the ECE (Šćepanović, 2013).
33  We thank an anonymous Polish state-aid expert for mentioning this aspect (Interview in Warsaw, 
30 November 2017).
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ironically—reinforce the negative outcomes of the dependent developmental model. 
In this way, EU funding may become its own parody: a market-amplifying instrument.
To be sure, both the state aid regulations and the EU funds have been 
instrumental in helping ECEs to manage their dependence on external capital. The 
legal restrictions on subsidies have allowed them to resist more onerous demands by 
the multinationals, and enforce some rules over the kinds of projects that may bid for 
support. The availability of the EU funding has created additional opportunities for 
these states to reinvent their industrial policies (Medve-Bálint & Šćepanović, 2019). 
At the very least, the use of EU funds for investment-promotion purposes may relieve 
the pressure on the public budgets and alleviate distributional tensions, allowing 
diversification of support to different types of firms and projects. At best, it may 
help the Eastern member states nudge the multinational companies towards new 
investments that contribute to industrial upgrading instead of simply exploiting their 
low-cost advantage.
Whether or not the EU funds end up being a market-correcting tool, drawing 
investments to new actors and activities, or a market-amplifying vehicle that only 
lowers investment costs for the most powerful firms, depends in the end on how they 
are used. How much of the EU funding actually goes to the multinational firms? Does 
it mainly support routine investments that would have likely happened anyway, or 
does it facilitate investments in new directions, such as research and development 
(R&D)? Is the current extent of policy coordination sufficient, or can the EU do more to 
close the grey areas that permit its poorest regions to spend the most on incentives of 
dubious value? Surprisingly enough, there is very little empirical research to answer 
these questions one way or another. Other authors have acknowledged the overlap 
and the possible contradictions between the EU state-aid and regional-development 
policies (e.g. Thielemann, 2002; Wishlade, 2008), but the developmental aspects 
of the relationship between state-aid control and cohesion policy have just begun 
to attract scholarly interest (Streb, 2013). In the next section, we use data from two 
Eastern member states, Poland and Romania, to break new empirical ground on this 
front and investigate to what degree and in which ways the EU funds have been used 
for investment promotion purposes.
1.3  EU Funds as a Tool of Investment Promotion: Evidence from 
Poland and Romania
To understand how the EU funds are used as a form of subsidy to FDI, in this section 
we examine the allocation of funding to private firms in the automotive industry in 
Poland and Romania. The industry has long been one of the primary beneficiaries 
of public funding, for a number of reasons. The first is its relative size. Automotive 
production takes place in large industrial agglomerations that bring significant 
benefits in terms of employment and output. In Poland and Romania, the automotive 
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industry broadly understood (including all the primary component providers) 
accounts for 10% and 17% of industrial value added—equivalent to respectively 3% 
and 5% of total private sector GDP34. The industry’s contribution to export is even 
more remarkable: 15% of all commodity exports in Poland and 20% in Romania are 
directly related to the automotive sector35. Even more importantly, the industry is a 
centrepiece of a complex production network. With supply chains stretching far into 
many other industrial branches, it holds the promise of driving forward the entire 
manufacturing sector (Lee & Cason, 1994). 
The second reason is the industry’s concentration. A few global manufacturers 
control the majority of production worldwide, and thus command enormous 
bargaining power. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the post-socialist 
Eastern and Central Europe, where regional governments did everything in their 
power to attract the automotive giants in order to save their industries after the 
collapse of socialism. They assumed most of the restructuring costs of the former 
national champions so that the new owners could take over streamlined, debt-free 
companies, usually for symbolic amounts (Balcet & Enrietti, 1998; Dörr & Kessel, 
2002). They offered tax breaks, direct grants, discounted land purchase, dedicated 
infrastructural investments to connect the factories to the Western transportation 
network, and, as long as the trade liberalization schedule with the EU permitted it, 
they also maintained a modicum of import restrictions in order to reward incoming 
investors with privileged access to the local market (Antalóczy & Sass, 2001; Cass, 
2007; Domański, 2005; Drahokoupil, 2008). Some went so far as to stand up to the 
EU in defending the concessions granted to the automotive investors. In the run-up 
to the accession, the Polish state frequently clashed with the Commission over aid 
to the Korean carmaker Daewoo, the continuing protection of the domestic market 
in the guise of “environmental” ban on imports of used cars from Western Europe, 
and generous tax holidays in the Special Economic Zones (Van Aken, 2007). To this 
day, the sector remains among the “preferred sectors” on the lists of governments’ 
investment promotion agencies. In Romania, the automotive absorbed nearly 60% 
of about EUR 620 million spent on investment incentives in the period between 2007-
201636. In Poland, more than one third of state-aid funds allocated to large firms under 
regional-aid schemes in the same period went to the automotive industry—around 
EUR 580 million in total37.
34  Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat data.
35  Authors’ calculations based on COMTRADE.
36  Authors’ calculations based on data from the Romanian Ministry of Finance. Includes aid allocated 
under assistance schemes GD 1680/2008; GD 753/2008; GD 807/2014; GD 332/2014; GD 1165/2007.
37  Authors’ calculations based on data reported by the EU state aid register „Transparency system 
for regional aid for large investment projects”. 
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All of this makes the automotive industry the test case for the EU’s effectiveness 
in curbing the excessive use of public funds in the competition for investment. 
Since enlargement, the ECE’s incentive schemes has been brought into line with EU 
regulations, but in view of their past record and the industry’s undiminished power, 
there are good reasons to expect the governments to continue finding ways to grant 
automotive multinationals the subsidies they had come to expect. There are, however, 
even better reasons to ensure that as little public money as possible is spent on incentives 
to multinationals, least of all from the EU funds. First, as noted in the introduction, 
there is no evidence that subsidies are economically necessary to attract investment to 
the region, and most investor surveys already rank ECE as the most attractive area in 
Europe for automotive production (Deloitte, 2016). Second, although the steady flow 
of investments by the lead automotive firms has indeed boosted the manufacturing 
capabilities of the ECE states, it has done so mostly by transplanting the existing supplier 
networks to these countries, with very little involvement of local companies. With few 
exceptions, the latter had either been acquired by foreign competitors, or pushed 
out of the sector altogether, with potentially detrimental consequences for long-term 
development of industrial capabilities in the region (Pavlínek, 2012; Pavlínek & Janák, 
2007; Šćepanović, 2013). These processes are not peculiar to ECE: product integration 
and follow-up sourcing have led to growing industry concentration and marginalization 
of local producers in many parts of the world (Barnes & Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey & 
Memedovic, 2003). Yet, in the ECE, their marginalization has been further exacerbated 
by the fact that most public efforts at industry target foreign companies that already 
have better access to both capital and technology. 
In this section, we examine whether the EU funds are used to broaden the FDI-
promotion arsenal or, on the contrary, create opportunities for other firms to join the 
industry and improve their chances in market competition. To do so, we compiled 
a dataset that combines information on the distribution of EU funds under the 
2007-2013 financing framework, with information on company characteristics, 
including ownership, size, and performance. The dataset includes information from 
governments’ websites on EU funds, commercial databases EMIS and D&B, and 
automotive industry organisations in the two countries. As the automotive supplier 
base reaches into many different industries, in order to include all the relevant 
firms, we used information on companies’ primary activities as reported in the 
EMIS database and cross-checked it with the databases maintained by the industry 
associations (PIM and Automotivesuppliers.pl in Poland, and ACAROM in Romania). 
This gave us a list of 871 firms in Poland, and 523 in Romania, active in the automotive 
sector, with complete market and financial profiles. To this, we added information on 
ownership from D&B database, and classified as “foreign” those firms whose ultimate 
owner was registered in another country. As the vast majority of foreign-owned firms 
in our dataset are large companies with more than 1000 employees globally, we use 
“foreign” and “multinational” interchangeably in the paper. Finally, we matched the 
resulting dataset with that containing information on the EU funds in order to identify 
firms that received support. 
    103Subsidizing Foreign Investments Through EU Funds in the European Peripheries
We then performed both quantitative and qualitative analyses on the dataset, 
complementing it with information from company records, media, and government 
websites, to answer the following questions: Which characteristics make companies 
most likely to benefit from the EU funds? And what kinds of projects are most likely 
to be funded? The following two sub-sections tackle each of these questions in detail. 
1.3.1  EU Funds for the Automotive Industry: Who benefits?
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics and structure of automotive industries in 
Poland and Romania based on the information contained in our dataset. As expected, 
while the majority of firms in both countries are domestically owned, foreign 
enterprises overwhelmingly dominate the sector. They are responsible for more than 
80% of employment, 85% of revenues in the Polish automotive industry, and 89% of 
employment and 94% of revenues in Romania. Their share of EU funding is, however, 
smaller than their weight in the industry employment and output, though the amount 
of funding allocated to them is still sizeable: roughly half in Romania and as much as 
three quarters in Poland.
Table 1: Weight of foreign-owned firms in industry size and funding allocation.
  Number of 
firms
Employment 
(000s)
Operating 
revenue  
(EUR mn)
No. firms 
receiving  
EU funding
Total EU 
funding (EUR 
mn)
Poland 871 257.2 46158.3 198 298.3
of which % foreign-
owned
40.6 80.7 85.1 29.9 76
Romania 523 230 21059.8 83 144.5
of which % foreign-
owned
43.8 89 94.1 43.4 46.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the automotive dataset, drawing on EMIS, DB, and 
government databases on EU funding allocation. Data on revenues and employment refer to year 
2016.
The absolute figures also suggest that compared to the national state-aid allocations, 
the automotive industry does not feature prominently among the beneficiaries of EU 
funds. In the 2007-13 programming period, the total budget of EU funds amounted 
to EUR 67.3 billion and 19.7 billion in Poland and Romania, respectively (EC, 2007). 
By the end of the accounting period (end of 2015), Poland had contracted 95% of its 
budget while Romania managed to call in only 71%. According to the official records 
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published by the monitoring agencies, of the total national budget, EUR 19.3 billion 
was distributed to private firms in Poland, compared to just 2.9 billion in Romania. Of 
this, EUR 298 million (1.5% of private sector funding) in Poland and EUR 144.5 million 
(5%) in Romania was allocated to automotive firms. 
This would suggest that the EU is indeed successful at restricting access of large 
multinationals to EU funds, privileging a different population of firms. To confirm this, 
we first ran a logistic regression model and then built a two-step model (Heckman, 1979) 
to estimate the effects of firm characteristics such as ownership, size, productivity, 
and firm age, on the probability of receiving funding. In the first step, we performed 
a logistic regression, estimating the likelihood of obtaining funds, while the second 
one extends the regression by estimating the size of individual grants (measured as 
total EU-funding per employee). Firm size was proxied by the number of employees. 
Firm productivity was measured as operating revenue per employee; age was derived 
from the company’s year of incorporation (when operation in Poland or Romania 
began); and ownership was identified by the country of the ultimate owner. To check 
for possible differences in the behaviour of the two countries, in some estimations we 
introduced an interaction term between the country dummy and the binary indicator 
for foreign companies. To avoid biased estimates, due to the cross-country differences 
in average firm size, productivity and size of funds, we divided the firms’ operating 
revenue per employee, and total funds per employee by the corresponding country 
means. Finally, because the continuous variables showed a strong positive skew, we 
applied log transformation in order to normalize their distribution.38
We summarized the results of the models in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 are the logistic 
regressions while models 3 and 4 are the two-step models.39 Model 1 reveals that all 
else being equal, greater firm size and firm productivity increase the likelihood of 
being funded, while foreign ownership decreases it. The age of the firm does not 
show any significant relationship with the dependent variable. The country dummy 
is not significant which suggests that holding everything else constant, there is no 
difference in the likelihood of a Polish and a Romanian automotive firm gaining 
access to EU support. Model 2 contains the same explanatory variables but also adds 
the interaction term to the equation. The interaction between the country dummy and 
foreign ownership is not significant and the coefficient for the country dummy does 
not pass the 95% confidence level either. This is consistent with the results of the 
previous model.  
The first stage of the selection models estimates the likelihood of a firm receiving 
EU funds with a similar logistic model as applied above, and yields virtually identical 
results. In the second stage, OLS estimation is performed where the amount of funds 
38  For the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables, please consult Table A1 in the Appendix
39  As a robustness check, we ran all the models with an alternative indicator of size (total operating 
revenue). The results remained identical to those reported in Table 2.
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per employee becomes the dependent variable to reveal the relationship between the 
size of funds and the explanatory factors. In other words, the models estimate the 
size of EU grants that a firm gets once it is being funded. The results show that—all 
else held constant—larger firms contract fewer funds per employee, while an increase 
in productivity is associated with higher grants per worker. It implies that more 
efficient, more productive firms are able to secure bigger contracts relative to their 
size. Furthermore, the significant country dummy suggests that enterprises in Poland 
obtain on average lower EU funding per employee than firms in Romania. This is 
consistent with the descriptive statistics (Table 1) and reveals that funds distributed to 
the automotive sector are more concentrated in Romania than in Poland. Finally, the 
significant negative interaction term between the country dummy and firm ownership 
reveals that funding per employee for foreign businesses does not differ between the 
two countries: while the Romanian domestic firms—on average—receive significantly 
higher grants per worker than the domestically owned companies in Poland, the 
difference disappears in the case of the foreign-owned enterprises (Figure 1) if we 
hold all other variables constant. To put it differently, funds are more concentrated 
on the domestic firms in Romania, which also implies that funding in the automotive 
sector is less distributive there than in Poland, but the average grants per employee to 
foreign businesses is similar in the two countries, all else being equal. 
Figure 1: Predicted EU funding per employee with firm ownership by country (Model 4).
Source: Own elaboration.
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The conclusions of our regression models are somewhat conflicting. On the one hand, 
they show that foreign automotive firms do not enjoy privileged access to EU funding. 
On the contrary, if two firms are of the same size, age, and productivity, then domestic 
firms are on average more likely to receive funds. On the other hand, the data reveal a 
clear preference for larger firms, the vast majority of which are foreign. Even though 
this trend is somewhat attenuated by the apparent compression of funding amounts—
with very large firms receiving less per employee than the small firms—there is also 
evidence that the more competitive (i.e. more productive firms) are also better at 
obtaining larger grants. 
This is in line with the reasoning presented in Section 2, in which we argued 
that the EU funds may end up being channelled to investment promotion purposes, 
not because of an explicit bias towards multinationals, but because of the way in 
which they are distributed. In other words, the problem is not that multinationals are 
outright privileged—if anything, programme objectives work to prevent their access 
to the funds—but that they may end up being primary beneficiaries because of the 
interaction of funding mechanisms and market structure. In an industry in which 
large multinational firms control the majority of production, so long as they remain 
eligible for public support and this support is provided on competitive terms, the 
same characteristics that ensure their market dominance will also conspire to secure 
them a large proportion of funding. Thus, despite the fact that no preference towards 
foreign firms can be detected once appropriate controls are introduced, at the macro 
level, the coincidence of these factors—size, productivity, and ownership—ensure 
that they receive a very large proportion of EU funds. 
The fact that substantial funding goes to multinationals is not yet evidence that 
programmatic objectives of EU funds to private firms—development of capacities in 
areas where the private funding is not readily forthcoming—have been overridden by 
market power. Support to SMEs is one such area; the others are promotion of R&D 
activity, investment in human resources, and diffusion of “green” technologies to 
minimize the environmental impact of industry. In the following section, we examine 
the extent to which automotive industry projects, which successfully bid for EU 
funding, fall in line with these objectives.  
1.3.2  What kinds of projects are being financed?
EU funds are allocated in accordance with the programming documents that must 
be prepared by each member state ahead of the start of the financing period. The 
national documents are aligned with the EU’s own economic goals, and the national 
authorities work closely with the European Commission to translate the European 
objectives into operational programmes (OP) that best suit the country’s needs. 
These typically comprise regional programmes, dedicated to development of specific 
regions, and sectoral programmes, targeting horizontal objectives such as growth, 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the logistic and the two-step regression models.
Logistic models Two-step selection models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Second stage: 
EU funds/
employee
Second stage: EU 
funds/employee
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Constant .18 .28 .02 .31 2.33 .39 2.76 .42
Fixed effects
Number of employees .52*** .05 .51*** .05 -.44*** .06 -.44*** .06
Op. revenue/employee .29*** .06 .29*** .06 .33*** .10 .34*** .11
Age of firm .00 .01 -.01 .01 .01 .02 .01 .01
Foreign-owned -1.81*** .21 -1.56*** .32 -.17 .24 -.73*** .31
Poland .21 .15 .36* .20 -1.16*** .22 -1.54*** .25
Interaction effects
Poland * foreign firm -.35 .33 .81** .41
First stage: 
selection of 
firms
First stage: 
selection of firms
Constant .04 .11 .04 .11
Number of employees .29*** .03 .29*** .03
Op. revenue/employee .16*** .04 .16*** .04
Foreign-owned -.98*** .11 -.98*** .11
Poland .12 .09 .12 .09
Mills lambda .21* .13 .23* .14
rho .15* .10 .15* .08
sigma 1.50*** .08 1.49*** .08
N (uncensored) 1346 1346 1345 (279) 1345 (279)
-2Log-likelihood -1189.1 -1187.9 -2204.8 -2200.9
Wald Chi-square 133.1*** 136.9*** 107.8*** 133.95***
Pseudo R-squared .14 .14
Unstandardized coefficients, robust standard errors.
 * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01
Source: Own elaboration
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competitiveness, or environment. Each operational programme is then subdivided 
into Priority Axes (PA), each with their own budget line, and within these into specific 
measures and areas of interest. Private firms do not have equal access to all OPs, 
at least not as primary beneficiaries. Most funding under regional OPs (ROP), for 
instance, go to public authorities for investments in infrastructure, and the financing 
of private sector activities is strictly limited to SMEs. Under other OPs, access may be 
limited to firms in certain sectors such as energy, water, or transport. 
In the 2007-2013 programming period, the overwhelming portion of EU funding 
to the automotive industry in Poland came from OP Innovative Economy (86%) and, 
to a lesser extent, from the 16 regional OPs and the OP for the development of Eastern 
Poland (12.2%) and OP Human Capital (2%). In Romania, nearly all funding (97%) 
came from OP Increase of Economic Competitiveness, followed by OP Human Capital 
(3%) (Table 3).
Table 3: Distribution of EU funds to the automotive industry by Operational Programme.
Operational Programme Total funding to 
private firms
(mn EUR)a
Automotive 
industryb (mn 
EUR)
% from all 
funding to 
automotive
Poland      
OP Regional 3055.7 28.3 9.5%
OP Infrastructure and Environment 10002.7 0
OP Innovative Economy 4550.9 255.8 85.8%
OP Human Capital 1524.2 5.9 2%
OP Development of Eastern Poland 178.1 8.2 2.7%
Total 19311.6 298.2
Romania      
OP Regional 553.8 0.6 0.4%
Op Environment 91.2 0
OP Economic competitiveness 1676 139.6 96.5%
OP Human capital 405.7 4.4 3.1
OP Transport 157.3 0
Total 2884 144.6
a Total funds contracted by end of 2016 
b As defined in our database
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the automotive dataset and governments’ data on EU funds.
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The structure of Poland’s OP Innovative Economy and Romania’s OP Increase 
of Economic Competitiveness differ according to the needs of the two countries, but 
a few similarities stand out. Both programmes emphasise the need to improve the 
countries’ competitiveness by investing in innovation, and both have priority axes 
dedicated specifically to funding collaborative and individual projects by private 
enterprises in research, development, and innovation. Both also have funding 
lines for projects that consist of investment in fixed assets, such as buildings and 
equipment, as well as intangible assets such as services, intellectual property, and 
the like. In principle, large firms should not be allowed to bid for grants that support 
purchase of capital equipment, as these are essential for the firm’s core operations 
and should therefore easily be funded in the private markets. However, both Poland 
and Romania resolutely fought the Commission’s attempts to exclude large firms from 
these funding opportunities, citing the overall backwardness of the countries’ capital 
stock and the need for extra support to bring the overall technological profile of the 
industry closer to the European levels (Government of Romania, 2007; Ministry of 
Regional Development, 2007). In the final compromise, these budget lines remained 
open to the large firms, but with a number of caveats. 
In Romania, funding for capital equipment purchase is tucked under OP IEC 
Priority Axis 1 - “An innovative and eco-efficient productive system”, but only 20% 
of the allocations under it may be distributed to large firms. By contrast, no such 
restrictions apply to Priority Axis 2 – “Research, Technological Development and 
Innovation for Competitiveness”, which funds R&D-related activities (Government of 
Romania, Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2007). In Poland, about 70% of all direct 
support to OP Innovative Economy is similarly earmarked for support to SMEs. Large 
firms can access funding for capital investments under Priority Axis “Investments in 
innovative undertakings”, measure 4.5 (“Support for investments of high importance 
to the economy”), under stipulation that priority will be given to investments 
“connected with start and development of R&D activities in enterprises” (Ministry of 
Regional Development, 2009).
In view of all these efforts to direct funding towards smaller firms and non-routine 
activities, it is quite surprising that over 80% of all sectoral funding to automotive 
industry in both countries went to projects involving purchase of capital equipment 
and services, compared to just 8% for R&D-related projects in Poland and as little as 
3% in Romania (Table 4). Even more disappointing is the fact that the majority of 
such funding was claimed by multinational companies. As noted above, to the extent 
that the programme documents allow for EU support to companies’ purchase of basic 
operating assets—factory halls, machinery, licences—they should do so only where 
private financing is unavailable, or prohibitively costly. This is often the case with 
SMEs, which find it harder to obtain loans at favourable terms, or with local companies 
operating with especially out-dated equipment and facing very high costs of replacing 
their capital stock. It is emphatically not the case with the multinationals, which 
almost by definition operate at the technological edge and have premium access to 
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private financing. And yet, these firms were not only more likely to apply for funds in 
order to finance investment in basic equipment, but were even less likely than other 
firms to use EU funding for R&D-related projects or for investment in human capital 
development (Figure 2).  
Table 4: EU funds to the automotive industry by type of project, excluding funding from ROPs.
  Poland Romania
  EUR mn % total EUR mn % total
Purchase of capital equipment and 
other assetsa
210.6 80.5 115.7 81
R&D projects 21 8 4.3 3
Human capital 5.8 2.2 4.3 3
Otherb 24.2 9.3 18.5 13
Total 261.6 142.8
a “Purchase of capital equipment” includes all projects funded under OP 3, PA 1, measure 
3.2.1.1. in Romania, and projects funded under OP 3, PA 4, measures 4.4 and 4.5 in Poland. “R&D 
projects” includes funding accorded under OP 3, PA 2 in Romania and OP3, PA 1 and PA 4 measure 
4.1 in Poland. “Human capital” refers to funding allocated under OP 4 - Human Capital, in both 
countries.
b “Other” includes funding for increasing energy efficiency of buildings, introduction of IT 
systems, assistance with registration of intellectual property and internationalization (attending 
international fairs etc.). This includes measures under OP 3, PA 1, 3.2.1.3.; PA 3 and PA 4 in 
Romania and OP 3 PA 3, 5, 6, and 8 in Poland.
Source: Own calculations based on the automotive dataset and governments’ data on EU funds.
Figure 2. EU funds by type of firm and project, mn EUR.
Note: For detailed description of categories, see Table 4 above. 
Source: Own calculations based on the automotive dataset and governments' data on EU funds. 
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All of this suggests that a good part of EU funds is being used to fund routine 
investments of large multinationals. This is not only wasteful, as such activities 
would have likely happened even in absence of any public support, but also 
counterproductive, as it diverts funding from firms that would have needed it more 
and reinforces the competitiveness gap between the large foreign firms and their 
local counterparts. It is, of course, very difficult to know how innovative a company’s 
project really is. The applications are usually tailored to fit the requirements of the 
call, and the companies do their best to advertise their own investments as boons to 
the countries at large. For instance, the EUR 14 million in national and EU funding 
awarded to Renault in 2014 was widely touted as a subsidy to the development of a 
competitiveness pole Auto-Muntenia, which would in time contribute to the growth 
and export competitiveness of the entire regional cluster (Ministerul Economiei, 2014). 
Yet, all five grants awarded within this package went to two of Renault’s subsidiaries—
Automobile Dacia and Renault Technologie Roumaine—to construct facilities for the 
production and testing of a new engine model that had already been announced. The 
model change came in response to the EU regulation on vehicle emissions requiring 
all engines installed as of September 2014 to meet Euro 6 standards (Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 459/2012), and it is very difficult to imagine that this project 
would not have happened without the subsidy. Even so, 30% of the total costs of this 
EUR 36 million investment had been covered from the EU’s coffers. 
In Poland, Bridgestone won close to EUR 42 million in 2015 and 2016 to cover 
about 25% of the costs of expansion and upgrading of its tyre factories in Poznan and 
Stargard. The investment was part of a larger EUR 266 million investment package by 
the Japanese company to expand and upgrade its European facilities. In addition to 
the two Polish factories, this also included a EUR 70 million investment in Burgos, 
Spain (Ureta, 2017). Since Burgos has a GDP higher, and unemployment lower than 
the EU average, it qualifies for minimal EU funds and no state aid, thus the investment 
went ahead without public support. It is hard to imagine that the Polish investments 
would have been so much more difficult to finance without public help, especially 
as the two facilities are decades younger than the one in Burgos. The majority of 
other investments supported by the EU funds similarly include minor equipment 
upgrades in anticipation of new product models or expansion of existing facilities. 
Though the Polish programming documents specifically state that projects related 
to establishment of R&D activities will be prioritized, not a single one of the top ten 
funded projects in the automotive industry mentions establishment or development 
of an R&D centre in the project description.
1.4  Conclusion
Although the FDI-centred economic strategies of the ECE countries have successfully 
embedded these economies into the global market, this emerging model of dependent 
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development is not without downsides. As domestic economic performance continues 
to depend on large multinational firms, it is difficult for the public authorities to find 
ways to steer their business decisions in the direction that would contribute to further 
domestic development. Meanwhile, keeping the investors happy requires continued 
provision of various incentives, and thus diverts funds from projects that would assist 
the upgrading and development of local businesses. In the long run, this may lead 
to persistent economic disparities between East and West, leaving ECE in a middle-
income trap and foreclosing these economies’ chances to catch up with the more 
advanced states.
The European Union’s transnational industrial policy provides an important 
corrective to such practices. Driven by a market-preserving logic, the European state-
aid regime, which sees the promotion of private businesses through public funds as 
a violation of intra-EU competition, sets legal limitations on investment competition. 
More importantly, the market-correcting EU funds offer compensatory public 
resources targeting the least developed areas in order to enhance their development 
by promoting SMEs, research, innovation, and training activities. In this way, the 
EU funds represent an opportunity to partially mitigate the shortcomings of the 
dependent development model.
However, in this chapter we have argued that the reach of these policies has 
been limited. As a consequence of the ECE’s structural dependence on FDI, in 
combination with the peculiarities of EU policies themselves, the EU’s market-
correcting instrument can turn into a market-amplifying one. More specifically, EU 
funds may be used as incentives to large multinational enterprises, funding routine 
foreign investment projects that would have been realized even in absence of public 
grants. This is because EU funds are distributed competitively, and since foreign firms 
in ECE are eligible to apply, their competitive advantage over most domestic SMEs in 
preparing quality applications and raising their own resources play to their favour. In 
addition, contracting large amounts of EU funds to multinationals eases the problems 
with domestic fund-absorption capacity, which is a particularly pressing issue in the 
less developed ECE member states. Last but not least, foreign firms are accustomed 
to receiving sizable subsidies for their investment projects in ECE, a practice that 
they expect central governments to continue in order to secure further investments. 
In these circumstances, the distribution of EU funds to the benefit of multinationals 
seems nearly guaranteed in the Eastern European members.
To test our argument, we analysed the funding contracts to the automotive 
industry in Poland and Romania in the 2007-2013 programming period. In both 
countries, the automotive sector plays a key role in the domestic economies and 
is overwhelmingly dominated by large foreign enterprises. What is more, local 
businesses in this industry face difficulties with integrating into the value chains 
controlled by multinational carmakers and their suppliers. Domestic firms in this 
sector are thus in dire need of gaining access to external capital, such as EU funds, 
to upgrade their production systems and to survive the fierce market competition. 
    113Subsidizing Foreign Investments Through EU Funds in the European Peripheries
However, the structural dominance of foreign enterprises in the automotive industry 
may divert EU funds from SMEs to the multinational companies. 
While our expectations about EU funds being diverted to multinational enterprises 
have been confirmed, our results reveal a mixed picture. After controlling for several 
firm characteristics such as size, productivity, and age, we found that foreign 
automotive firms are in fact less likely to receive EU funds than the domestically-
owned ones. However, both the likelihood of obtaining EU grants and the size of 
those grants show a strong bias towards larger firms, which in turn, tend to be foreign. 
This is why a notable share of EU funds contracted to the automotive sector goes to 
multinationals even though the pattern is considerably more distributive than in the 
case of traditional state aid disbursed from the national budgets. Firm productivity is 
also positively associated with EU grants, which confirms the competitive character 
of fund distribution. While we do not find significant differences between the two 
countries in the propensity to award EU grants to multinational firms, we do find some 
differences with respect to funding to domestic firms. Specifically, the distribution of 
funds is more concentrated in Romania, with fewer SMEs obtaining funds relative to 
their number in the sector. This is an indicator of the country’s lower fund absorption 
capacity. It also suggests that while the pressure to compete for FDI poses a similar 
external constraint to ECE governments’ space for manoeuvre, the extent to which 
they are able to take advantage of the tools of the EU’s transnational industrial 
policy also depends on their domestic institutional capacities (see Medve-Bálint & 
Šćepanović, 2019).
The problematic nature of the above funding pattern does not necessarily lie 
in the fact that multinational enterprises obtain EU grants, but that most of those 
funds support projects that are not innovative in character. As we have shown, the 
vast majority of EU funds contracted to foreign automotive firms assist the purchase 
of capital equipment and other assets—or, to put it differently, routine investments 
that would have been realized without any public support. This contradicts the main 
objectives of EU funds and may contribute to the negative economic consequences of 
the dependent development model. While the Commission is aware of the problem, 
the design of the 2014-20 funding programmes continues to allow it. In the current 
funding cycle, three PAs of the Smart Growth OP—which, in terms of objectives, has 
replaced the Innovative Economy OP in Poland—are available to the private sector, 
and two of them are open to large enterprises. This means that large firms, including 
multinationals can, in principle,  compete for 69% of the total EU contribution of 
EUR 7 billion allocated for the three PAs.40 The situation is similar in Romania: the 
40  The authors’ own calculation based on Detailed Description of Priority Axis of Smart Growth 
Operational Programme 2014-2020, Warsaw: Ministry of Infrastructure and Development, 22 October 
2015 (Available: https://www.poir.gov.pl/media/11337/SZOP_POIR_22102015_ang.pdf, accessed on 1 
July 2018)
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primary instrument for supporting businesses, the Competitiveness OP, has two PAs 
and, except for a single action assisting SMEs in accessing venture capital, nearly 
the entire budget of EUR 1.3 billion is open to large firms as well.41 Most notably, 
the reason that the EU funds may continue to subsidize multinationals is that the 
same ECE states that are increasingly complaining about being colonized by Western 
capital, and blaming the EU for it, have not found a way to extricate themselves from 
structural dependence on FDI and have thus done everything in their power to ensure 
that the EU funding programmes remain open to large firms.
Our analysis has thus revealed that the structural power of multinationals, and 
the funding allocation mechanisms combined with the states’ dependence on foreign 
capital, create a perverse outcome: the least developed regions of Europe spend their 
own, as well as the EU’s resources, to finance some of the richest firms in the world. 
This is not only wasteful, it potentially prevents these countries from overcoming 
the economic drawbacks of the dependent development model. Nevertheless, the 
empirical evidence presented here is limited to a single albeit highly important sector, 
the automotive. Further inquiries should investigate whether or not a similar pattern 
characterizes the distribution of EU funding contracted to other industries in ECE.
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Appendix
Table A1: Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables.
Operating 
revenue
Number of 
employees
Operating 
revenue per 
employee
Age Foreign-owned
Operating revenue 1
Number of 
employees
.83*** 1
Operating revenue 
per employee
.62*** .08*** 1
Age -.09*** -.17*** -.04 1
Foreign-owned .54*** .46*** .33*** -.05** 1
** p < .05 *** p < .01
Source: Own elaboration
Figure A1: Distribution of EU funding per employee (logged), non-zero cases.
Source: Own elaboration
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables. (Original scales)
Name of variable Min. Max. Mean SD
EU funds per employee (EUR) 0 438467 3519.6 20885.7
Total operating revenue 
(mn EUR)
0 4623.9 49.38 207.80
Number of employees 1 13835 350.23 935.14
Operating revenue per employee 
(mn EUR)
0 10.9 .192 .62
Age of firm 1 58 13.58 6.36
 
Source: Own elaboration
2  The Hungarian Experience of Using Cohesion 
Policy Funds and Prospects
Györgyi Nyikos42 & Gábor Soós43
Abstract: Since Hungary joined the European Union, cohesion policy funds have 
opened up a number of opportunities for development. The general belief was that, 
with such funding, the prospect of higher economic growth, new jobs, higher wages 
and improved standards of living would arrive. While Hungary has implemented a 
number of projects, and the country has been fairly successful in the absorption of 
funds, there has not been a real sentiment of success following the closure of the last 
two programming periods. Despite being one of the biggest net beneficiaries of funds, 
Hungary has not achieved exceptional economic performance. In light of this, it is 
important to examine the possible causes of this limited success. This research thus 
presents an overview of the evolution of the administration dealing with cohesion 
policy and the set-up of the legislative framework in each programming period. 
Data analysis is conducted on Hungary’s use of EU funds and is contrasted against 
economic indicators during the same period. Based on the findings from analysing 
Hungary’s prospects as a recipient of EU funds, suggestions are made about what the 
implementation practice should take into consideration.
Keywords: Cohesion policy, development fund’s effects, institution system, 
simplification 
2.1  Introduction
A review of literature revealed a lack of consensus on whether or not cohesion 
policy has a true impact on the economic performance of EU member states. In some 
studies, research carrying out in-depth analysis on this subject evidenced significant 
impact. In the 90s, several studies measured impact using macroeconomic models 
(e.g. Cappelen et al., 2003; Pereira & Gaspar, 1999). The European Commission has 
published plenty of evaluation studies44, where findings broadly confirmed the 
positive impact of subsidies. There is also a body of literature indicating that EU 
cohesion policy does not result in the desired impact on Central and Eastern European 
42  National University of Public Service, Institute of Public Finance and Financial Law, Hungary. 
Correspondence: nyikos.gyorgyi@uni-nke.hu
43  National University of Public Service, Institute of Public Finance and Financial Law, Hungary.
44  Please visit http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/
 Journal xyz 2017; 1 (2): 122–135
The First Decade (1964-1972)
Research Article 
Max Musterman, Paul Placeholder
What Is So Different About 
Neuroenhancement? 
Was ist so anders am Neuroenhancement?
Pharmacological and Mental Self-transformation in Ethic 
Comparison 
Pharmakologische und mentale Selbstveränderung im 
ethischen Vergleich
https://doi.org/10.1515/xyz-2017-0010 
received February 9, 2013; accepted March 25, 2013; published online July 12, 2014
Abstract: In the concept of the aesthetic formation of knowledge and its as soon 
as possible and success-oriented application, insights and profits without the 
reference to the arguments developed around 1900. The main investigation also 
includes the period between the entry into force and the presentation in its current 
version. Their function as part of the literary portrayal and narrative technique. 
Keywords: Function, transmission, investigation, principal, period
Dedicated to Paul Placeholder
1  Studies and Investigations
The main investigation also includes the period between the entry into force and 
the presentation in its current version. Their function as part of the literary por-
trayal and narrative technique.
*Max Musterman: Institute of Marine Biology, National Taiwan Ocean University, 2 Pei-Ning 
Road Keelung 20224, Taiwan (R.O.C), e-mail: email@mail.com
Paul Placeholder: Institute of Marine Biology, National Taiwan Ocean University, 2 Pei-Ning 
Road Keelung 20224, Taiwan (R.O.C), e-mail: email@mail.com
 Open Access. © 2017 Mustermann and Placeholder, published by De Gruyter.  This work is 
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
 Open Access. © 2020 Ida Musiałkowska, Piotr Idczak, Oto Potluka and chapters’ contributors. Published by 
De Gruyter. 
 Journal xyz 2017; 1 (2): 122–135
The First Decade (1964-1972)
Research Article 
Max Musterman, Paul Placeholder
What Is So Different About 
Neuroenhancement? 
Was ist so anders am Neuroenhanc ment?
Pharmacological and Mental Self-transformation in Ethic 
Comparison 
Pharmakologische und mentale Selbstveränderung im 
ethischen Vergleich
https://doi.org/10.1515/xyz-2017-0010 
received February 9, 2013; accepted March 25, 2013; published online July 12, 2014
Abstract: In the concept of the aesthetic formation of knowledge and its as soon 
as possible and success-oriented application, insights and profits without the 
reference to the arguments developed around 1900. The main investigation also 
includes the period between the entry into force and the presentation in its current 
version. Their function as part of the literary portrayal and narrative technique. 
Keywords: Function, transmission, investigation, principal, period
Dedicated to Paul Placeholder
1  Studies and Investigations
The main investigation also includes the period between the entry into force and 
the presentation in its current version. Their function as part of the literary por-
trayal and narrative technique.
*Max Musterman: Institute of Marine Biology, National Taiwan Ocean U iversity, 2 Pei-Ning 
Road Keelung 20224, Taiwan (R.O.C), e-mail: email@mail.com
Paul Placeholder: Institute of Marine Biology, National Taiwan Ocean University, 2 Pei-Ning 
Road Keelung 20224, Taiwan (R.O.C), e-mail: email@mail.com
 Open Access. © 2017 Mustermann and Placeholder, published by  This work is 
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
3.0 L cens . https://doi.org/10.1515/9788395720451-007
120   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
(CEE) countries. Borsi and Metiu (2013) have concluded that there is no real income 
per capita convergence in the European Union (Borsi & Metiu, 2013: 11). Others have 
pointed out that the convergence process has been interrupted by the economic crisis 
and that disparities will prevail, not only between the old and new member states, 
but also between the richer and poorer regions. The sluggish pace of the convergence 
process will be insufficient to counterbalance the forecasted increase in disparities 
(Camagni & Capello, 2014: 7). 
A simple examination of Hungarian data from the past 12 years does not 
capture the impact of the funds received.45 In fact, the Hungarian economy has 
struggled in various ways as early as 2007, and only started to recover fully from 
the economic crisis in recent years. Nevertheless the main objective of cohesion 
policy—namely, to help convergence—in CEE countries might not be immediately 
obvious from basic economic data. The data indicate that the effect of the crisis 
was still quite severe, both in Hungary and in other member states, despite 
there being a steady flow of EU funding during the crisis. Even so, EU funds did 
help alleviate the negative effects of the crisis in CEE countries. Counterfactual 
impact evaluations and macro-level approaches show that, without EU funds, the 
Hungarian GDP growth rate would be even lower (Nyikos, 2013a; Balás, 2015). For 
example, infrastructure developments could still receive funding, whilst money 
is still available for SMEs both in the form of grants and financial instruments. 
The latter was particularly significant given that many banks were reluctant 
to offer loans at the time. This is contrasted against the current recovery from 
the crisis, which impacted financial institutions inversely through increasing 
their willingness to offer loans. Furthermore, economic models have shown 
that, in beneficiary countries, consumption and wages increase inline with an 
improvement in productivity. While private investments might be crowded by EU 
support in the short term, in the medium term increase in productivity becomes 
significant and investment expenditures grow (Kengyel, 2014: 504).
Administrative capacities and efficient procedures may also have a bearing 
on whether the impacts of funds are maximised. This is especially important, 
since member states are responsible for managing programmes, including 
project selection, control and monitoring (to prevent, realize, and correct any 
irregularities) and project evaluation (Nyikos & Talaga, 2015: 116). The literature 
also highlights the contribution of cohesion policy to economic development, 
revealing that it is conditional on the capacity of national and regional institutions 
to design robust strategies, allocate resources effectively, and administer EU funds 
efficiently (Bachtler et al., 2014: 735). In order to ensure efficient functioning of all 
implementation systems, it is essential to clearly define powers and responsibilities 
and establish well-functioning coordination mechanisms, which are well 
45  See data in Figure 6.
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documented and properly implemented (Nyikos, 2013a: 52). Weak capacity levels 
can hamper the effective management and implementation of the Operational 
Programmes and as a result negatively affect the overall regional development 
outcomes (Smeriglio et al., 2016: 178). It has also been estimated, through analyses 
of the absorption of regional funds, that government capacity is positively 
correlated to ERDF absorption performance (Tosun, 2013: 2). In Hungary, there are 
sufficient administrative capacities in place to enable adequate implementation of 
funds. Hungary has also managed to absorb most of the funds available to it in the 
past two programming periods. On the other hand, the quality of projects may well 
have had an income on the Hungarian economic data. The literature supports this 
by pointing out that promoting faster spending through the de-commitment rule 
has conflicted with the goal of more effective spending through the performance 
reserve and more targeted spending under the earmarking requirement (Bachtler 
& Ferry, 2015: 1270). 
In Hungary, the pressure to try to spend all available funds often resulted in the 
diminishing significance of project-selection quality. This happens towards the end of 
the programming periods. Yet even so, the Hungarian Government has made plans to 
commit all available funds for the current programming period before 2019. Looking 
at the results of this decision, there are uncertainties on whether or not such actions 
will maximise the positive economic impact of the funds.46
2.2  Methods
Research methods in this study are twofold: First, we analysed the relevant European 
and national regulations, literatures, evaluations of the implementation of EU funds 
in Hungary in the period 2004-2015. This enabled to collect and assess the relevant 
factors which may influence the results of the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds. In 
particular, we looked at the issues pertaining to governmental-structure changes 
and the availability of sufficient administrative capacity in that timeframe, as the 
regulatory and institutional environment strongly affects the capacity for the efficient 
and effective use of the funds (Nyikos, 2013). Information collection and validation 
rely on a range of further sources, including official websites and annual reports, 
scientific literature, and last, but not least, a great array of interviews with Cohesion 
Policy experts.
Second, we looked at the figures linked to EU funds to examine its impact on 
Hungarian economic performance, whether or not outcomes were positive, and how 
funds were used to offset negative effects of the economic crisis. We assessed the 
46  In regions in Hungary competitiveness remained largely unchanged over the 6 years. (Seventh 
report on economic, social and territorial cohesion)
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relation between the data on absorption and the Hungarian macroeconomic figures to 
measure the country’s performance and identify improvement needs.  The  research 
is  then expanded into a section explicating the use of financial instruments and how 
these special types of financing tools function  and the challenges that arise from 
it. By examining significant phenomena linked to the implementation of cohesion 
sources in Hungary, we find factors that explain the results and issues that need 
improvement in the future. 
2.3  Results
Results obtained are interpreted as the causal impact of cohesion policy in Hungary. 
Our findings confirm that the funds had a positive impact on Hungarian economic 
performance. However, the Hungarian implementation of the programmes has been 
difficult and problematic with increasing irregularity levels, not only because of 
the complexity of cohesion policy regulation, but also because of institutional and 
regulatory changes in the Hungarian implementation system. Besides the positive 
macro-economic effect, the funds did not improve productivity, even though they 
would be essential for long-term convergence. 
2.4  Discussion
2.4.1  Implementation of EU Funds: Administration and regulation in Hungary
Cohesion policy legislation, at both EU and national level, are very complex. Besides 
the strict and complicated cohesion-policy-legal framework, member states also have 
to comply with other sets of rules, such as state aid and public procurement. In this 
complex legal environment, the permanent institutional reorganization significantly 
increases the risk against proper and regular implementation. Partly, this phenomenon 
caused government effectiveness to diminish in Hungary the between 1996 and 2015 
(Seventh Cohesion Report: 137). 
Extant literature suggests that effective use of EU funds depends on member 
states having sufficient administrative capacity to manage these funds. Undoubtedly, 
cohesion policy works best in an environment that is supportive of such policy 
(Nyikos, 2013b: 173). Initially, most Central and Eastern European countries had 
perceived weaknesses in their legal frameworks, administrative structures, and 
management systems. However, further attempts have been made to solve these 
problems through better human resource management, including increased salaries 
and better career prospects (Bachtler et. al, 2014: 750). In Hungary, it took some time 
before administrative structures and cohesion policy legislation were developed, only 
for implementation to be hindered by the continuous institutional and regulatory 
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changes taking place. This instability and excessive overregulation not only increased 
the administrative burden for both beneficiaries and implementing entities, it also 
complicated overseeing and addressing all ongoing changes that were causing 
substantially higher compliance risks. 
The initial structure of the regulatory framework that Hungary created for the 
programming period 2004-2006 was rather complex. The domestic regulations not 
only supplemented the EU regulations, it provided detailed obligations47. Managing 
authorities48 retained the right to issue OP and fund-specific rules—each of them 
adopting their own operational manual. The involvement of multiple agencies49 with 
overlapping authorities created difficulties in maintaining a nationally-consistent 
approach to the interpretation and employment of regulatory requirements. In 
the 2007-2013 programming period, a complete overhaul of the system took place. 
The newly established National Development Agency (NDA) took over the role of 
managing authorities from all the relevant ministries. The rationale behind this was 
that national-level objectives could be better realized compared to sectoral objectives, 
and that the coordination of measures taken under different programs could be 
improved. Further justification for reorganization revolved around centralization and 
standardization, where certain tasks such as the operation of IT systems, evaluation, 
and communication were also centralized within the NDA. Despite the efforts to 
enhance and cascade shared understanding of the rules throughout a structure 
comprising more than 25 executing bodies, the overlapping regulations inevitably 
led to different departures in legal interpretation. Likewise, inconsistency and 
fragmentation generated an additional compliance burden.
As a result, complete mid-term revision commenced in 2010. This included 
re-programming and institutional redesign in addition to revisiting the regulatory 
framework. Coordination and control functions of the managing authorities had to be 
strengthened and provisions increasing efficiency had to be introduced. The fractured 
regulatory landscape was replaced by a general overarching government decree50 
that provided a clearer distribution of tasks between managing authorities and 
intermediate bodies. It also contained the description of the delivery principles and 
47  National rules on the use of EU funds were divided between 5 pieces of legislation, which were 
supplemented with an Operational Manual containing even more detailed rules on how to implement 
each process. There was one ministerial decree jointly adopted by 5 different ministries regulating 
procedural rules. Then there were separate government decrees each regulating one separate area, 
namely institutions, finance, guarantees and sanctions.
48  3 ministries (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Employment) and the 
independent Hungarian Territorial and Regional Development Office
49  The implementation system carrying out the actual transactions was rather fragmented with 22 
intermediate bodies.
50  Government Decree 4/2011. (I.28.) on the use of assistance from ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion Fund 
in the 2007-13 programming period 
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governed the functions of project selection, financial implementation and control, 
management of irregularities and collateral. This regulatory architecture improved 
consistency and coherence. As a final change towards the end of the programming 
period, supervision of the NDA was moved from the Ministry for National Development 
to the Prime Minister’s Office. 
The start of the 2014-2020 programming period brought with it further substantial 
changes in the cohesion policy institutional system. From the 1st of January, 2014, the 
NDA was abolished and its functions were distributed between the pertinent ministries 
and the Prime Minister’s Office. Managing authorities were transferred (back again) 
to the line ministries. The Prime Minister’s Office was also entrusted with the tasks of 
central coordination51. Intermediate bodies were also abolished and their tasks were 
integrated into the competent ministries carrying out managing authority functions. 
An exception to this is the Hungarian State Treasury, which acts as an intermediate 
body for the Territorial and Settlement Development OP. 
Driven by the intention to advance efficiency and effectiveness, the government 
chose to radically recalibrate the programming architecture as well as amend the 
legislative and institutional environment for the period between 2014-2020. However, 
the legislative concept remained—namely, to merge all domestic legislative provisions 
dealing with the system of EU funds implementation into a single government 
decree.52 Notwithstanding, this proved complicated, lengthy53, and resulted in 
6 annexes54. Despite its complex nature, the new decree does provide for some 
simplifications. The utilization of a simplified project selection method and of grant 
letters—rather than two-sided grant contracts, which took months to be signed, for 
relatively straightforward, small-scale projects—was extended significantly. 
Thus far, there have been repeated attempts to rationalize the implementation 
systems and to establish a logical distribution of tasks between institutions. Hungary 
at last opted for a system, with very strong centralized control, and with a single 
coordination body and a handful of ministries acting as managing authorities. From 
this it would seem that adequate administrative capacities exist in Hungary for the 
implementation of EU funds. However, the continuous reorganizations also resulted 
51  The Prime Minister’s Office is responsible for member state level coordination tasks, which includes 
the preparation of programming documents, functions related to programme implementation, 
monitoring of use of funds, preparation of legislation and proposals for their amendment, and 
centralised management functions related to programs (e.g. communication, evaluation).
52  Government Decree 272/2014 (XI.5.) on the use of support originating from European Union funds 
in the 2014-2020 programming period.
53  Its main body contains over 200 sections and its Annex 1 containing the Operation Manual has 
388 paragraphs
54  The first of which consists of the Operational Manual. Annex 5 contains a detailed manual on 
eligible expenditures. The other annexes have provisions on institutions responsible for policies, 
designation of bodies, document samples and control aspects of supporting documents.
 The Hungarian Experience of Using Cohesion Policy Funds and Prospects   125
in negative effects on the system in the form of increased staff turnover and the loss 
of qualified employees. Salaries of civil servants in Hungary continue to be relatively 
low compared to the private sector, where the salary base remains unchanged since 
2008. Therefore, staff retention is proving to be a challenge for managing authorities. 
Certain incentives such as performance-related premiums are used to alleviate the 
problems, but the general sentiment is that more needs to be done. 
Table 1: Fluctuation in the Hungarian institution system.
Year Fluctuation
2014 12.7%
2016 14.7%
2017 12.6%
Source: Nyikos, data from the KÖZSTAT 
Having all relevant provisions in a single piece of legislation is certainly a significant 
improvement and is projected to make the life of people working in the implementing 
institutions easier. However, it must be reiterated that the new government decree is 
not an easy one to apply. Firstly, despite being extensive already,  practitioners still 
insist that the rules do not cover all relevant situations55. Furthermore, the decree 
was adopted in a rush at the beginning of the period, meaning that it constantly had 
to be adapted to practical issues surfacing during implementation. As a result, it has 
already been amended 44 times with more amendments expected. While constant 
amendments can ensure that all legislative problems are resolved, this causes 
uncertainty in the implementation process, which has the potential to hinder the 
efficient use of funds. However, the effectiveness of regional policy depends largely on 
the efficiency of the operation of management organizations and, in general, on the 
functioning quality of the administrative system as well. Several research (Charron, 
Lapuente & Rothstein, 2011; Charron & Lapuente, 2013; Charron, Dijkstra & Lapuente, 
2014; Nyikos & Kondor, 2019) and evaluation confirms that the quality of governance 
and public administration of countries also affects the capacity for the efficient and 
effective use of the cohesion funds, and in Hungary, there is  room for improvement 
in this area.
55  E.g. the experience of the authors is in particular that the provisions on the use of financial 
instruments are inadequate
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2.4.2  Financial Instruments in Hungary 
In the analysis of the effectiveness and the results of the use of cohesion sources in 
Hungary, and in considering future prospects, it is important to examine the use of 
financial instruments (FI). Financial instruments have attracted interest because of 
their revolving character— meaning, FIs invest on a repayable basis, as opposed to 
grants, which are non-repayable investments56. Their use has been promoted because 
of the added value of revolving instruments compared to that of grants in terms of 
the efficiency of use of public resources. Secondly, by unlocking other public sector 
funding and private sector resources through co-financing and co-investment, FIs 
increase the overall capital available (Nyikos, 2016; Nyikos & Soós 2018a: 15; 2018b: 
18). 
Through an examination of the use of FIs, we detect that the credit schemes have 
over-performed in terms of financial targets. Yet, in the case of guarantee and venture 
capital schemes, we observe a very slow take up and consequently, slower progress 
in the allocation of funds. Reasons for the differences in the financial performance 
indicators are manifold. For instance, slower allocation can be partly institutional 
and regulative (e.g. time-consuming institutional setup process in the first half of the 
programming period and perception of regulatory burden when it comes to guarantee 
schemes), or they can be partly strategic (e.g. higher demand for credit schemes, 
especially for those combined with non-refundable grants).
In the 2014-2020 period, 60  % of all ESI Funds were dedicated to economic 
development and job creation. With an allocation of EUR 2.3  billion, Hungary is 
almost tripling its allocation to financial instruments compared with 2007-2013. 
Besides SME-development support, the use of FIs has been extended to R&D&I, 
energy, ICT and the social economy. Following a slow start, all loan products and 
loans combined with grants have been launched, whilst venture capital programs are 
also under preparation. However, their effectiveness is yet to be determined. There 
were several changes in the FI implementation.
56  FIs are defined also in Financial Regulation as measures of “financial support provided from the budget 
in order to address one or more specific policy objectives by way of loans, guarantees, equity or quasi-equity 
investments or participations, or other risk-bearing instruments, possibly combined with grants”.
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Figure 1: FIs in 2014-2020 peri d (ESIF i  million EUR).
Source: (Nyikos 2016), data from the EC (downloaded on 9. 7. 2016), OPs adopted by EC 
Hungary implemented FIs in the pre-accession period and, again, in the 2007-2013 programming 
period when financing was provided in the form of loans, guarantees, and venture capital. According 
to programme documents and AIR 2013, the main objective of FIs was to overcome the limited access 
of finance on the market,  driven by the assumption that their FIs may represent more efficient forms 
of SME support than grants.
Figure 2: Different FIs in 2007-2013 in the business development cycle.
Source: Nyikos compilation, info from financial agreements and Fontium (2015).
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Figure 3: Absorption process of the different Hungarian FIs.
Source: (Nyikos, 2016), data from Hungarian Development Bank
In 2007-2013, Hungary worked with a widespread external intermediary network 
(credit institutions, financial enterprises, and local enterprise development agencies). 
In 2014-2020, the financial intermediaries had to be selected through formal public 
procurement, so a banking consortium as distribution network has been procured. 
Furthermore, the system based on a re-financing model changed into a distribution 
system. Likewise, the size of loans increased, as the microfinance model changed 
to SME finance. This could have been a potential problem with the “number of 
supported companies” indicator, since it was planned based on previous experience. 
The use of FIs thus offers more incentives to businesses to use their funds properly 
and encourage profitable investment. The revolving nature of financial instruments 
will, as such, allow funds to be re-used in the future. 
Table 2: FI loan size in 2007-2013 versus 2014-2020 (in HUF).
2007-2013 2014-2020 Change
Average loan 16 072 044 91 927 470 572%
Average combined loan 6 450 631 54 729 824 848%
Source: Nyikos compilation
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2.4.3  Absorption of EU Funds and Economic Performance 
As suggested in the previous section, Hungary has established its necessary legislative 
and administrative systems for the use of EU funds, even though challenges, such 
as maintaining adequate staff levels, remain because of the constant reorganization. 
Even so, it is necessary to see whether or not the use of EU funds throughout the past 
programming periods has led to a positively measurable economic performance in 
the country. Data from all programming periods show that Hungary has had very high 
allocations of EU funds and has been fairly successful in their use if measured by the 
percentage absorbed. 
Naturally, as Hungary joined the EU in 2004, it did not participate in the 2000-
2006 programming period; it was only allocated a relatively small amount of 2.8 
billion euros for the last 3 years of that period. In the next programming period, it 
received a fairly large amount, i.e. 25.3 billion euros, seizing a lucrative opportunity 
to boost the economic development of the country. For the 2014-2020 period, it 
managed to practically maintain the budget it was due to receive from the EU, as its 
allocation was set at an impressive 25.0 billion euros. Hungary in fact has the second 
highest allocation of funds per capita. The receipt of such an amount of funding, if 
used properly, could boost Hungary’s GDP growth and other important economic 
indicators. 
According to the relevant data, it seems that Hungary has managed to spend 
the vast majority of allocated funds in its first programming period. In Hungary, 
between 2004 and 2008, 95% of ERDF and EAGGF funds have been paid out while 
the absorption rate for the ESF was 91.02% and 86.19% for the FIFG. Hungary had 
a total absorption rate of 94.11% for all the Structural Funds, which was better 
than both EU25 averages (Bachtler et. al., 2014: 743). Hungary’s absorption of 
funds was similarly quite successful in the 2007-2013 programming period. Not 
surprisingly, the rate of payments took off quite slowly in 2007, while an increase 
took place towards, and beyond, the end of the programming period. As a result of 
the ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion funds, Hungary managed to absorb just over 94% 
of available funds—the EU28 average was 94.45%, slightly above the Hungarian 
absorption rate. 
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Figure 4: Absorption of ERDF, ESF and CF in Hungary in the 2007-2013 programming period.
Source: European Commission InfoRegio.
If we look at the rate of payments of funds for the EU as a whole, a similar pattern 
is discerned: that payments were very small in the first few years, before steadily 
increasing until 2013 (2014 for the EU12) and then dropping slightly in 2015. 
Figure 5: Time pattern of EU payments, all funds (million euros).
Source: EC 2017, referring to: DG REGIO. Totals for ERDF, CF and ESF in 2015 are estimated until end-
year; EAFRD payment requests data until August 2015.
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It must be noted that the absorption of the 2007-2013 programming period’s transfers 
in Hungary accelerated after 2009 as illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Absorption of the 2007-2013 programming period’s transfers in Hungary.
Source: Hungarian National Bank.
There are several possible causes for why absorption has accelerated after 2009. One 
possibility is that, in 2007 and 2008, the funds of the previous 2004-2006 programming 
period were typically still being absorbed. Furthermore, it may be caused by the 
nature of the implementation of multiannual operational programmes and projects 
(implementation phase after longer preparation)57. Another possibility is that after the 
financial crisis, the state budget’s situation stabilized, and due to the SPLs58, it was 
able to provide pre-financing to the beneficiaries. It is also possible that centralisation 
of implementation (see section 4.1.), as was the integration of MAs into the ministries 
who worked more closely with the beneficiaries of major projects had a role. Finally, 
another cause could be attributed to the national cohesion rules on pre-financing 
expenditures, which have been changed, leading to an increase in possible advance 
payments. As so, it is too early to make any estimation on whether or not they will 
achieve the same outcomes in 2014-2020. However, since the programming period is 
well under way, it is worth looking at how payments are doing in Hungary and how 
57  For several programmes, 2007 was a preparatory year, the first calls were launched in 2008 and 
most of the contracts were signed in 2009.
58  Structural programme loan, see more information: http://www.eib.org/attachments/documents/
mooc_factsheet_eib_loans_en.pdf  
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these compare to the total allocations. Examining Table 3 reveals that payments got 
off on a slow start, comparable to the previous programming period. Unlike the latter, 
there was a large increase in 2015, while in 2016 the amount of actual payments dropped 
again. Hungary’s payments of EU funds have so far been below the EU average. 
Table 3: Total EU cumulative payments in the 2014-2020 programming period.
Total EU payments
  2014 2015 2016
Hungary (million EUR) 489 1879 2172
% of total 2 8 9
EU average (%) 3 9 13
Source: European Commission InfoRegio
Examining the fiscal and economic indicators, to determine if any direct correlation 
can be observed between the use of EU funds and improvements to the Hungarian 
economy, provides additional information on the usefulness of ESI Funds to support 
the Hungarian economy. After years of deterioration in Hungary’s public finances59, 
spanning the 2011-2016 period, the government has achieved considerable 
progress in strengthening public finances. Macroeconomic imbalances are being 
corrected whilst public debt-to-GDP ratio continues to drop. Markedly, the budget 
deficit decreased in recent years, as did the public-debt ratio, which continued 
on a declining path. This helped improve financial stability (see Figure 7)60. Yet, 
although financial vulnerabilities have been reduced, non-performing loans still 
hamper bank lending. 
Nevertheless, total investment in Hungary fell following the crisis. Private 
investment started to decrease in 2008 and its share in GDP has continued to shrink 
ever since. Public investment has played a stabilizing role, owing to strong EU-funding 
support. Based on the commitment made by the EU in the 2007–2013 programming 
period, Hungary was entitled to a funding of EUR 35.3 bn (almost HUF 9,900 bn 
calculated at EUR/HUF 280, the average exchange rate of the period), accounting for 
roughly 35% of the country’s annual GDP. The largest part of the allocation came from 
59  The effect of electoral considerations in determining budgetary outcomes was evident in Hungary 
over the last 15 years, with government deficits reaching their highest levels in election years (1994, 
1998, 2002 and 2006).
60  Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, the government debt-to-GDP ratio increased 
sharply, reaching almost 81 % in 2011. Since then, it has decreased by more than 6 pps., falling below 
75 % by 2015.
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A. Public and external deficit
B. Public debt61
Figure 7: Macroeconomic imbalances are falling (% of GDP).
Source: OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections Database.
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund; these funds amounted to EUR 24.9 bn 
(HUF 7,000 bn). At the height of the crisis, difficulties in planning large projects and 
programmes hindered the payments in Hungary, which were further augmented by 
the need for advanced payments for the beneficiaries. The co-financing obligation 
must be respected if the cohesion policy funds were to be used, and this became 
increasingly difficult. Hungary was therefore in need of liquidity, and ostensibly, the 
cost of the sources became most vital. 
61  Maastricht definition
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Figure 8. Credit rating of Hungary (2006-2017).
Source: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch.
As such, the EIB’s SPLs facilitated a kick-start implementation of the Managing 
Authority’s Operational Programme, setting it on schedule62. In the 2014-2020 
programming period, Hungary continues to use SPLs for financing the national 
contribution of ESI Funds as well as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). 
Table 4: Financial details of the SPLs.
OPs The Social Renewal OP 
co-financed by ESF and 
Social Infrastructure OP 
co-financed by ERDF 
2007-2013: Transport OP, Environmental and Energy 
OP 2014-2020: Integrated Transport Development 
(ITOP), Environment and Energy Efficiency (EEEOP) and 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
Source EDUCATION CO-FINANCING 
FACILITY (HU) (20060511)
COHESION FUND 
FRAMEWORK LOAN 
(20040589)
COHESION 
FUND FL II 
(20100410)
COHESION FUND 
FRAMEWORK LOAN 
IV (20150006)
EU funds 
(EUR m)
3,737.79 1,157.27 7,319.00 7,624.00
Other funds 
(EUR m)
359.61 133.81 1,048.00 346.00
EIB funds 
(EUR m )
300.00 300.00 770.00 1,000.00
TOTAL  
(EUR m)
4,397.40 1,591.07 9,137.00 8,970.00
Source: Nyikos, data from EIB
62  Interview conducted with the Ministry of National Economy.
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Given the magnitude of cohesion policy funding in Hungary, the macroeconomic 
effects of cohesion funds cannot be ignored. Towards the end of the 2007–2013 
programming period, the absorption of EU transfers gradually increased; net grants—
reduced by contributions—reached 5–6% of the GDP. In addition to the accelerating 
payments, the Hungarian State paid the available total allocation of EUR 24.9 bn 
in full. In excess of the total allocation, overspending of roughly EUR 1.9 bn also 
occurred, which may have helped to avoid the loss of funds. Figure 9 shows the 
significant effect of cohesion policy on both GDP and employment. 
Figure 9: The estimated impact of the national strategic reference framework (2007-2013).
Source: (Nyikos, 2013b), referring to data received from the National Development Agency.
Using a model63, the impacts of fund utilisation were compared to a situation without 
EU development funds. The calculations showed a 5.5% GDP surplus on a yearly 
average, compared to a scenario without funding. The simulation also shows that the 
simultaneous presence of recession, slow growth, and funding, does not necessarily 
indicate the inefficiency of funding. It is possible that without this funding, the given 
segment of the economy would be much worse (Nyikos, 2013b).
63  For a detailed description of the model see: http://www.nfu.hu/modellezes 
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A study carried out for the European Commission (2017)64 shows that cohesion 
and rural development policies effected many key economic variables of Member 
States in the 2007-2013 programming period. The study highlighted that interventions 
substantially increased GDP, in particular in the Members States that are the main 
beneficiaries of the policies. The highest impact was found in Hungary, where GDP 
increased by 5.3% (EC, 2017: 23). In addition, Figure 10 (also published by the European 
Commission) shows the estimated impact of cohesion and rural development policies 
on GDP in 2015 and in 2023. Interestingly, it reveals how Hungary is at the top in 2015, 
but projected to drop by 2023. It is also noteworthy to point that the study highlights a 
positive impact on real wages, total factor productivity, and private investment.
Figure 10: Impacts on GDP of cohesion and rural development policies in Member States, 2015 and 
2023 (percentage deviation with respect to baseline).
Source: Commission Staff Working Document Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 
2007-13 SWD(2016) 318 final.
With regards to GDP growth, data show that in 2005 and 2006, Hungary had relatively 
high growth rates of 4.4% and 3.9% respectively. However, due to the economic crisis 
of 2009, GDP growth was badly affected in a similar pattern comparable to the whole 
EU28. Towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period, the pace of economic 
growth picked up significantly, peaking in 2014 and maintaining a relatively strong 
and stable growth rate in 2015 and 2016.
64  EC Woring Paper WP 05/2017 (2017) The impact of cohesion and rural development policies 2007-
2013: model simulations with quest III
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Figure 11: Real GDP Growth rate (%).
Source: Eurostat.
A similar pattern to GDP growth emerges when examining the employment rates 
from the data. Unemployment soared as a result of the crisis, and dropped in 2009. 
Afterwards, the indicator improved significantly towards the mid 2010s, just as the 
end of the programming period approached.
Figure 12: Employment rate (%) 20 to 64 year olds.
Source: Eurostat.
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Taking into account the effects resulting from the evaluations, and looking at the real 
figures of GDP growth and employment rates, the data suggest that without EU funds 
these rates would be much lower. A study carried out by KPMG for the Hungarian 
government, analysed the impact of funds on the Hungarian economy specifically. 
The study found that spending on every priority, with the exception of ICTs, has had 
an impact on GDP, production, consumption, and investments. The biggest impact 
on GDP was caused by support given to transport infrastructure, while the subsidies 
provided to farmers had the second largest impact. Also of significance, grants given 
to enterprises did not have a huge impact on the Hungarian economy, although loans 
sourced from EU funds had a clear positive impact as illustrated in Figure 13 (KPMG, 
2017). 
Figure 13: Social Infrastructure: trends in GDP.
Source: KPMG 2017, p. 347 (authors’ translation).
It is important to notice that in Hungary without EU funds the state deficit would be 
always higher than 3% and the debt instead of reduction would be increased to 84% 
of the GDP. The EU funds also helped the fiscal stability with exchange of the Euro to 
Hungarian forint. 
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Figure 14: Impact of EU funds on the Hungarian budget.
Source: KPMG 2017.
2.5  Conclusion
Following initial difficulties, Hungary managed to develop an administration dealing 
with EU funds. Fundamental reorganizations have had negative effects on the system. 
High staff turnover remain a problem. Significant efforts were made to simplify 
the domestic legislative framework but remain quite complex, needing frequent 
amendments that ultimately lead to uncertainty. Therefore, more effort is needed to 
improve certainty and usability of the system.
Coping with the economic crisis has been a huge challenge. During the first half 
of the programming period, Central and Eastern European countries were trying to 
recover from the economic downturn. In effect, by looking at patterns in the economic 
data without substantial analysis, the effects of the use of cohesion policy funds are 
hardly visible. Some in-depth economic analysis on the other hand, brought to light 
its impact: without the cohesion sources, the Hungarian economic growth rates 
would be much lower (Nyikos, 2013b). 
For the 2014-2020 programming period, plenty of funds are made available for 
Hungary. Although a welcomed development, the use of this fairly significant amount, 
as a financial instrument, is yet to be analysed. Hungary continues to have a very large 
amount to spend, which, if used effectively, can no doubt revitalize the economy and 
increase productivity. This will, however, depend on a number of factors: Maintaining 
and improving administrative capacities is a key factor. Reiterating from previous 
sections, there is a strong correlation between administrative capacities and the 
effectiveness of EU funds. Hungary has a functioning institutional setup. However, 
there is a risk that after general elections—even though the former governing party 
won—reorganization of the government and institutional changes will follow. It 
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will thus be essential to have some stability in the implementation system and even 
increase the level and quality of human resources through proper training and 
reduction of staff turnover. 
As indicated by some authors, for the post-2013 period, very strict rules were put 
in place for the use of cohesion policy funds with ex-ante and ex-post conditionalities, 
milestones, strict payment conditions, and a performance reserve (Nyikos, 2013a: 
42). Legislation at both EU and national level remains very complex. Besides the 
strict and complicated cohesion policy, legal framework member states also have 
to comply with other sets of rules, such as state aid and public procurement. Non-
compliance can lead to financial corrections and obligation to repay state aid. 
Therefore, focusing on simplification will be essential for the administration to be 
able to cope with the legislative framework and be able to strike the right balance 
between following the rules, effective and efficient selection, and implementation 
of projects. 
Success will also depend, to an extent, on the approach of the Government 
towards the use of funds. If at any stage of implementation there is pressure to use 
as much of the funds as possible in a relatively short time, then there is a threat to 
the quality of projects. So far, the quick disbursement of the funds seems to be a high 
priority. Unfortunately, there are issues with this in terms of what effect it will have on 
quality. In addition, it will be important for the implementation process to be free from 
all sorts of corruption. Selection of beneficiaries on the basis of personal connections 
and deliberate overestimation of certain expenditures should be avoided.
It is also likely that the use of financial instruments will be the norm rather 
than the exception in the next programming period. This means that Hungary 
should gain as much experience as possible in the use of financial instruments to 
draw the necessary conclusions. Making more use of the potential-leverage effect 
of financial instruments will ensure higher levels of economic development. In 
any case, early preparation for the next programming period is key for success. 
Hungary should prepare its administration as early as possible for the new 
legislative framework. Its experience in using financial instruments will be critical 
for the upcoming era. 
References 
Bachtler J. and Ferry M. (2015) Conditionalities and the Performance of European Structural Funds: A 
Principal–Agent Analysis of Control Mechanisms in European Union cohesion policy. Regional 
Studies, 49:8, 1258-1273
Bachtler J., Mendez C. and Oraze H. (2014) From Conditionality to Europeanization in Central 
and Eastern Europe: Administrative Performance and Capacity in cohesion policy. European 
Planning Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, 735–757
 The Hungarian Experience of Using Cohesion Policy Funds and Prospects   141
Balas, G., A. Csite, G. Kiss, K. Major, N. Németh and A. Piross (2015), Az EU-források 
gazdaságfejlesztési és növekedési hatásai, tech. rep., HÉTFA Kutatóintézet
Borsi M.T. and Metiu N. (2013) The evolution of economic convergence in the European Union. 
Discussion Paper Deutsche Bundesbank No 28/2013
Camagni R. and Capello R. (2014) Rationale and Design of EU Cohesion Policies in a Period of Crisis 
with special reference to CEECs, Policy Paper No. 1, GRINCOH Working Paper Series
Cappelen, A., F. Castellacci, J. Fagerberg and B. Verspagen (2003), ‘The impact of EU regional 
support on growth and convergence in the European Union’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 41 no. 4, pp. 621–644
Charron, N., & Lapuente, V.(2013), ‘Why do some regions in Europe have a higher quality of 
government?’, The Journal of Politics, 75(3), 2013, 567-582. 
Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., & Lapuente, V. (2014), ‘Regional governance matters: quality of government 
within European Union member states’, Regional Studies, 48(1), 2014, 68-90. 
Charron, N., Victor Lapuente, V., & Rothstein, B. (2011), ‘Measuring Quality of Government and 
Sub-national Variation’, Report for the EU Commission of Regional Development, European 
Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy Directorate Policy Development, 2011.
Commission Staff Working Document Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-13 
SWD(2016) 318 final
EC Woring Paper WP 05/2017 (2017) The impact of cohesion and rural development policies 2007-
2013: model simulations with quest III
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Investing in jobs and growth - maximising the contribution of European 
Structural and Investment Funds, COM(2015)639final, 14.12.2015, Bruxelles 2016
Kengyel Á. (2014) Az európai uniós tagság, mint modernizációs hajtóerő. Gondolatok a kelet-közép-
európai országok EU-tagságának 10. évfordulóján. Közgazdasági Szemle, LXI. évf. április 
493–508. o.
KPMG (2017) A magyarországi európai uniós források felhasználásának és hatásainak elemzése a 
2007-2013-as programozási időszak vonatkozásában
Nyikos G. (2013a) Kohéziós intézményrendszerek – tapasztalatok és kihívások. Pro Publico Bono – 
Magyar Közigazgatás. Issue 2013/3.
Nyikos G. (2013b) The Impact of Developments Implemented from Public Finances, with Special 
Regard to EU cohesion policy.  Public Finance Quarterly 58.2, 163-183.
Nyikos G. and Talaga R. (2015) Cohesion policy in Transition. Comparative Aspects OF THE Polish And 
Hungarian Systems of Implementation. Comparative Law Review, 18, 111-139.
Nyikos G. (2016): Research for REGI Committee - Financial instruments in the 2014-20 programming 
period: First experiences of Member States, European Union, 2016
Nyikos G. (2017) Kohéziós Politika 2014-2020. Az EU belső fejlesztéspolitikája a jelen programozási 
időszakban. Dialóg Campus kiadó, Budapest
Nyikos, G; Kondor, Zs. (2019), The Hungarian Experiences with Handling Irregularities in the Use 
of EU Funds; Nispacee Journal of Public Administration and Policy XII : 1 pp. 113-134., doi.
org/10.2478/nispa-2019-0005
Nyikos, G; Soós, G (2018a) Microfinance and access to finance of SMES In: Ondřej, Dvouletý; 
Martin, Lukeš; Jan, Mísař (szerk.) Proceedings of the 6th International Conference Innovation 
Management, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability: Wirtschaftsuniversität VŠE Prag, (2018)  
pp. 831-845.
Nyikos, G; Soós, G (2018b), Financial Instruments in EU Cohesion Policy and Public 
Procurement: Challenges for the 2014–2020 Programming Period Public Procurement Law 
Review 2018 : 32 pp. 120-137.
Pereira, A. and V. Gaspar (1999), ‘An Intertemporal Analysis of Development Policies in the EU’, 
Journal of Policy Modeling, vol. 21 no. 7, pp. 799–822
142   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
Smeriglio A., Bachtler J. and Sliwowski P. (2016) Administrative capacity and cohesion policy: 
new methodological insights from Italy and Poland. In: Learning from Implementation and 
Evaluation of the EU cohesion policy. RSA Research Network on cohesion policy, pp. 173-190.
Tosun J. (2013) Absorption of Regional Funds: A Comparative Analysis. JCMS 2013 pp. 1–17
3  Effects of EU-Funds on Territorial Cohesion - Public 
and Private Resources for Regional Development in 
the Least-Developed, Most Deprived Micro-Regions 
in Hungary
Judit Kalman65
3.1  Introduction
Traditionally, development policy has double orientations directed towards economic 
growth enhancement and/or a care for social, territorial, and economic inequalities 
across and within countries simultaneously. However, managing this trade-off is 
challenging throughout the world, especially during, and after, austerity times. 
Results of the New Economic Geography literature  (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 2001; 
Puga, 2002) underline such trade-off—i.e. it is uncertain whether or not concentrating 
on diminishing regional disparities itself could bring convergence, or if growing 
regions, development poles, and development policy assistance  might bring better 
results. Within the EU, and in different common policy areas, there are mixed goals, 
as for example: cohesion policy, with its former convergence focus, versus EU2020 
and Lisbon goals of competitiveness and employment integration of these two. That 
is, the “lisbonization of cohesion policy” is a major feature of the current 2014-2020 
EU framework period. But such trade-offs are also visible in the diminishing regional 
concentration of cohesion policy—or the introduction of transitioning regions and 
the funding that is given for developed regions. This chapter is assessing the success 
of allocating extra-resources to backward, deprived regions within a country and 
compares EU funding with national public resources for investment as well as private 
sector investment activities among the least developed, most deprived micro-regions 
in Hungary. What is the spatial pattern of these three different resources? What 
drives development in these backward areas?  The initial hypothesis is that available 
development policy funds are minor compared to private (business) investments or 
state budgetary resources, hence only additional role can be expected. Yet, in least 
developed, economically depressed and poor areas the private sector is very weak, 
thus here development policy is expected to have a major role.
In the context of Hungary, the same above trade-off applies. That is, 
notwithstanding the major priority of the country’s overall convergence towards EU 
65 Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics. 
Correspondence: judit.kalman@krtk.mta.hu
 Journal xyz 2017; 1 (2): 122–135
The First Decade (1964-1972)
Research Article 
Max Musterman, Paul Placeholder
What Is So Different About 
Neuroenhancement? 
Was ist so anders am Neuroenhancement?
Pharmacological and Mental Self-transformation in Ethic 
Comparison 
Pharmakologische und mentale Selbstveränderung im 
ethischen Vergleich
https://doi.org/10.1515/xyz-2017-0010 
received February 9, 2013; accepted March 25, 2013; published online July 12, 2014
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levels and efficient funds absorption goals, which lead to higher funding allocated 
for more advantaged prosperous regions66. Hungarian development policy also 
considers transforming areas that are least developed into dynamic areas as an 
important part of its goals. Even so, it remains secondary, showing up among targets 
and priorities within policy documents. Official development policy recognizes the 
problems of disadvantaged (micro-)regions and has at least some intentions to tackle 
them—even before EU accession, the National Development Concept adopted some 
cohesion-like features dealing with within-country regional disparities and caring 
for lagging regions (Horváth, 2001). It later developed a methodology for a complex 
index, identifying the most disadvantaged ones before putting them into government 
decrees and Parliament decisions on subsidization67. Indeed, some extra funding has 
been provided for these disadvantaged areas from various sources68. However, the 
duality of development policy persisted. Meanwhile the structural problems caused 
by the economic and financial crisis rendered it as secondary to other economic 
policy goals in Hungary. Moreover, given the availability of EU Cohesion Funds, the 
more advantaged, more prosperous, better endowed, and growing regions managed 
to absorb larger funds. All of these processes point to cumulated disadvantages that 
lagging regions face in terms of regional growth prospects.
National budgetary resources for development purposes have gradually shrunk, 
due to EU Cohesion funds already in pre-crisis years (Figure 1). As illustrated in Figure 
1, former national decentralized regional development subsidies (TEKI, CEDE) had 
completely disappeared from the state budget. Since 2010, a 0.9-1.5 bn HUF amount 
was budgeted as regional development allocation in the state budget. But by 2015, 
even this fund ceased to exist. The reason was mostly a result of the huge amounts 
of EU Cohesion Funding received, just like in other new member states. For the entire 
EU budget period of 2007-2013, Hungary received 24.92bn EUR from cohesion policy, 
which, after deducting the country’s contribution to EU budget, still corresponds to 
2.5% of Hungarian GDP produced in the same period. Despite additionality principles, 
regional development or territorial cohesion is entirely financed by EU resources in 
Hungary today. Such crowding out of national development policy by EU Cohesion 
Funds happened similarly in several other EU member states (Grosse, 2006). 
66  Where all but the central region being under the 75% EU GDP threshold.
67  e.g. 67/2007. (VI. 28.) Parliament Decree
68  See e.g. a report compiled by the National Ministry of Economy in 2009 http://www.vati.hu/files/
sharedUploads/docs/teruletfejlesztes/hazai_tfejl_tam_19962008.pdf 
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Figure 1: Shrinking national budgetary resources for regional development purposes in 2006-2010.
Source: Hungarian State Treasury 2011. Report on the system of local government development 
grants.
Turning the focus onto the least developed (most depressed) areas highlights how they 
are characterized by, not only low economic performance and a lack of employment 
opportunities compounded by social problems (low standards of living, outmigration 
of educated population), but also by weak absorption capacities for development 
funds. Recognizing these problems, starting from 2009-2010, a special program was 
designed to target the 33 least developed micro-regions (LAU1, formerly NUTS4) of 
Hungary within EU Structural Funds allocation This in turn, forced the prioritization 
and extra-funding for projects coming from these areas. This study assesses the 
success of allocating extra-resources to these disadvantaged micro-regions and takes 
stock of, and compares, EU funding with national resources for investment, as well 
as private investment flows into such lagging areas. Its primary novelty is relying on 
business financial data for a better estimation of private investment activities and not 
just on the use of registered number of businesses or other aggregate investment data 
utilized in previous studies. This research also explores the spatial scale all the way 
to the micro-region level (LAU1/NUTS4). 
3.2  Research Question & Hypotheses
The questions this paper answers are as follows: 1) What type and magnitude of 
private/public (national and EU) regional development resources do these least 
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developed (depressed) micro-regions have access to in Hungary? 2) What is the 
spatial pattern of these three different resources (private/natl./EU)? 3) Have the 
least developed micro-regions managed to absorb more EU funds due to the special 
program within Hungarian cohesion policy interventions? Finally, 4) what drives 
development in such areas? 
In assessing the role of development policy in the context of development 
potential of these least developed micro-regions, our initial hypothesis is that, 
under normal circumstances, in any region available, development-policy funds are 
minor compared to private (business) investment flows or state budgetary resources. 
Hence, only an additional role can be expected of them in the development potential 
of a region or micro-region. A related hypothesis predicts that without any special 
targeting, fund-absorption capacity (measured by per-capita EU-grants allocations) 
is lower than average among the least-developed micro-regions. This is for various 
reasons, all of which lead to further under-development.
Yet, in the least developed, economically-depressed, and poor areas the private 
sector is very weak, whereby barely any investments happen. As such, we can expect 
development policy to have a more major role in this area (comparable to that of 
private sector investments)—that is, in their growth as well as in transformation of 
their social and economic structures. In other words, development funds targeted 
with a special regional focus can bring about significant socio-economic changes. 
However, the possibility of real convergence, of such areas into the broader regions, 
remains a separate issue; and currently, the present economic situation and policy 
trends do not have this consideration within their periphery. 
Another contribution to knowledge that this research has to offer is in the use of 
micro-regional (LAU1-NUTS4) and municipal level data. The sparsely available extent 
literature, dealing with this subject matter, conventionally only used additional 
aggregated county-wise data, often provided by the National Statistics Office of 
Hungary. Collection, cleaning, and editing of data—especially private sector data—at 
the micro-regional level, had several challenges of its own, demanding a substantial 
amount of work.
3.3  State of the Art in the Literature
Extended public finance literature (Musgrave, 1975; Oates, 1991; Aschauer, 1989) has 
seen a growing trend in addressing issues pertaining to how to allocate public funds 
in an efficient and effective, yet equitable manner, for some time. This includes the 
design of tax policy or welfare systems among other things for example. Such issues 
have challenges that are well described in the literature during normal operation 
too, but especially under crisis and austerity times. For the sub-national level, the 
extent and mode of fiscal decentralization, and different sub-national governance 
models, can bring various types and degrees of local autonomy, depending on the 
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set-up.69 Yet the literature has mostly focused on the causes of degrees and diversity 
of fiscal decentralization , incentives and behaviour of governments at different 
levels and with its economic impacts on growth (Davoodi & Zhou, 1998; Martínez-
Vázquez & Mcnab, 2003). However, the deeper and more complex issues of political 
decentralization and its linkages to growth have been overlooked despite a trend 
of devolution across the world. Linking it with the issues of regional development, 
Ezcurre-Rodriguez-Pose (2013) finds no statistical relationship between political 
decentralization and economic growth, regardless of how political decentralization 
is measured with different indices and ambiguities. Even so, this is not to say that 
there are not somewhat positive results for the link between decentralization and 
increasing regional disparities. 
The trade-off between equity and efficiency is especially highlighted in the field 
of development policy, where opposing goals/policy tools are often used (Brakman 
et al., 2005; Bachtler et al., 2003; Martin, 2005). Such mixed policies are present in 
the EU development policy scene as well—both at EU and national levels. This begs 
the following questions: Should the concentration be on infrastructure or human 
resources? Which of these will better boost an inclusive growth and give more funds 
to businesses or to the public sector? How? What other aspects of development should 
be prioritized and measured? By which best indicators? 
With this into consideration, mixed-policy goals are noticeable—for example, the 
co-existence of growth-oriented Lisbon agenda and EU2020 goals, as well as the care 
for lagging regions (cohesion policy). Despite this, cohesion policy and its reforms in 
the recent EU cycles (“lisbonization”) seem to disregard the trade-off between equity 
and efficiency as non-existent, or at least easy to handle, and that it is possible to 
maximize growth and overall convergence at the same time.
Neoclassic regional growth models (e.g. Barro-Sala-I-Martin, 1992) have 
acknowledged that economic activity is unevenly distributed across space due to 
comparative advantages, emphasising processes of convergence based on trends 
in post-war Europe and the US until the 1980s. Additionally, in early development 
economics, there was much talk about circular and cumulative economic processes, 
and later about ‘convergence clubs’ (Myrdal, 1957; Hirschmann, 1958; Quah, 1996).
However, since the 1990s, a number of studies have recognized widening 
within-country regional disparities in GDP per capita or in employment terms 
(Puga-Venables, 1999; Martin, 2005; Puga, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose, 1999) despite 
international convergence trends. With ever-larger economic integration, especially 
within Europe, core regions are benefitting while periphery regions seem to suffer70. 
69  See indices created by Ebel-Yilmaz (2002), Rodden and Wibbels (2002), Treisman (2002), Schakel 
(2008), and Hooghe et al. (2010).
70  Acknowledging this and somewhat counter-balancing for it being the very core underlying 
‘reason d’etre’ for EU cohesion policy.
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From the perspective of regional endowments and growth potential, core regions with 
high levels of skilled labour and access to capital and few institutional barriers to 
adopting new technologies, are usually places where innovation and thus economic 
growth happens; whereas low income periphery regions, characterized by high 
concentrations of unskilled labour, limited access to capital and low productivity, 
substantial cultural and institutional barriers generally remain far from it. New 
Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 2001; Puga, 2002) emphasizes 
focusing on growth and to concentrate economic activity and funding to faster 
developing hubs of the economy (usually the core regions). This would then help lift 
the rest of the economy along with the rapidly developing hubs. Other models, built 
from endogenous growth theory put the focus on innovation (Romer, 1986; Grossman 
& Helpman, 1991), and the distance of territories from the technological frontier. They 
emphasize change management, adaptation efficiency, and learning processes. 
Nonetheless, recent literature on regional economic development seems to have 
reached a consensus that spatial proximity, density, and localization should be put 
in the wider context of economic globalization (e.g., Crescenzi, Nathan, & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2016). That is, local and regional development processes do not solely depend 
on locally available human capital and production assets anymore, and there are 
different non-spatial linkages such as social-, institutional-, knowledge-overflow 
that play complementary or even substituting roles (Boschma, 2005; Boschma, 2015; 
Crescenzi et al., 2016; D’Este, Guy & Iammarino, 2013; Javorcik, 2004). Ostensibly, this 
means that FDI flows and multi-national companies play significant roles in these 
‘glocalization’ processes. The emerging literature on the interdependence of corporate 
and geographical connections and linkages relates the concept of connectivity with 
regional economic development (Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Baldwin, 2011). 
What all of these different strands of literature have in common is that human 
capital and training knowledge transmission networks are of utmost importance to 
innovation and thus regional development. 
There is yet another school of thought emphasizing that the persistence of 
institutional differences across regions, despite economic integration, is a key in 
maintaining regional disparities, since institutions shape the way the economy can 
use available resources or absorb new ones. Serious institutional weaknesses and so 
on, keep a regional economy away from innovation, moving up on the technological 
frontier and thus growth (Persson et al., 1997; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Acemoglu, 
2006; Acemoglu-Johnson, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose 1999).
Regarding EU cohesion policy and its effects on regional growth, the bulk of the 
literature deals with convergence analyses and the funds’ impact on these (Becker, 
Egger & Von Ehrlich, 2008; Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen, de Groot, & Nahuis, 2006; 
Mohl & Hagen, 2010; Pellegrini et al., 2013; Varga & Veld, 2011; Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 
2008). Regional socio-economic conditions are found to be a positive conditioning 
factor for policy impacts. That is, where demographics, productive structure, the 
labour market, regional innovative capacity, and infrastructural endowment are 
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more favourable, the relationship between EU regional policy funding and regional 
growth is stronger (Crescenzi & Giua, 2014). Fratesi and Perucca (2014) analysed the 
relationship between structural characteristics (accessibility, public goods, stock of 
private capital, social capital, human capital, urban/rural nature) of the recipient 
regions of funds and the impact of the EU financial support on economic growth in 
NUTS 3 regions, and found a positive relationship. The true policy question therefore, 
is whether or not, and how active policy intervention can improve these capacities 
and structural characteristics in lagging periphery type regions, and which of these 
are really reacting to, and can get improved by, policy intervention. The current idea 
of reducing regional disparities in a growth-enhancing way calls for a development of 
capacities, both hard and soft (EC, 2014).
The cohesion policy literature also emphasizes the strong role institutions play 
in both more effective funds absorption and regional growth in general. Bachtler and 
McMaster (2007) found that EU Structural Funds lead to stronger regionalisation in 
the EU8 member states through the building of regional structures and competences, 
which are necessary to absorb funds. The connection between government 
effectiveness and cohesion policy funding absorption is also recognised in Ederveen, 
de Groot, and Nahuis (2006), Tosun (2013), and the European Commission–DG 
Regional and Urban Policy (2014). Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente (2014a; 2014b) 
created the regional government quality index that is proven to be highly correlated 
with sub-national levels of socio-economic development and levels of social trust. 
It has since been used by a number of research papers. Farole et al. (2011) also 
emphasize institutions as the key determinant of a country or region’s growth path, 
and warn that development policies are often mis-implemented and prone to elite 
capture and rent-seeking. For lagging periphery regions, focusing on human capital 
and capacity development is of utmost importance for enhancing local institutions 
and thus absorption and growth.  With regard to new member states from Central 
and Eastern Europe, there is increased attention to their institutional structure, 
government (in)effectiveness, transparency, political influence and corruption issues 
centring on EU funds absorption and effective use (Tosun, 2013;  Farole et al., 2011; 
Medve-Balint, 2017; Medve-Balint, 2018; Kersan et al., 2017;  Grusevaja-Pusch, 2011; 
Kalman, 2002; Kalman, 2011).
Still substantial gaps or disagreements remain in the literature, especially on 
what happens economically within regions and the needed local economic and 
structural conditions or the design of the right set of public policies to boost regional 
development in different type of core, periphery, and lagging regions. Inflows/
outflows of private sector investment or FDI and the relative socio-economic position 
of sub-national regions within the EU are of utmost interest and policy importance for 
overall EU2020 growth goals and EU cohesion policy. This chapter is a small attempt 
to contribute to the literature and fulfil such need by taking stock of private, public, 
and EU origin investment flows to sub-national regions (at the NUTS4 or LAU1 level) 
at different level of development within Hungary. It attempts to take a look at patterns 
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of allocations and flow of funds. It does not deal with the efficient use of such funds 
and their economic effects on the micro-regions. Such an examination is a task for 
future research when longer periods and more data become available.
3.4  Institutional Background
3.4.1  Growing Importance & Governance of EU Structural Funds in Hungary
Providing a steadily growing flow of funds ever since EU accession in 2004, but 
noticeably after the 2008 crisis, EU Structural Funds became a major source of public 
investment in cohesion countries—especially in the CEEs (over 50% for all, ca.74% 
for Hungary), providing a good counter-cyclical tool for these countries (Figure 2). In 
the subsequent EU cycle of 2014-2020, the order of countries has changed somewhat, 
with Portugal becoming the first with 80% of public investment financed from ESIF, 
but still substantial ratios (above 50%) of EU funding for public investment in the CEE 
member states as well. It is then followed by some southern cohesion countries also 
covered for 20-40%. Hence, the involvement of not only available public and private 
investment resources, but also differentiating between national and EU origin funds, 
are both critical in the analysis of regional resource disparities. 
Figure 2: EU has become a major source of public investment after crisis in CEE (2011-13).
In the 2007-2013 EU cycle, at the period of analysis (due to the special program for 
disadvantaged micro-regions taking place from 2009), the National Development 
Agency was the central institution for the operation of EU cohesion policy in 
Hungary, established by the government in 2006. This was then followed by yet 
another institutional change from 2014 onwards. Its tasks included coordination of 
the planning and programming, including the drafting of the national development 
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plan, and the operational programs and action plans. It became the central 
management authority, managing tasks such as: announcement of calls, approval of 
the invitations, the framework contracts of support, as well as setting up evaluation 
committees laying the groundwork for the selection of eligible projects. The agency 
also managed, monitored, and assessed the work of cooperating organizations 
carrying out the actual tendering, contracting and disbursement, reported annually 
on program progress to the parliament. It bore responsibility for communication 
and public relations about the entire development. Oversight was provided by the 
Ministry for National Development up until the end of 2013, and then later by the 
Prime Minister’s Office.
Still, the government handled strategic decisions, such as the approval of the 
national development plan and its operational programs, 2-year action plans, as well 
as submitting them to the European Commission. Such central management was 
always characteristic to Hungarian development policy across various governments 
(Pálné et. al., 2004; Pálné, 2013). It also usually decides on support for special 
projects/high-value developments, which are typically those with a budget of over 
HUF 5 billion/EUR 15 mn. The certifying authority in disbursements was the Ministry 
of Finance, whilst operational compliance and financial monitoring was conducted 
by the Government Audit Office, the State Audit Office, and the inspectors of the 
European Commission.  
From 2014 onwards, the institutional arrangement for EU funds allocation in 
Hungary has been changed for the new 2014-2020 EU budgetary cycle: the former role 
of the National Development Agency, as central coordinating body for development 
policy planning and EU funds allocation, has been taken over by the Prime Minister’s 
Office—i.e. the system went through strong centralization. At the same time, specific 
ministries became responsible for the planning and implementation of Operative 
Programmes, which on one hand, allowed for better alignment with sectorial public 
policy plans, but on the other, meant a very fragmented implementation and a 
secondary role of development policy. Efficiency and effectiveness of these new 
governance structures is yet to be seen. Such centralization helps better total national 
absorption of available funds, albeit cost-efficiency is not the same as true results. 
The effective, growth, and social-inclusion enhancing use of EU funds remains 
questionable and a task of later evaluations and future research71.
71  However, such centralized management of EU funds is characteristic to many other cohesion 
countries and happened with the silent consent of the European Commission, which also realized 
the weak administrative capacities of the middle-tier in new member states (Bailey & De Propris, 
2004). Thus, in fact, cohesion policy allocation brought about concentration of power and centralized 
management instead of more regionalization and devolution in most new member states (Bruszt, 
2008; Ferry & McMaster, 2013).
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3.4.2  Dealing with Regional Disparities in Hungarian Development Policy: The 
Appearance of The Complex Program in 2009
Throughout the 2000s, an external-convergence-internal-divergence process 
characterized Hungary, with convergence driven by the central region of the country 
(containing the capital city Budapest and its agglomeration), yet a serious increase in 
internal territorial inequalities (Figure 3).
Figure 3:  Widening gaps of regional differences in per capita GDP in HU regions 2000, 2010, and 2011.
Source: own calculations based on CSO Hungary data.
These development gaps are especially visible if measured not on the regional (NUTS 
2) level but among micro-regions (NUTS 4/LAU 1), where there is considerable and 
growing variance in socioeconomic indicators, with unsustainable loss of economic 
base, strong outmigration in several of them, and with differences as much as 20 times 
across micro regional development levels east and west of the country, especially 
between centre and eastern and southern peripheries (Figure 4, on the development 
level of all 174 HU micro-regions in 2007, along the complex development indicator 
applied by Central Statistical Office of Hungary).
Recognizing these issues, the following national objectives of territorial cohesion 
were identified:  (i) the dimension of European convergence  of the country overall; 
(ii) mitigation of internal inequalities (at regional and micro-regional levels); (iii) 
the need for territorial harmony in developments, and (iv) the need for territorial 
synergies in developments (co-operation between regions and sectors of the 
economy). Development needs were also reflected by the fact that six of the seven HU 
regions were identified as objective 1 regions, under EU level GDP averages, and thus 
eligible for ESIF. The central region however, comprising capital city Budapest and its 
agglomeration, became transitory “phasing-in” regions, first entitled for similar rates 
of support as other regions, but significantly smaller rates from 2011 onwards. Hence, 
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contrary to earlier ranking of within-country disparities by problems and needs, and 
some care for the lagging regions within development-targeted funds, this situation 
created a level-playing field for all regions of the country, all competing for available 
cohesion funds with the same conditions (Bachtler & Downes, 2000).
Figure 4: Development level of 174 Hungarian micro-regions in 2007 along the complex development 
indicator applied by CSO.
Thus despite the presence of some regional cohesion objectives in subsequent 
development plans (from 2004 EU Accession onwards), the least depressed areas of 
Hungary could hardly reach and receive resources from the huge pool of EU Structural 
Funds. More developed parts of the country had much better absorption rates (Hajnal-
Medve, 2016; Kalman, 2011; Cartwright-Báthory, 2012,).72 These happened partly due 
to regulatory issues and incentives for full and fast total national absorption of funds 
(with prosperous regions also having better administrative and own contribution 
capacities), and partly due to a restructuring of resource-allocation following the 
financial and economic crises escalating from 2008. As so, the least developed 
micro-regions were characterized by not only low economic performance, lack of 
employment opportunities, social problems (outmigration of skilled population), but 
72  Similar results, a better absorption by more prosperous regions, were found for many other new 
CEE member states by Bloom and Petrova (2013), and by Dąbrowski (2012).
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also by a relatively low absorption capacity for development funds (as also shown 
by the huge differences in magnitudes across least and most developed countries 
in Figure 6 and Table 1 presented in the next section). Even from the absorbed 
EU funding within micro-regions, it was usually the more developed parts, central 
settlements, that gained support, and less so the peripheral villages. This exacerbated 
their disadvantages, and thus more economic integration enhanced within-country 
regional divergence, as is the case in many other countries.
Recognizing the special problems these least developed areas face, starting from 
2009, a special program targeting the 33 most depressed micro-regions of Hungary 
(often referred to as the LAMR program, or least advanced micro regions) was launched 
within EU cohesion policy allocation by Hungary (Figure 5). Its stated goals included 
stimulating local economy (jobs) and reducing inner social and regional inequalities 
via infrastructure and human development (health, education, labour market… etc.). 
This special program had a dedicated support framework (ca.320Mn EUR; minor 
compared to total amounts, but still something dedicated for lagging areas), which 
tried to develop both regulatory and operating environment in a positive direction. 
For example, with extra funds combined from several Operative Programs (regional, 
social development., social infrastructure) and initiating complex innovative project 
packages in an iterative way. It aimed at improvement of local development capacities 
and incitement of collaboration among local actors, between local and central, and 
among different Operative Programs (funding). 
These 33 least developed areas represented ca. 10% of national population, were 
mainly rural (2/3 without a town above 10 thousand people), mainly peripheral (1/2 
on border, 2/3 in border region), mainly with large Roma population (1/3 of national 
Roma population), packed with an under-educated and low-skilled population and 
high child poverty73. Having its effects and relying on funds across several Operative 
Programs, the primary tools of territorial focusing within this program were: forcing 
prioritization in eligibility, extra-points in project-assessment, and increased funding 
intensity given for projects coming from these depressed areas.
This paper is, on one hand, assessing the success of this policy choice, this special 
experiment program, where it takes a look at numbers to assess the allocation of 
extra resources to these least advanced micro-regions had really happened; and, on 
the other hand, compares regional development resources coming from EU funding 
with other resources, such as national subsidies for investment as well as private 
investments.   
73  20-30 % of Hungarian children live under the 60% median income at national level at this period.
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Figure 5: The 33 least developed micro-regions (LHH33, dark green) targeted by the special complex 
program out of all local areas with severe socioeconomic disadvantages in Hungary (light green, 
amber).
3.5  Data 
For the purposes of our analysis, at first a new micro-region and settlement-based 
database of funds was built, which represents a new element in the literature and the 
policy-practice. Previously only county-wise (NUTS 3) sub-national investment data 
have been published by the National Statistical Office of Hungary. Thus, earlier studies 
relied only on those. We connect local municipality-level demographic, infrastructure, 
economic, financial, business accounts and grants data originating from various 
different sources: for detailed EU grants allocation data the National Development 
Agency EMIR database, National Statistical Office T-Star data for detailed municipal 
level socio-economic data, Hungarian State Treasury data on government finances, 
Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database for business financial data74. 
74  Due to data access problems with private sector financial data at company level from Hungarian 
Tax Office, we turned to a second best solution by using the Amadeus database, that is an international 
business data collection, covering several countries and years, widely used for both business and 
academic purposes.
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After access issues and tedious cleansing of data is aggregated based on the 174 
micro-regions structure used in Hungary since 200875. That is, with micro-regions 
ranked and classified based on the complex micro-regional development statistic 
created by the National Statistical Office of Hungary. For easier comparability, all 
financial data is deflated at end of term 2011 prices. Due to reasons of data availability, 
and to shed light on the 33 LAMR special program introduced in 2009, the empirical 
analysis focuses on the 2007-2011 period, but also compares results of the 2004-2006 
period (former EU budget cycle) with respect to the 33 (47) least developed micro-
regions targeted by the special program and/or the 94 less-developed micro-regions, 
that is the subsequent category of focus by the national policy. 
The CSO of Hungary collects investment data only county-wise. Moreover, not 
separating public and private sector, this data it was not useful for our analysis at 
micro-regional level. Former studies only used such aggregate data at county level, or 
mere administrative data of number of registered businesses at municipal level, but 
not their actual financial data and especially investments of private sector. However, 
for the purposes of comparing private and public investment flows set out in this 
exercise, these were insufficient. As such, the decision to turn to Bureau van Dijk’s 
Amadeus international database for business financial data, and calculating private 
investment from firm level fixed assets data, depended on to the following formula: 
Investmentt= fixed assetst – (fixed assetst-1 - depreciation t)  >0 (Fixed assets 
corrected with depreciation)
Equity ratio (equity/total assets)>= 0.25
That is, the analysis only takes positive change in fixed assets as true private investment 
in a given year, if the firm has enough of its own capital to invest (leverage), not just 
re-values, its assets for accounting reasons.
3.6  Main Findings
3.6.1  Uneven Distribution: Regional Development Resources in Function of the 
Cumulative Population 
In order to demonstrate the uneven distribution of development resources, a Lorenz-
curve type chart was created to show the magnitude and distribution of development 
75  At the analysed period, mirco-regions were also used as a planning category, not only serving 
statistical purposes but also some joint municipal projects also carried out at this level. From 2013, 
yet another governance change was carried out in Hungary, and the old-new “jaras” category was re-
introduced at this territorial level, which however more or less overlaps with micro-regions.
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grants from various sources: EU, national state budget or private investment (Figure 
6). On the x-axis, population is cumulated along the complex development indicator 
(constructed by HU CSO and used by HU development policy as a major targeting 
variable). The y-axis shows the proportion of private, state, or EU-funded investment 
resources.
Figure 6.  Distribution of different regional development resources 2004-2006 and 2007-11 by 
population cumulated across development levels. 
Source: Own calculations from database.
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It is visible, how in the first EU planning period right after accession (2004-2006), 
EU funds followed almost the straight population-proportional distribution (the 
diagonal would mark an absolutely even distribution); i.e. they are not larger than their 
proportion even in the least developed areas. The national state budgetary investment 
grants show a bump above the straight diagonal, marking higher than proportional 
funding going to the less developed parts, steeply increasing in the lower first two 
quintiles. At the same time, the distribution of private equity resources follows a 
completely opposite pattern, with very low proportions in the lower developed 
quintiles and a very sharp jump in the more developed micro-regions. This pattern 
is not unique to Hungary, and has long been the concern for economic geography 
and development policy, that private sector activity and investment is concentrated in 
more developed areas, contributing to widening gaps between regions. However. the 
magnitude of the differences is still striking in this case. 
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Figure 7: The total sum of development resources in 2007-11 by micro region quintiles (along CSO 
complex indicator); from lowest to highest developed quintile.
Source: own calculations from database.
As shown in figure 7, national state budgetary grants for local government investment 
are negligible everywhere in these periods. The reason being mostly a crowding out 
of such national funds by EU cohesion policy funds that were becoming available 
from 2004 onwards. These EU funds (marked by the colour green in figure 7) and 
the level of their amount was similar for 3rd, 4th, and 5th most developed quintiles of 
micro-regions. Yet, while this equals half of the total available resources for those 
middle-range regions in the 3rd quintile, it is just ca.1/10th of all development resources 
in the upper, most developed quintile, where private sector investment dominates. 
This highlights marked differences of development potential across micro-regions. At 
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the same time, this figure once again makes it visible and very clear how the majority 
(over 95% and large magnitude) of private investment (marked by the colour blue) 
were realized in the most developed 4th and 5th quintiles of micro-regions. 
3.6.2  Opposing Development Patterns Emerge
The special benefits and special treatment offered by the program to the 33 LAMR 
(extra points and greater proportions of funding; less need for own resources) had 
some effects, but could not be effective enough on their own. Although 15.65% of all EU 
funds went to the least developed 33 micro-regions between 2007-2011 (Table1), which 
is larger than their population proportion (10%), the optimal utilisation of funds is 
hindered by the fact that there are fewer innovative long-term development projects 
in these regions, because their absorption capacities are lower, the institutional 
system and human capacity are also weaker than average. National public investment 
resources, although much smaller in magnitude, seem to follow similar patterns to EU 
funds allocation (though allocated through different channels), i.e. not having much 
compensatory effect. 
Table 1: Development Resources in micro regions (NUTS4) of HU. 2007-2011
EU 
Cohesion 
funds
(mn HUF)
 
(%)
Private 
investment 
(mn HUF)
 
(%)
Natl. budget 
invest. grants 
(mn HUF)
 
(%)
Population
(%)
More developed 2783997 54.61 32026202 95.82 41278 52.28 68.3
33 LAMR 797551 15.65 260340 0.78 11471 14.53 9.8
14 other LAMR 
(47)
325678 6.39 203481 0.61 5183 6.56 5.4
47 other 
underdeveloped 
mr (94 LAMR)
1190327 23.35 933231 2.79 21030 26.63 16.5
Source: own calculations from database
As hinted by new economic geography and growth theories, more than half of EU 
origin development funds, and also investment grants from national budgetary 
sources, were allocated to better developed parts of the country in the analysed period 
(Table1), focusing on growth-enhancement investments, that serve the economic 
growth and thus overall convergence of Hungary to the rest of the EU. Striking is the 
fact, however, that during the same time period, 95% of private investment has been 
realized in these more developed micro-regions, while only less than 1% (!) flowing 
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into the 33 LAMR—a fact very telling on its own about differences in development 
potentials and opportunities and the strong regional disparities resulting from market 
forces alone.
The following Figure 8 summarizes development resources in per capita terms 
in the two periods in different micro-regions by development categories used by 
policymakers in Hungary. One can detect the shrinking size and role of national 
investment grants as well as the growing (both magnitude and importance of) EU 
funds in all categories for the period after 2007, when Hungary was indeed one of the 
major beneficiaries of EU cohesion policy. But what is most apparent is that, while 
the national average is a development pattern relying mostly on private investment 
resources and just partially on public funds, in the disadvantaged micro-regions 
the pattern is the opposite. Here the resources for development are coming from EU 
funds (red bars), notably larger per capita than the national average. This latter fact 
reflects the goals of territorial cohesion. However, the lack of private resources for 
development in these most disadvantaged areas is drawing an opposing development 
pattern (or rather one of under-development), an almost fully grant-dependent path. 
This seems inevitable, given the lack of other resources in these regions. However, it 
is not sustainable in the long term.
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Figure 8: Per capita development resources in the disadvantaged micro-regions.
Source: Own calculations from database.
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The LAMR program effect is shown by the fact that although the funds allocated 
through it represented only ca.15% out of the total EU funds portfolio, the funds 
paid per capita considerably exceed figures of the ‘control group’: that of 14 other 
most disadvantaged micro-regions for whom the program was unavailable (also 
underdeveloped, but just beyond the cut-off point in the complex development 
indicator used for selection). The latter can be considered the losers of the program-
limit, since they received somewhat larger per capita EU funds than the national 
average, yet significantly lower than the 33 micro regions involved in the LAMR 
program, or even less than other, not so well-developed, but not the most depressed 
micro-regions. 
Broken down across different settlement-types (Figure 9), the per capita 
development funds show these opposing development patterns from another angle: 
micro-regions containing county cities show a typical pattern similar to the national 
average. Even those countryside micro-regions that do not have a major city as their 
poles but are not in the least-developed category, have a similar pattern of private 
resources being highest (though significantly smaller) and somewhat larger EU 
funds per capita than MRs with county cities. Yet the least advantaged 33 MRs—that 
were the focus of the special program—indeed show an opposite pattern: small, 
private, and highest EU origin development resources. Hence the conclusion that in 
general, micro-regions and cities develop mainly due to private sector investment 
activity, where public grants play only additional role, while the least developed are 
characterized by huge grant-dependence 
Figure 9: Per capita development resources by micro-regions with different settlement types.
Source: Own calculations from database.
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3.6.3  Spatial Patterns Confirm Opposing Development Trends
If we put the above results on maps, the opposing development patterns are even 
more visible in terms of geographic location as well (Figure 10). 
33 LHH
75 000 - 250 000 
250 000 - 608 000
608 000 - 1 010 000
1 010 000 - 2 202 000
2 202 000 - 10 090 000
10 090 000 - 25 882 000
1 főre jutó piaci beruházás kistérségenként 2004-2011
      
Figure 10: Per capita private investment (upper)) and per capita (lower) EU funds received by micro-
regions (NUTS4) of Hungary, 2007-2011. Darker areas show higher per capita amounts, dots signal 
the 33 least advantaged micro-regions affected by the LAMR program. 
Source: Own calculations based on database. 
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It should be noted that per capita amounts in the LAMR micro-regions are showing a 
somewhat upward biased picture, due to the low population of these areas. However, 
if we compare total and per capita amounts of EU funds granted and paid for different 
micro-regions in Hungary (Figure 11), it becomes obvious that the largest amount in 
total magnitude went to the more central regions and/or growth poles of the country, 
as shown by the numbers in the previous figures.
    
Figure 11: Total (upper) and per capita (lower) amounts of EU funds received by different micro-
regions in Hungary, 2007-2011. 
Source: Own calculations based on database.
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This is dictated by the logic of external convergence (of Hungary as a whole), 
by Lisbon goals of growth and employment orientation, competitiveness… etc. 
Internal convergence within Hungary was somewhat (and solely) served by EU-funds 
allocation, but, as noted, the quality of its absorption could be improved. The analysis 
of what specific goals these resources went for, and the usefulness/socioeconomic 
development contribution of those goes beyond the scope of this paper, but is 
definitely worth consideration in future work.
3.7  Conclusions & Policy Implications
Apart from describing the differences in private and public investment activities, 
flow of investment funds between well-off, more developed areas and the most 
deprived, and least developed ones, this chapter highlights the growing importance 
of governmental budgetary resources (be it national, or EU) for the development 
potentials of deprived areas, since very small amounts of private investment get 
realized there. It raises awareness of the deep structural problems facing the least 
developed micro-regions, as well as how national and EU resources have tried and 
managed to tackle these issues. However, especially under an austerity economic 
environment, but during periods of growth too, governments need to think wisely 
about how to allocate public funds in an efficient and effective, yet equitable manner. 
Indeed the conflict between efficiency and convergence does exist in a Europe that is 
to remain competitive and growing in the integrated world economy, yet faced with 
stubborn regional disparities that stay and even grow within EU and within countries. 
Finding the right sources of growth for different types of core and periphery regions, 
balance on the edge of efficiency, and effectiveness yet care for equity, is not an easy 
task for governments at all levels. With the new EU multi-annual budgetary framework 
on the horizon, Europe really needs to re-think the overall costs and benefits of its 
redistribution policy, and rigorously assess its effects.
Overall convergence of Hungary, as a country towards EU averages in terms of 
economic development (income, GDP levels… etc.), as well as economic recovery from 
crisis, is indeed better served by concentrating development resources on growth 
poles and economic growth-oriented investments. As tables and figures in this study 
show, more than half of the total amounts of EU funds went to better developed parts 
of the country. Yet, for the sake of reducing within-country disparities, support for the 
lagging regions is still important, as very significant disparities exist and continue 
diverging in economic and social development and economic potential among 
Hungarian regions today.
As it has been shown, also in this chapter, private investment almost exclusively 
flows into more developed regions: only 1.7% of private investment was realized in 
those 33 micro-regions. Thus, market forces strengthen regional differentiation. The 
scale of public funds arriving at the impoverished regions exceeds that of private 
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investments, and, in per capita terms, also EU funds absorbed by other areas. As 
a result, in these least developed micro-regions, development policy can indeed 
trigger a significant relative move. Nonetheless, the grant-dependent nature of their 
development path is also evident. The role of EU funds has grown even more in their 
development potential with the decrease of national decentralized resources. 
A major contribution of the analysed special program, for targeting the most 
disadvantaged 33 micro-regions, was that it has managed to induce some positive 
changes in the fund absorption capacities of these laggard areas (Figure 12) via 
facilitating connections among local development actors and institutions. Results 
show marked differences in per capita allocations, especially compared to data from 
the other 14 disadvantaged micro-regions not treated by this special program (Figure 
7). Although, in terms of program coordination and execution, it was far from optimal.
Figure 12: Funds absorption improved: Per Capita EU funds disbursement in LHH33 micro-regions 
between 2007-2011 in % of national average. 
Source: National Development Office Hungary, 2013, Program Evaluation Report, p.92.
More developed regions of the country received larger chunk of EU funds for 
development in the first 2004-2006 period (65%), than in the second period between 
2007-2011 (54.5%). There was slight improvement in their role in internal convergence, 
but as said, the large majority of private investment, and thus economic development, 
happens in those better-developed areas. 
The effects of LAMR special program is captured nicely in that the funds 
allocated to the least advanced micro-regions are ca.15% out of the whole EU funds 
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portfolio76, the funds paid per capita considerably exceed figures of the other 14 
most disadvantaged micro-regions for whom the program was unavailable. This 
unavailability is due to their position just beyond the cut-off point, lending them a 
unique class as a natural ‘control group,’ and due to several more developed areas. 
However, per capita figures draw a somewhat upward biased picture, due to the low 
population of these laggard micro-regions. Likewise, looking at total amounts instead 
of per capita shows that more than half of EU funds went to better-developed areas, 
and growth poles of the country. From a detailed breakdown along different subsidy 
categories, it is visible that these targeted micro-regions applied for and received 
higher than average portions of funds for the improvement of local communal 
services, smaller infrastructure development, funds for active labour market policies, 
and funds given for businesses. Nonetheless, they were fairly underrepresented in 
funds given for research and development, higher education, and human resource 
development in general (Dynamiting depressed regions, Program Evaluation, NDA 
2013).
 Well-targeted programs of even smaller amounts, such as this special program 
introduced in Hungary for the least advantaged micro-regions analysed here, can offer 
a chance to smooth and slow down negative processes, as the development of such 
laggards is grant-dependent. The practice of highlighting/favouring disadvantaged 
micro-regions is a useful and necessary policy tool. However, the devil is in the 
details, where targeting complex program design, setting outcomes and policy tools 
right, special treatment and local planning, and cooperative implementation are key 
for the success of such special policy programs. As previous research has pointed out, 
chances of bad implementation, clientelistm, political deterrence, rent seeking, and 
elite-capture are threats especially at local levels. These dangers are relevant in all 
cohesion countries, but are especially strong for new CEE member states, with fragile 
and emerging institutional systems. 
It has been shown that, not only are lagging regions behind with their growth 
and development, but often, due to weak institutions, lower capacities to innovate, 
lack of human capital and so on, they cannot really make productive use of available 
resources. Hence, they become prone to persistent under-development. On one hand, 
cushioning lagging regions with such well-targeted and complex programs can help 
draw them out of these vicious cycles. Yet, there are risks and potential pitfalls too. 
Such interventions distort efficient functioning of markets by favouring certain types 
of activities, and entities and so on. Such favouritism induces adverse selection in 
many cases, as well as shelters these regions from the markets. They also crowd out 
private investments, leaving these regions very grant-dependent and thus fragile if 
pubic funding becomes non-available. The very strong dependency culture has its 
roots in new CEE member states and in their common socialist past. However, in such 
76  That is, higher than their 10% proportion from the country’s population.
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regions, it gets even more re-enforced and makes them less able to adapt and innovate, 
and more prone to local elite capture and clientelism. It seems that strengthening 
such laggard regions in the long term is only possible with a combination of grants, 
and provided public goods and services; but also along with an institutional reform 
and strengthening of human capacities. 
Serious improvement in terms of territorial policymaking can only be expected 
if sectorial policies and social agenda become ‘space-sensitive’ and ‘place-based’, as 
suggested by Barca (2009: 120-125). Without these, according to Barca, mere provision 
of more public funds is neither enough, nor efficient, as it can easily lead to grant-
dependency—as evident in the outcome of this case. With this in mind, Europe and its 
member states (Hungary included), need to further think about how to reconcile the 
truly conflicting goals of overall growth and innovation, as well as on social cohesion 
and partial regional convergence of core, peripheral, and other regions, in a more 
nuanced way.
Acknowledgement
This research  partially stems from results of an evaluation report  for the National 
Development Agency of Hungary, the author would like to thank Balazs Varadi, Flora 
Samu and Timea Suto (Budapest Policy Institute) for their comments and assistance.
References
Acemoglu, D. (2006) ‘Modelling Inefficient Institutions’. NBERWorking Paper No. 11940, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S.H. (2006) ‘De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence’. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 325–30.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2000) ‘Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development’. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 126–30.
Aschauer, D. 1989. “Does public capital  crowd out private capital?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
vol 24 (2), 171-188. 
Aschauer, David Alan (1989): “Is public expenditure productive?,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-200, March.
Bachtler, J. – Downes, R. 2000: The Spatial Coverage of Regional Policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe. – European Urban and Regional Studies 7: (2). pp. 159–74.
Bachtler, J. -Barnier,M.- Stahl,G.- Lluna, D., -Ziegler,A. 2003 EU cohesion policy: Challenges and 
Responses  Intereconomics,Vol. 38, 2003, No.6,pp.292- 310
Bachtler, J., - McMaster, I. (2007). EU cohesion policy and the role of the regions: Investigating 
the influence of structural funds in the new member states. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 26, 398–427. doi:10.1068/c0662
Bailey, D. – Propris, L. DE 2004: A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity-Building in 
the Candidate Countries. – Journal of Common Market Studies 42: (1). pp. 77–98.
168   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
Baldwin Richard  (2003): Economic Geography and Public Policy, Princeton University Press.
Baldwin, R. E. (2011). Trade and industrialisation after globalisation’s 2nd unbundling: How building 
and joining a supply chain are different and why it matters (Working Paper No. w17716). 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Barca, Fabrizio 2009.: An Agenda for a Reformed cohesion policy. A place-based approach to 
meeting European Union challenges and expectations. Independent Report. http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm
Barro R. J. and Sala-I-Martin X. (1992) Convergence, Journal of Political Economy 100, 407–443.
Barro, Robert J. (1990): “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Economic Growth”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.98.No5.
Becker, S. O., Egger, P. H., - Von Ehrlich, M. (2008). Going NUTS: The effect of EU structural 
funds on regional performance. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 578–590. doi:10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2010.06.006
Békés, G.-Muraközy B. (2011): Magyar gazellák: gyors növekedésű vállalatok jellemzői és 
kialakulásuk elemzése Magyarországon, MTA KTI,   TÁMOP - 2.3.2-09/1 Műhelytanulmányok  
T/4
Beugelsdijk, M., - Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2005). The effectiveness of structural policy in the European 
Union: An empirical analysis for the EU-15 in 1995-2001. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 43, 37–51. doi:10.1111/j.0021-9886.2005.00545.x
Bloom, S. – Petrova, V. 2013: National Subversion of Supranational Goals: ‘Pork-Barrel’ Politics and 
EU Regional Aid. – Europe-Asia Studies 65: (8).pp. 1599–1620.
Boldrin, M. and F. Canova 2001. Inequality and Convergence in Europe’s Regions: reconsidering 
European Regional Policies. Economic Policy, 32, 205-245.
Boschma, R. (2005). Proximity and innovation: A critical assessment.Regional Studies, 39(1), 61–74. 
doi:10.1080/003434005200032 0887
Boschma, R. (2015). Towards an evolutionary perspective on regional resilience. Regional Studies, 
49(5), 733–751. doi:10.1080/ 00343404.2014.959481
Bouvet, F. – Dall’erba, S. 2010: European Regional Structural Funds: How Large Is the Influence 
of Politics on the Allocation Process? – JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48: (3). pp. 
501–528.
Brakman, S.-Garrettsen- Marrewijk, 2005. The New Introduction to Geographical Economics, 
Cambridges University Press,Cambridge M.A. USA 2005
BRUSZT L. 2008: „Multi-Level Governance – The Eastern Versions Emerging Patterns of Regional 
Developmental Governance in the New Member States. – Regional and Federal Studies 18: (5). 
pp. 607–628.
Budapest Szakpolitikai Elemző Intézet (2013): Egészségügyi Tárgyú Nsrk-Fejlesztések Kvantitatív 
Értékelése – NFÜ megrendelésre, LOT1. 
Cappelen, A., Castellacci, F., Fagerberg, J. and Verspagen, B. (2003) ‘The Impact ofEU Regional 
Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union’.JCMS, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 621–44. 
Cartwright, A. – Bátory Á. 2012: Monitoring Committees in cohesion policy: Overseeing the 
Distribution of Structural Funds in Hungary and Slovakia. – Journal of European Integration 34: 
(4). pp. 323–340.
Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., - Lapuente, V. (2014a). Mapping the regional divide in Europe: A measure 
for assessing quality of government in 206 European regions. Social Indicators Research, 122, 
315–346. doi:10.1007/s11205-014-0702-y
Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., - Lapuente, V. (2014b). Regional governance matters: Quality of government 
within European Union member states. Regional Studies, 48, 68–90. doi:10.1080/00343404.2
013.770141
    169Effects of EU-Funds on Territorial Cohesion - Public and Private Resources ... 
Charron, Nicholas, Dijkstra, Lewis and Lapuente, Victor, (2014), Regional Governance Matters: 
Quality of Government within European Union Member States, Regional Studies, 48, issue 1, p. 
68-90, 
Crescenzi, R., - Giua, M. (2014). The EU Cohesion policy in context: Regional growth and 
the influence of agricultural and rural development policies. http://www.lse.ac.uk/
europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper85.pdf
Crescenzi, R., - Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2011). Innovation and regional  growth in the European Union. 
Berlin: Springer Science - Business Media.
Crescenzi, R., Nathan, M., - Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2016). Do inventors talk to strangers? On proximity 
and collaborative knowledge creation. Research Policy, 45(1), 177–194. doi:10. 1016/j.
respol.2015.07.003
Csite A.-Jakobi Á. (2009): Területi diszharmónia: A 33 LHH kistérség NFT-s és ÚMFT-s fejlesztési 
forrásszerző teljesítményének néhány sajátossága
D’Este, P., Guy, F., - Iammarino, S. (2013). Shaping the formation of university–industry research 
collaborations: What type of proximity does really matter? Journal of Economic Geography, 
13(4), 537–558. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbs010
Dąbrowski, M. 2012: Shallow or deep Europeanisation? The uneven impact of EU cohesion policy on 
the regional and local authorities in Poland. –Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 30: (4). pp. 730–745.
Dall’erba, S., - Le Gallo, J. (2008). Regional convergence and the impact of European structural funds 
over 1989–1999: A spatial econometric analysis. Papers in Regional Science, 87, 219–244. 
doi:10.1111/j.1435-5957.2008.00184.x
Davoodi H. and Zou H. (1998) Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth: a cross country study, 
Journal of Urban Economics 43, 244–257.
Ebel R. D. and Yilmaz S. (2002) On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation. Policy 
Research Working Paper Number 2809. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Ederveen, S., H. de Groot, and R. Nahuis 2006. “Fertile Soil for Structural Funds? A PanelData 
Analysis of the Conditional Effectiveness of European cohesion policy”. Kyklos, 59 (1), 17-42. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00318.x
European Commission – Eurostat. (2015a). Economy and finance. [Adobe Digital Editions version]. 
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home
Ezcurra R - Rodríguez-Pose A.(2013) Political Decentralization, Economic Growth 
and Regional Disparities in the OECD, Regional Studies, 47:3, 388-401, DOI: 
10.1080/00343404.2012.731046
Ezcurra R. and Rodríguez-Pose A. (2009) Measuring the regional divide, in Capello R. and Nijkamp P. 
(Eds) Regional Dynamics and Growth: Advances in Regional Economics, pp. 329–353. Edward 
Elgar, Northampton, MA.
Farole, T., Rodríguez-Pose, A.,- Storper, M. (2011). Cohesion policy in the European Union: Growth, 
geography, institutions. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49, 1089–1111. doi:10.1111/ 
j.1468-5965.2010.02161.x
Ferry, M. - McMaster, I. (2013). Between Growth and Cohesion: New Directions in Central and East 
European Regional Policy. Europe-Asia Studies. 65. 10.1080/09668136.2013.832958.
Fratesi, U.-Perucca, G. (2014). Territorial capital and the effectiveness of cohesion policies: An 
assessment for CEE regions. Investigaciones Regionales, Special Issue 2014,
Fujita,M.-Krugman,P.-Venables, A.J (2001): The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International 
Trade, MIT Press.
Gábor Békés - Péter Harasztosi (2013): Agglomeration Premium  and Trading Activity of Firms, http://
cefig.eu/view/list/ (Utolsó letöltés: 2012.01.12.)
Gramlich, Edward M 1994. “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 1176-96, September
170   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
Grosse, T.G. 2006.: Euro-Commentary: An Evaluation of the Regional Policy System in Poland 
Challenges and Threats Emerging from Participation in the Eu’s cohesion policy. – European 
Urban and Regional Studies 13: (2).pp. 151–165.
Grossman, E.H. and Helpman, E. (2001) Special Interest Politics (Cambridge, MA  and London: MIT 
Press).
Grossman, G.M. - Helpman, E. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press.
Gruševaja, M., - Pusch, T. (2011). How does institutional setting affect the impact of EU structural 
funds on economic cohesion? New evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. [Adobe Digital 
Editionsversion]. Retrieved from http://www.iwh-halle.de/d/publik/disc/17-11.pdf
Hajnal, Gy.- Medve-Bálint G.. 2016. „Fejlesztéspolitika térben és időben: az Európai Unió fejlesztési 
célú támogatásai Magyarországon - 2004-2015”. O. 57–88 in Humán tér-kép: A humán és 
fejlesztéspolitikai tényezők földrajza Magyarországon : Tanulmánykötet, szerkesztette I. Tózsa. 
Budapest: PAGEO,
Halpern László–Muraközy Balázs (2010): Innováció és vállalati teljesítmény Magyarországon, 
Közgazdasági Szemle, LVII. évf., 2010. április (293–317. o.)
Hirschmann 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University Press, 1958
Hooghe L., Marks G. and Schakel A. H. (2008) Regional authority in 42 democracies, 1950–2006: a 
measure and five hypotheses, Regional and Federal Studies 18(2–3), 111–302.
Hooghe L., Marks G. and Schakel A. H. (2010) The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 
42 Democracies. Routledge, New York, NY.
Horváth GY. 2001: Európai regionális politika. – Budapest–Pécs: Dialóg-Campus
Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In 
search of spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic Review, 94(3), 605–627. 
doi:10.1257/0002828041464605
Kálmán J. 2011: Derangement or Development? Political Economy of Eu Structural Funds Allocation 
in New Member States – Insights from the Hungarian Case. – Budapest: Center for Policy 
Studies, Central European University. – https://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/
cps-workingpaper- eu-structural-funds-hungary-2011.pdf
Kjetil Bjorvatn - Alexander W. Cappelen (2003), “Redistributive Tax Policies and Inequality: An 
Assessment of Recent Country Comparative Studies,” CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 1(1), pages 28-31, 02.
Krugman, Paul (1991): “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political Economy, 
University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 483-99, June.
KSH (2011): Területi különbségek Magyarországon – Bakos Norbert – Hidas Zsuzsanna – Kezán 
András, Területi Statisztika 2011/04
Kullman Ádám (2009): A regionális gazdaságfejlesztés eszközrendszere és magyarországi 
alkalmazása, Doktori Értekezés, ELTE TTK
National Development Office Hungary (2013) A fejlesztési források szerepe a leszakadó térségek 
dinamizálásában, Értékelési Jelentés (The role of development funds in dynamizing 
disadvantaged regions) -  Program Evaluation Report for the National Development Office,  
https://www.palyazat.gov.hu/a_fejlesztesi_forrasok_szerepe_a_leszakado_tersegek_
dinamizalasaban
Martin, P. (2005) ‘The Geography of Inequalities in Europe’. Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 
12, pp. 83–108.
Martin, Philippe - Rogers, Carol Ann (2000): “ Optimal Stabilization Policy in the Presence of 
Learning by Doing,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, 
vol. 2(2), pages 213-41.
Martínez-Vázquez J. and McNab R. M. (2003) Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth, World 
Development 31, 1597–1616. 
    171Effects of EU-Funds on Territorial Cohesion - Public and Private Resources ... 
Medve Balint G. 2018 The cohesion policy on the EU’s Eastern and Southern Periphery: Misallocated 
Funds? Studies in Comparative International Development 53(2):1–21.
Medve-Bálint, Gergo. 2017. „Funds for the Wealthy and the Politically Loyal? How EU funds may 
contribute to increasing regional disparities in East Central Europe”. O. 220–40 in EU cohesion 
policy: Reassessing Performance and Direction, Regions and Cities, szerkesztette J. Bachtler, S. 
Hardy, P. Berkowitz, és T. Muravska. London; New York: Routledge.
Mohl, P., - Hagen, T. (2010). Do EU structural funds promote regional growth? New evidence 
from various panel data approaches. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 40, 353–365. 
doi:10.1016/j. regsciurbeco.2010.03.005
 Musgrave, Richard - Musgrave, Peggy. (1975). Public Finance Theory and Practice. http://lst-
iiep.iiep-unesco.org/cgi-bin/wwwi32.exe/[in=epidoc1.in]/?t2000=015005/(100). Vol. I. 
10.2307/2553841
Myrdal G.1957, Economic Theory of Under-developed Regions, G. Duckworth London, 1957
Oates,W.E:1991 Studies in Fiscal Federalism, Edward Elgar, 1991 ISBN-13: 978-1852785208
OECD (2009): How Regions Grow - Trends and Analysis, OECD, Paris
Open Society Foundations – KAI Consulting: A kövesút végén, A területi egyenlőtlenségek 
csökkentése és a romák helyzetének javítása  – jelentés az LHH Program első szakaszának 
eredményeiről, 2011. március , OSI, Budapest
Ottaviano, Gianmarco (2008): “Infrastructure and economic geography: An overview of theory and 
evidence,” EIB Papers 6/2008, European Investment Bank, Economics Department
Pálné Kovács I. – Paraskevopoulos, C. J. –Horváth GY. 2004: Institutional‘legacies’ and the shaping 
of regional governance in Hungary. – Regional and Federal Studies 14: (3). pp. 430–460.
Pálné Kovács I. 2013: Miért hagytuk, hogy így legyen? A területi decentralizációs reformok 
természetrajza Magyarországon. – Politikatudományi Szemle 22: (4). pp. 7–34.
Pellegrini, G., Terribile, F., Tarola, O., Muccigrosso, T., - Busillo, F. (2013). Measuring the effects of 
European regional policy on economic growth: A regression discontinuity approach. Papers in 
Regional Science, 92, 217–233. doi:10.1111/j.1435-5957.2012.00459.x
Pereira, Alfredo Marvao - Roca-Sagales, Oriol (2003): “Spillover effects of public capital formation: 
evidence from the Spanish regions,” Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 
238-256, March.
Persson, T., Roland, R. and Tabellini, G. (1997) ‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, pp. 1163– 202.
Pires, Luis Madureira (2001); The present Institutional Structure of Regional Development in Hungary 
and Its Preparation for the EU Structural Funds; Study prepared in framework of PHARE Special 
Preparatory Programme for Structural Funds in Hungary, July, Budapest, 2001
Puga, D:  (2002): “European regional policies in light of recent location theories,” Journal of 
Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(4), pages 373-406, October
Puga D. and Venables A. J. (1999) Agglomeration and economic development: import substitution vs. 
trade liberalisation, Economic Journal 109, 292–311.
Quah, D.T. (1996) ‘Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dynamics’. 
Economic Journal, Vol. 106, pp. 1045–55.
Rodden J. and Wibbels E. (2002) Beyond the fiction of federalism: macroeconomic management in 
multitiered systems, World Politics 54, 494–531.
Rodríguez-Pose A. -  Crescenzi R. (2008): “Mountains in a flat world: why proximity still matters 
for the location of economic activity,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 
Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 1(3), pages 371-388
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (1999) ‘Convergence or Divergence? Types of Regional Responses to 
Socioeconomic Change’. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 90, pp. 
363–78.
172   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Do institutions matter for regional development? Regional Studies, 47(7), 
1034–1047. doi:10.1080/ 00343404.2012.748978
Rodríguez-Pose, A., - Di Cataldo, M. (2015). Quality of government and innovative performance in the 
regions of Europe. Journal of Economic Geography, 15(4), 673–706. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbu023
Rodriguez-Pose, Andres - Ugo Fratesi† (2004): “Between Development and Social Policies: The 
Impact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions,”Regional Sudies, Taylor and 
Francis Journals, vol. 38(1), pages 97-113
Romer, P.M. 1986  Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
94, No. 5. (Oct., 1986), pp. 1002-1037.
Schakel A. H. (2008) Validation of the regional authority index, Regional and Federal Studies 18, 
143–166.
Solow, Robert (1956): A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics
Sturm, Jan Egbert - de Haan, Jakob (1995): “Is public expenditure really productive?: New evidence 
for the USA and The Netherlands,” Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 12
Tosun, J. (2013). Absorption of regional funds: A comparative analysis. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 52, 371–387. doi:10.1111/jcms.12088
Treisman D. (2002) Defining and measuring decentralisation: a global perspective. Unpublished 
manuscript (available at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/defin.
pdf).
Varga, J.,- Veld, J. (2011). Cohesion policy spending in the new member states of the EU in 
anendogenous growth model. Eastern European Economics, 49, 29–54. doi:10.2753/EEE0012- 
8775490502
Vickerman, Roger(1995): “Location, accessibility and regional development: the appraisal of trans-
European networks,” Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 225-234, October.
4  JESSICA Initiative to Support Sustainable Urban 
Development Projects in Poland
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Abstract: The JESSICA initiative has been set up to respond to development needs 
of urban areas, which are of key importance for stimulation of sustainable economic 
growth. It is supposed to provide a more efficient alternative to the traditional EU 
grants for the implementation of developmental projects. The funding available 
under the JESSICA framework relies on a repayable and recyclable basis. This means 
that it not only offers revolving funds, increasing financing capacity of EU cohesion 
policy, but also creates scope for cooperation between public authorities, financial 
institutions, and private investors to support implementation of this policy. Since 
JESSICA supports projects being part of an integrated plan for sustainable urban 
development, its primary challenge is to combine the objectives focused on urban 
sustainability and policy intervention with revolving financial models that assume, 
in principle, the long-term viability of projects. However, taking into particular 
consideration the needs of urban areas and the EU cohesion policy objective on the one 
hand, and the organisation and operation of financing engineering instruments on 
the other, JESSICA seems to be a very ambitious undertaking. The evaluations carried 
out, up to now, have been mainly focused on its legal and institutional framework, 
or limited to some selected project. Our study concerns the assessment of all projects 
implemented within the framework of the JESSICA initiative in five Polish regions, 
namely: Pomorskie, Mazowieckie, Śląskie, Wielkopolskie and Zachodniopomorskie, 
in the years between 2007-2015. To do so, we designed a methodological approach for 
assessing the extent to which projects implemented under the JESSICA initiative have 
contributed to achieving its fundamental assumptions. Subsequently, we made an 
assessment of the results of JESSICA through the conceptual lens of sustainable urban 
development. The main findings show that the range of achieving the assumptions 
of the JESSICA funding model by projects diverges widely. Many projects were quite 
well adjusted to the requirements but there were also projects that fulfilled them to a 
very limited extent.
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revolving instruments, cohesion policy
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4.1  Introduction
One of the consequences of the development processes in the EU is the growing 
disparity in cities and urban areas. The negative result of such processes affect 
citizens, especially those who inhabit potentially marginalised areas of the cities, and 
the level of economic activity, which may cause the degradation of the space itself. 
Disparities may be treated as the result of market failure. Therefore, intervention 
is required. Intervention is often a part of the regeneration that is based on three 
dimensions: 1) spatial, 2) social, and 30 economic dimensions. In order to address 
the problem, the European Commission decided to introduce the Joint European 
Support for Investments in City Areas initiative (JESSICA), as a part of the cohesion 
policy in the years between 2007-2013. JESSICA is the revolving financial instrument 
focused on the sustainable development of the cities. Eleven member states decided 
to experiment with the newly proposed solution. One of them was Poland, the first 
country to sign the agreement. Five Polish regions, namely, Pomorskie, Mazowieckie, 
Śląskie, Wielkopolskie and Zachodniopomorskie, included the JESSICA resources 
into their operational programmes.
JESSICA relies on revolving mechanisms that provide repayable and recyclable 
funding targeted at economically-viable and sustainable urban development projects. 
Revolving funds that are complementary to grant funding make it possible to increase 
the financing capacity of managing authorities because they create a lasting legacy 
from the EU and national public funds (Mazars, 2013: 10–11). Its role has been to create 
strong incentives encouraging private investors to develop projects aimed at redressing 
the market failures in deprived urban areas, and also to be a powerful catalyst for 
mobilising additional financial resources for public-private partnership (PPP) (Held 
& Jakubowski, 2009). This new way of using funds, through a revolving mechanism 
and thereby accelerating further investments, would appear in practice; however, not 
as a satisfactorily functioning solution. Although there are only few studies looking 
into the problematic aspects of JESSICA, most of them indicate some shortcomings 
and achievements that are far from the expected goals. For instance, Bode (2015: 174–
178) in his legal analysis of repayable instruments, points to some weaknesses in the 
assessment procedure of projects, with the consequence that they may not address 
actual market needs and have little real impact on the ground. He also draws attention 
to a relatively low real leverage rate of private sector, and consequently disappointing 
multiplier effect. Fotino (2014: 245–251) underlines the novelty of JESSICA, which in 
conjunction with a lack of expertise and existing “grant-framework culture,” leads to 
uncertainty especially in the public sector concerning the use of financial revolving 
instruments and creation of PPP. Dąbrowski (2014; 2015) in turn, argues that the major 
barriers for the wider use of repayable instrument arise when it comes to cooperation 
between the public authorities and private entities. As a result, the implementations 
of urban projects often lead to tension, misunderstandings, and clashes of interests. 
Musiałkowska and Idczak (2016) note that key decisions on project selection are made 
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by financial institutions whose operating objectives may differ from the objectives of 
the EU cohesion policy and city authorities. This may mean that the benefits assumed 
by the designers of JESSICA at the EU level are being achieved only partially. A recent 
study on this topic, carried out by Nadler and Nadler (2018), confirms the previous 
findings and outlines several reasons for the main difficulties encountered, including 
among others, incapacity of private financial institutions to risk sharing, relatively 
high implementation and administrative costs, and low financing at the project level.
The above-mentioned complex analyses however, have failed to address the 
impact of JESSICA funding on sustainable urban development. Since the question of 
this new kind of support and its functioning has been mainly discussed in the context 
of its legal and institutional framework. This study focuses on projects implemented 
with the use of JESSICA funds. It provides further evidence for the debate on the 
specific nature of revolving funds used to accelerate investments in urban areas. The 
original contribution of this study, in contradiction with earlier findings, is to assess 
the JESSICA projects implemented in Poland with regard to the assumption of the 
JESSICA funding model. Thus, the objectives of the study are twofold: First, to build 
a methodological approach for assessing the extent to which projects implemented 
under the JESSICA initiative have contributed to achieving its fundamental 
assumptions as a new tool for supporting urban development, and its objectives to 
be initially adopted. Second, to evaluate the result of JESSICA through the conceptual 
lens of sustainable urban development. 
The methods used in the research comprise multivariate analysis (MVA) 
techniques that facilitate the capture of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
the JESSICA assessment (such as expert survey, principal component analysis, and 
polychoric correlation). We applied the techniques to datasets created for the purpose 
of the study, which included all projects implemented in Poland in the years 2007-
2015. The study sheds more light on the innovative use of financial instruments within 
the cohesion policy, and presents in-depth analyses of the mechanisms of sustainable 
development on the example of Polish cities. Therefore, the experiences of Poland 
can serve policy-makers and add to the body of literature on the implementation of 
the EU cohesion policy in Eastern, Central, and Southern Member States, which is 
one of the main aims of the monograph. The results are of particular importance in 
the wake of negotiations of new multiannual financial frameworks of the European 
Union, where the use of financial instruments is heavily debated.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: in section 2, we present 
briefly the institutional structure of JESSICA in Poland and its key characteristics. 
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework of JESSICA-led sustainable urban 
development. Section 4 develops the model of operationalisation of the assessment 
of the JESSICA projects, and includes a multi-variate analysis techniques applied in 
the study. In section 5, we present and discus the results. Finally, section 6 concludes 
the chapter by highlighting the most important results and implications that emerge 
from the study.
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4.2  Jessica Initiative as a Revolving Instrument of the EU Cohesion 
Policy
The JESSICA initiative is one of the financial engineering instruments used under 
the EU cohesion policy that entered into life in the 2007-2013 financial perspective. It 
was a response to insufficient financial resources for the regeneration processes that 
promoted regeneration actions through the use of the repayable financing mechanism. 
It was aimed at increasing effectiveness and efficiency of the actions and projects. 
JESSICA used the resources of one of the structural funds—the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF)—in the form of revolving instruments (loans, guarantees), 
allowing for example, achieving the multiplier effect of the actions implemented 
(Memorandum of Understanding, 2006). JESSICA was developed by the European 
Commission in cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB), which can act 
as a trust fund manager and which works in cooperation with the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB). In the years 2007-2013, this initiative was applied in 11 
EU countries, including Poland. In all five Polish regions: Mazowieckie, Pomorskie, 
Śląskie, Wielkopolskie, and Zachodniopomorskie (see Map 1), that decided to 
implement JESSICA, EIB was a beneficiary of the measures of regional operational 
programmes and performed a function of the holding fund that cooperated with the 
specialised Urban Development Funds (UDFs, namely: Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 
(BGK), Bank Ochrony Środowiska (BOŚ), and Bank Zachodni WBK S.A. (BZWBK S.A.)) 
responsible for the selection of the projects (Musiałkowska & Idczak, 2018a).
JESSICA, in general, supported projects in many areas such as urban infrastructure 
(including transport, water and sewage systems or power), heritage or places 
relevant to culture (contributing to the development of tourism or other permanent 
use), development of brownfield sites (including cleaning and decontamination 
of areas), creation of new commercial premises for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, development of information technology and research and development 
work, expansion of university buildings and improving energy efficiency (European 
Commission, 2013). Almost all types of legal persons enumerated in Polish law were 
eligible for applying for funds. The initiative was implemented under nine measures in 
five regional operational programmes that reflected the possible scopes of the eligible 
projects. In two regions, Pomorskie and Śląskie, there was only one measure related, 
in general, to regeneration of degraded urban areas. In the Zachodniopomorskie 
region, two measures were designed for operations of regeneration;  respectively, of 
metropolitan area of the city of Szczecin, and the second measure, of other cities of 
the region. The remaining two regions, Mazowieckie and Wielkopolskie, also planned 
additional measures focused on the environment (Mazowieckie) and support to 
business environment or regional innovation system (both regions, see Table 1). 
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Map 1. JESSICA projects implemented in Polish regions
Source: own elaboration
In total, the allocation of 265.5 mln EUR was used for the initiative in the country for 
all 161 projects implemented until 2015 (according to “n+2” rule). The allocation was 
distributed via loan system only through above-mentioned UDFs, which increased 
the possibility of re-use of the allocated amount. The majority of projects were 
implemented in the Pomorskie region—45 projects—and in the Wielkopolskie region—
40 projects. The lowest numbers of project (19) accounted for the Zachodniopomorskie 
region (Table 1). Nevertheless, the region with the lowest number of projects was 
the best performing in terms of fulfilment of criteria of the regeneration projects (see 
further analysis in the chapter). 
109 out of 161 projects (67.70%) were the revenue-generating projects (Musiał-
kowska & Idczak, 2018a). All the projects implemented in the Zachodniopomorskie 
region belonged to this category, then 76.9% of projects implemented in the Śląskie 
region; 74.19% in the Mazowieckie region; 65%; in the Wielkopolskie region; and 
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46.67% in the Pomorskie region. Almost all projects (98.18%) implemented by the 
private beneficiaries, and only 51.89% of projects implemented by public entities, were 
the revenue-generating projects (RGP). Both, the scope of the projects and the criteria 
set by the UDFs towards eligible projects had the crucial impact on such performance.
4.3  JESSICA Initiative & Sustainable Urban Development 
The key challenge for the JESSICA initiative has been to make optimal use of synergies 
between revolving investment funds and integrated urban planning objectives. Such 
approach implies many possible benefits for all stakeholders of urban development 
processes. First of all, structural funds provided in the form of a repayable model, 
recycle financial resources and thus, enhance and accelerate investments in 
disadvantaged urban areas. A further benefit is the catalytic effect on intensifying 
both public and private sector and their financial and managerial capabilities to 
cooperate effectively, and develop jointly urban development projects. Finally, 
financial engineering instruments not only support and promote sustainable urban 
development, but also provide incentives that lower risk-capital investments and 
consequently, allow overcoming existing market failures. In general, the JESSICA 
initiative is supposed to deliver on the sustainable outcomes sought by cities. By 
improving the availability of capital and its risk-return profile, in combination with 
an integrated approach, multilevel governance and partnership, this initiative should 
bring a real added value to urban communities.
However, when combining all of the assumptions with the multitude of urban 
needs and the willingness to implement the relatively challenging projects (taking 
into account the novelty of the JESSICA institutional framework as well), it emerges 
that this new initiative becomes a very ambitious undertaking. As pointed out in the 
objectives of the EU cohesion policy 2014-2020, urban development that meets the 
existing and new needs of urban areas can only be achieved through an integrated 
approach. Thus, “measures concerning physical urban renewal should be combined 
with measures promoting education, economic development, social inclusion and 
environmental protection” (European Commission, 2014b: 2). The clearly stated 
approach to urban development relates, admittedly, to the current EU financial 
perspective, but an explicit reference to that approach was also reflected in the 
cohesion policy between 2007-2013. Regulation on European Regional Development 
Fund (Article 8) suggests that structural funds should support “the development of 
participative, integrated and sustainable strategies to tackle the high concentration 
of economic, environmental and social problems affecting urban areas” (Regulation 
No 1080/2006, 2006). Therefore, EU cohesion policy introduced the urban dimension 
of the policy, which required the cities to establish the integrated urban development 
strategies or programmes. Hence, all measures undertaken within the framework 
of that policy should have promoted competitiveness and social inclusion. Such 
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an approach entails a variety of factors that must be taken into consideration 
when drawing up programmes of integrated urban development, such as inter 
alia, economic growth and jobs, rehabilitation of the physical environment, social 
exclusion, demographic change, urban sprawl, brownfield redevelopment, the 
preservation and development of natural and cultural heritage, the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, good governance… etc. (European Commission, 2009: 31–32; 
Regulation No 1080/2006, 2006). 
In order to ensure closer coordination of the wide scope of possible actions and 
sustained convergence of the socio-economic performances, all projects planned to be 
implemented under the JESSICA initiative must have been included in an integrated 
plan for sustainable urban development. This plan constituted a direct response to the 
diagnosed urban needs and issues that should have been addressed, and specifically 
those requiring mitigating measures. In this respect, the plan should have specified 
“a system of interconnected measures designed to produce a permanent improvement 
in the economic, physical, social and environmental conditions of a city or quarter” 
(Urbact, 2010: 2). It is worth noting that European regulations did not explicitly 
envisage a definition of an “integrated plan for sustainable urban development” 
(IPFSUD). This relevant regulatory framework should be laid down by the member 
states and their managing authorities in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EC), 
No. 1080/2006, and considering the specific urban, administrative, and legal context 
of particular regions. The plan should have been composed exclusively of coherent 
projects or consistent groups of projects, which rendered positive externalities for 
urban inhabitants; particularly, in specific fields having substantial needs for a long 
period. All of the projects, before they were included in the plan, had to be examined 
and evaluated in terms of their contribution to reducing negative states and their 
capacity to increase the quality of life and work of urban citizens. This means that 
those projects should be carried out on the basis of the interrelationship between 
them so as to generate synergies that guarantee that the results of the entire plan are 
greater than the simple sum of those of the individual projects (Urbact, 2010: 2). It is, 
however, clear that each particular project needs to be comprehensive as such—that 
is, tailored to the local needs, combining various aspects on a case-by-case basis: 
economic development, social integration, education culture, environmental issues, 
spatial planning… etc. Only such projects have the potential to achieve results with 
regards to sustainable urban development and deliver a real added value.
Coming back to the matter of relevant factors in sustainable urban development, 
it is important to emphasize that urban sustainability cannot be limited to what 
happens within a single place, and cannot be considered in isolation from the 
wider context. It is a multi-scale and multidimensional issue that leads to a balance 
between positive and negative urban quality conditions (Nijkamp, 2008: 15–17). 
Therefore, JESSICA projects should incorporate all driving factors deemed relevant in 
determining sustainable urban development and take into account urban problems 
in a coordinated way so as to be sustainable for itself and for the entire city (Nadler 
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& Nadler, 2018: 4–5). If one is to understand the impacts of that kind of policy 
intervention aimed at deprived urban areas, it is necessary to have some appreciation 
of the complexity of this issue. Therefore, it is important to build first an understanding 
of how it has been conceptualized and how this has fed into development of urban 
areas. In the subsequent section, five contexts (financial, economic, social, spatial 
and horizontal) of JESSICA-led sustainable development of urban areas are discussed. 
The contexts form the theoretical foundations (dimensions) of the model used in 
empirical analysis.
4.3.1  Financial Context
Since the JESSICA initiative relies on revolving funds, and its role is to enhance and 
accelerate a potential for new investments in urban areas, in principal only projects 
that generate return flows are eligible for funding offered by this instrument. Urban 
projects that were approved by UDF for investment can be funded through equity, 
guarantees, or loans (Nadler & Kreuz, 2011). This means that such types of financial 
support, in whatever form, must be reimbursed in accordance with the conditions laid 
down while granting them (EIB, 2010: 12, 45–47). The repayment should be achieved 
either in the form of solely commercial returns or project revenues secured directly 
by investors (mostly by the public side) from other sources. Hence, the refund can be 
provided by either revenues obtained from primary business activities of investors, 
or other revenues derived outside their main operations. In the former case, the cash 
inflows raised from sale revenues (flows directly paid by users for the goods or services 
provided by particular projects) allow the generation of a financial net present value 
(FNPV) and a financial internal rate of return (FIRR)78 in a dynamic capital budgeting 
analysis of a project. With regards to the latter, the lack of revenues, or their insufficient 
level, means that projects had to achieve neither an adequate level of profitability nor 
even an operational margin. Such an assumption can be justified on the grounds of 
the promotion of economic and social cohesion by correcting urban imbalances79. 
However, projects should be financially sustainable both during the investment and 
the operational stages. It means that projects must have sufficient sources of financing 
(both internal and external) to meet all of their financial obligations and needs 
over their life. Putting this more precisely, if the negative cash flows are forecasted 
78  FNPV and FIRR are commonly used as indicators that enable the assessment of the ability of 
a project to repay the investment costs, regardless of the sources or models of financing. There are 
measures of financial profitability.
79  The insufficient level of revenues in some projects can be offset by subventions that are paid in 
the form of other operating revenues by public institutions due to occurrence of an important public 
interest.
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during the project’s time horizon, the project promoters are obligated to provide a 
clear long-term commitment by external financing to cover these negative cash flows. 
The inflows may take the form of transfer, subsidies, and/or other financial gains 
that do not stem from charges paid by users for the use of the infrastructure, but are 
paid directly by investors and included in the income statement in the item’s “other 
operating revenues” (European Commission, 2014a: 50–52). In general, financial 
sustainability occurs if the cumulated generated cash flow is positive for the whole 
project’s considered time horizon.
4.3.2  Economic Context
Financial profitability as such, is used to show a project’s ability to generate profits 
from its operations and is calculated from the investor’s point of view. Therefore, it 
does not show the project’s impact on the economic welfare of the society, which 
is essential for the project appraisal in light of its contribution towards achieving 
the EU cohesion policy objectives and its consistency with other EU and national 
policies. This is why economic efficiency has an important role in the appraisal 
process of projects. It is a yardstick of the net benefits for society resulting from the 
implementation of a particular project. Economic efficiency aims at determining 
what extent a particular project will contribute to the creation of social wellbeing. 
Economic analysis is made on behalf of the whole of society instead of just the project 
owners—as in the financial analysis. It takes into consideration, not only the items of 
income or expense associated with financial cash flows, but also covers other areas 
that do not necessarily have to be subject to market transactions. It includes social 
benefits and costs as well, or externalities that spill over from the project towards 
other parties without monetary compensation (European Commission, 2014a: 54–62). 
In practical terms, economic analysis consists of adjusting the financial cash flows 
by inserting the externalities, previously quantified and valued in monetary terms, to 
the cash flow statement. As a result, it is possible to measure the economic efficiency 
by calculating the economic performance indicators; in particular, an economic-net 
present value (ENPV) and an economic rate of return (ERR)80. With all of this in mind, 
it is important to note that all projects supported by UDFs are required to demonstrate 
their capacity to generate not only FIRR, but also ERR (Nadler & Nadler, 2018: 1843). 
This means that only such projects, on the one hand, ensure the return on investment, 
which facilitates the repayment of the JESSICA loan, whilst, on the other one, provide 
80  ENPV and ERR are the most commonly used measures in appraising projects funded from EU 
Funds because they include social and environmental externalities. Moreover, these indicators 
are required in principle by the funds’ regulations when applying for EU assistance. For more, see 
European Commission (2014a: 54–67).
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significant positive externalities for society as a whole, contributing to improving 
welfare and living conditions in a sustainable way.
However, it is not infrequent in this matter that there are some benefits that may 
contribute positively to the project objectives; but they are defined in non-financial 
terms or take intangible forms. This refers mostly to such non-monetized or hard-
to-value benefits as quality of life, social integration, human capital, biodiversity 
preservation, landscape, cultural heritage and so on. Although those benefits specified 
in a convincing way may be exceptionally taken into account when appraising a project, 
at the assessment stage of its outcomes, they should be considered in a comprehensive 
manner (Fiedor, 1990; Idczak, Musiałkowska, & Mrozik, 2019). In addition, overall 
project’ impacts on the particular area are often excluded from the economic analysis 
of the project benefits. Nevertheless, they are particularly important because, as 
Verhoef and Nijkamp (2003: 4) noted, “externalities are more important in urban 
areas than elsewhere, both absolutely and relatively.” The specific feature of urban 
areas is proximity, which makes the occurrence of un-priced spill-over effects even 
more likely, and they are often neglected in the analysis due to measuring difficulties 
(Verhoef & Nijkamp, 2003: 3–6). As aforementioned, only projects combining various 
aspects of urban driving factors may deliver results that match the assumptions of the 
JESSICA initiative and stimulate sustainable development of urban areas. Therefore, 
the analysis should cover a wide spectrum of aspects that are responsible for project 
contribution to the objectives of JESSICA.
One of the cities’ tasks is to strengthen the local economy. For example, through 
creating urban development plans/strategies that include projects aimed at fostering 
entrepreneurship and prompting the emergence of new businesses in problem 
areas. Such actions should lead to the identification of new markets, and address 
people’s needs (European Commission, 2009: 30). However, one may find that those 
plans in which urban projects are embedded do not always sufficiently incorporate 
market needs. Thus, the question arising here is whether the scope of the particular 
project implemented under the JESSICA initiative follows the current and future 
trends and is tailored to market needs and expectations. This, in turn, raises further 
issues regarding to economic recovery of deprived urban areas. According to the 
assumptions, JESSICA projects are generally focused on providing a new functional 
quality and creating opportunities for growth. It means that they need to revive 
economic activity in problem areas through the creation of conditions, and new 
services and jobs to be used by inhabitants. Another interesting aspect of the analysis 
revolves around the possibility of projects in positively influencing the surrounding 
neighbourhood by spill-over effect or a multiplier effect. In short, a project should 
be framed within a longer-term perspective, and placed in a local context in order to 
spark, as its impact, new business activities, services, functions and so on. Among 
all of these un-priced effects imposed upon one by another, one should mention the 
environmental externalities that make urban areas more environmentally friendly and 
maintain the desired environmental quality within them. It is clear that urbanization 
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and population density bring with them many inherent environmental problems, 
including for instance, congestion, air pollution, intolerable noise levels, reduced 
green areas, large quantities of waste… etc (Capello & Faggian, 2002; van den Bergh, 
2010). The role of projects is to contribute to the protection of the environment, the 
prevention of natural hazards, as well as to mitigate the negative impact of human 
activities. Furthermore, the projects are expected to deliver beneficial environmental 
outcomes especially with regard to a reduction in the use of energy to avoid negative 
impacts on the security of energy supplies.
4.3.3  Social Context
When discussing issues concerning the JESSICA project and its impact on urban 
areas, one must keep in mind that key elements of urban development are social 
aspects. The IPFSUD’s aim at promoting comprehensive projects, which fulfils 
many social needs and, within the framework of the integrated approach, should 
lead to the renewal of those urban areas that experienced mostly negative effects of 
urban changes and provide the reinforcement of socio-economic structures. Social 
sustainability is a basic component of any plan and any project to improve the 
living conditions of residents (Musiałkowska & Idczak, 2018b: 236–237). Therefore, 
projects cannot be limited to re-stimulating economic activity in an area where it has 
slowed down or even disappeared. They have to be executed under the wider plan 
to stimulate comprehensive actions in the dysfunctional areas in order to guarantee 
the restoration of social functions and enable social integration (Couch, Fraser, & 
Percy, 2003). Projects should play a full and active part in spurring social revival and 
social inclusion in urban problem areas. The former term refers to the increase of 
social and professional activity of residents as well as their growing participation in 
public and civic life. The latter includes all measures targeting those persons who are 
(or feel) marginalized and excluded, and it is orientated to bring them back to the 
social life and to the conventionally recognized mainstream society. This may cover 
for instance, actions focused on the concerns of persons with disabilities or affected 
by long-term unemployment, but also apply to the unavailability of some services for 
inhabitants such as e-services. The social dimension should not only place emphasis 
on enhancing the integration among persons and their activities, but also improving 
their health and the overall level of safety in the place of residence. Finally, the cultural 
and educational aspects need to be seen in this context as well (Ginsburg, 1999). This 
implies increasing people’s access to culture, education and training, information, 
sport and recreation. With all of this in mind, operations run by urban projects create 
conditions that can close the existing gap and generate new opportunities, providing 
local people with a renewed urban space to live.
 JESSICA Initiative to Support Sustainable Urban Development Projects in Poland   185
4.3.4  Spatial Context
Another issue that constitutes an indispensable element of EU cohesion policy, 
and needs to be taken into account while assessing the JESSICA project, is spatial 
(territorial) dimension. Put simply, this term means project targeted in a defined 
spatial area (Musiałkowska & Idczak, 2018b: 236–237). This stresses the significance 
and the specificity of a given area as a place unique in terms of the existing assets, 
endogenous potential, concentration of problems and external forces. Areas vary in 
development needs, growth potential, and the ability to react to exogenous forces 
and impacts in distinct ways. The place needs to be strictly recognised by assigning 
appropriate functions to different parts of it because each territorial element makes 
a major contribution towards the formation of a single organism with a higher urban 
quality and with a consequential better quality of life for the city’s inhabitants 
(Francini, Gaudio, Mercurio, Palermo, & Viapiana, 2018: 165–166). This means 
that the preparation of a right project requires an understanding of the territorial 
diversity and territorial context. It must take into account the specificity of the space 
and respond in a precise manner to the distinct needs being expressed. Moreover, 
the project needs to be incorporated in the general framework of sustainable urban 
space development. Alongside this, it has to include actions that are environmentally 
friendly and at the same time maintain a high level of protection of human health 
and comfort of life. The urban actions should create places suitable for interpersonal 
relations and interactions, providing concurrently a space for leisure and recreation 
and enabling the performance of everyday-life tasks within the surrounding space 
(Sobol, 2013; Stangel, 2013). In that way, a particular project should be matched to 
the overall conditions laid down by spatial order that, in turn, organises an ensemble 
of possibilities and interdictions in urban space. It should contribute to shaping the 
spatial order by forming a harmonious whole and taking into account, in the right 
proportions, all functional, socio-economic, cultural, environmental, compositional 
and aesthetic requirements of urban development (Musiałkowska & Idczak, 2016: 
117–120). Overall, the spatial context is fundamental for the effective implementation 
of projects because it has the role of the verifier of a rationale for undertaken actions 
and coordinates them.
4.3.5  Horizontal Context
Behind the objectives of EU cohesion policy stands the place-based approach that 
aims to encourage more integrated actions, tailored to the needs of individual areas 
and their citizens, and designed in line with all possible stakeholders’ views. In this 
sense, a particular project should be seen either as a complex undertaking, combining 
in a single action several activities essential to reinforcing an individual area or as an 
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integral part of a larger plan including the coordinated actions that indicate the most 
appropriate solutions for a particular place. 
Nevertheless, the projects implemented in light of the place-based approach 
should be responsive to local needs and expectations in such a way that they 
address the problems not from the perspective of external stakeholders, but from the 
perspective of urban areas and particular local places situated within their boundaries, 
and the people who live in them. This means that they should be geared towards 
local places to tackle existing economic and social disadvantages and to exploit its 
spatial assets. Adopting an integrated approach towards urban places underlines 
the need to work with multiple levels of stakeholders, either public or private, also 
including residents, to formulate programmes and projects aimed at reinforcing socio-
economic structures and improving local capacity development (Böhme, Doucet, 
Komornicki, Zaucha, & Swiatek, 2011: 23-26). This is manifested by the formulation 
and preparation of integrated plans for sustainable urban development that must 
be adapted in accordance with existing needs, and include projects and proposals 
designed in relation to one another, to be approved through public consultations and 
embrace appropriate impact assessment (EIB, 2008: 2). The integrated context also 
means that projects should not be confined to a single investment that scopes only 
one type of action—for instance, infrastructure—but also offers other supplementary 
products or services important from the individual location point of view and its 
development. Moreover, the project should also be complex, meaning that they 
are expected to provide through their multifaceted status (integrated approach) a 
comprehensive response to the needs of a given area—to recreate certain activities or 
spark new functions.
As already mentioned, all of these considerations above constitute the concept 
of the JESSICA initiative and set the major theoretical framework for an empirical 
work on its functioning and achievements. The intention of the analysis carried out 
here, then, is to build a methodological approach for assessing the extent to which 
projects implemented under JESSICA have contributed to achieving its fundamental 
assumptions as a new tool for supporting urban development, and its objectives to 
be initially adopted. Undoubtedly, the deliberations made so far provide a better 
understanding of JESSICA and give rise to the identification of a set of operational 
measures that allow for the examination of JESSICA performance. However, it should 
be added that it does not mean that all projects need to fully reflect all aforementioned 
aspects surrounding a sustainable fund model. They should rather demonstrate 
a clear link to those aspects that, depending on the diagnosed requirements and 
needs of particular urban areas, result in achieving the desired effects to the greatest 
possible extent.
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4.4   Research Methods & Data
The main aim of the analysis is to evaluate the results of JESSICA through the 
conceptual lens of sustainable urban development. This means that the research 
process requires the confrontation of the adopted intervention mechanism and 
its outcome with the theoretical model of its operation. As a result, it is possible 
to demonstrate the success or failure of an intervention and, in case of failure, to 
indicate appropriate remedial actions (Chen, 2012). To this end, it is reasonable to 
use an investigative approach referring to process of evaluation. However, when 
dealing with deprived urban areas, it is important to bear in mind that they are 
characterized by a strong endemic context, which means that the research task 
boils down to verification, under what conditions, how, and to which recipients said 
intervention is effective or insufficient. This, in turn, requires the use of elements 
of realistic evaluation (Olejniczak, 2008: 32–33; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). It explores 
contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes of actions, so that the particular characteristics 
relating to different places can be drawn, and they in turn provide insight into action 
effectiveness (Astbury & Leeuw, 2010: 371–375). Thus, it is suggested that realistic 
evaluation may be an appropriate framework to assess JESSICA projects and may 
also yield recommendations for policy.
Realistic evaluation treats the subject of study as part of a complex social reality 
and, through the adoption of a relevant analytical model, allows the study of individual 
components and processes shaping that reality. The research procedure involves four 
stages, which are designed to clarify and understand the actions (projects) taken in 
particular places (Pawson & Tilley, 2004: 6–10). These stages are as follows:
1. Intervention mechanism – it includes, taking into account the knowledge on a 
particular type of intervention designed for specific needs, identification of the 
causal link;
2. Intervention context – addresses the issues of ‘for whom’ and ‘in what 
circumstances’ a project will work (be effective);
3. Outcome patterns – comprises intended and unintended effects of the intervention 
arising from the activation of different mechanisms in different contexts;
4. Context mechanism, outcome pattern, configuration – describe models indicating 
how actions activate mechanisms, amongst whom, and in what conditions, to 
achieve the desired outcomes.
The approach based on a realistic evaluation has one more advantage deemed to 
be essential from the perspective of this study. This approach does not impose any 
specific methods. It is assumed that both qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
used81. The mechanism of the intervention led within the framework of JESSICA and 
81  More details on this topic can be found in (Musiałkowska & Idczak, 2016).
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its interventional contexts were outlined in previous sections. Thus, the subsequent 
analysis seeks to assess the JESSICA results achieved so far and contrast them with its 
conceptual framework.
Since the question of JESSICA has been primarily discussed in the context of 
complexity and multi-functional impacts occurring in urban areas, the research 
focuses on multivariate analysis (MVA) techniques. No single assessment can evaluate 
all of the kinds of JESSICA results we value for the improvement of urban areas, nor 
can a single measure (variable) meet all of the objectives held by JESSICA promoters, 
stakeholders, and policymakers. Therefore, it is important to envision a multivariate 
approach of assessment, in which different criteria are used as a basis for formulating 
evaluative questions through the full range of evaluation issues (OECD, 2008). The 
criteria should be such that to make it possible to judge whether the desired level 
of performance has been met or not, in light of the objectives and assumptions set. 
In view of the aforementioned, we considered all contexts of JESSICA and its role 
in sustainable urban development to define evaluation criteria to measure JESSICA 
results. Given the discussion carried out in the previous section, it is possible to 
formulate the five interrelated, but distinct, evaluation dimensions of JESSICA 
projects: financial, economic, social, spatial and horizontal. These dimensions lay 
down the main priority aspects of the assessment that characterise, in principal, the 
conditions to be fulfilled by individual projects. However, each of the dimensions 
are still reflected by multi-scale representation and cannot be measured precisely 
by a single indicator. This implies the need for determining some sub-components 
and, subsequently, selecting individual indicators that clearly reflect their relative 
importance and the complexity of the overall composite (OECD, 2008). Thus, in the 
next step we specified within particular dimensions the individual indicators that 
were selected in a way that takes into account existing linkages between them and 
indicating their desirability in relation to the relevance of the specificity of the single 
dimension. The assessment dimensions, and the individual indicators describing 
them, are displayed in Figure 1. All in all, these dimensions, as well as individual 
indicators deriving from a conceptual base, create a construct that provide relevant 
items to operationalise the concept of the assessment of the JESSICA projects.
Admittedly, most of the individual indicators cannot be measured directly or are 
still represented by multi-dimensionality. They have the nature of latent variables that 
can be indirectly measured by means of variables, which, in turn, can be perfectly 
observed and measured. Means of variables, here called just variables, contain 
information that reflect the approximate characteristic of an individual indicator. It 
should be pointed out that MVA techniques facilitate data, including qualitative (soft) 
data, from surveys into the assessment process (Walesiak & Bąk, 1997). Therefore, 
we decided to measure individual indicators (latent variables) indirectly through the 
use of variables that were derived from a survey. To put it simply, each indictor was 
described by a single variable expressed in the form of a question. The responses to 
the questions consisted of choosing a proper integer value as follows: 
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0 – „no”; 1 – „no/yes”; 2 – „yes”
The assessment equals “0” when requirements defined through the individual 
question were not absolutely met by the particular projects, and “2” otherwise. 
The in-between assessment designated as “1” related to a situation when it was not 
possible to assess the projects accurately and entirely82. The approach based on MVA, 
as outlined above, allows for assessing JESSICA projects by means of the objective 
function defined by many criteria. It is often used to assess complex and incomparable 
projects, when it is insufficient, and often even impossible, to use only one measure 
based on scalar optimisation taking into account only one criterion. 
Figure 1: Operationalisation of the assessment of the JESSICA projects.
Source: own elaborations.
82  The use of the three-point-scale of assessment was dictated by an intention to obtain results 
that may be expressed in binary form, i.e. meets or does not meet. However, narrowing the possible 
responses to the only two opposing categories would have deprived respondents of the possibility to 
manifest reasonable doubts, if the sufficiently precise assessment was not possible. Therefore, an 
intermediate grade was also implemented.
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We decided to invite 4 experts, specialised in European funds, urban planning, 
and sustainable urban development, to participate in a survey83. This means that 
the variables used in the study provide information stemming from a process that 
represents a shared perception of a reality, which, in this case, relates to a given state 
of affairs reflecting individual projects. The multidimensional nature of JESSICA 
projects is thus described by many different variables that carry various kinds of 
information being extremely important for the process of comparing these projects. 
Therefore, in order to avoid explaining separately particular variables describing 
complex (dependent) phenomena (projects), there is a need to demonstrate the 
global relation of complex explanatory (independent) features to other given complex 
phenomena/projects (viewed as a uniform whole). To do this, it means applying 
composite indicators that aggregate multidimensional undertakings into simplified 
concepts and make their comparability possible. The main point of the construction 
of a composite indicator is to put together, in a meaningful way, different dimensions 
included and measured in the study. This implies the use of a weighting method to 
aggregate information. In order to give variables appropriate weight, we applied a 
principal component analysis (PCA) (Bollen, Glanville, & Stecklov, 2007: 19–22). PCA 
methods explain the highest variation in the dataset. They use the smallest possible 
number of factors that reflect the latent “statistical” dimension (factors) of the dataset 
(Kaczmarek, 2016; Mori, Tanaka, & Tarumi, 1998; Walesiak & Bąk, 1997). By doing so, 
the values of the weights derive from statistical models, and this approach is deemed 
non-arbitrary. Applying PCA was proceeded by the estimation of the correlation 
between latent variables. To this end, we used polychoric correlation, which measures 
the correlation between two continuous latent variables that have a bivariate normal 
distribution84. Additionally, it is important to emphasize that, when calculating the 
factor loadings, we applied the maximum likelihood method to receive the most 
appropriate estimators for the factor loadings (Olsson, 1979).
83  The experts came from academia and municipal departments dealing with regeneration. None of 
the experts were involved in the implementation of the JESSICA projects to assure impartiality. The 
experts assessed all 161 projects against detailed model criteria. It is worth mentioning that the group 
of potential experts capable of providing in-depth evaluation of JESSICA in Poland, with regard to 
the assessment approach proposed in the study, is quite limited. Moreover, the number of experts 
invited to the survey, in our opinion, meets the rules of the approach proposed by Christopoulos 
(2009) relating to expert interviewing/surveying, and those experts can legitimately be considered 
relevant for our research purposes. In view of the above, we believe that the information collected in 
this way ensures the reliability of data and the validity of research results based on them. For further 
details see Dorussen, Lenz, & Blavoukos (2005). Nonetheless, bearing this in mind the results from 
such analyses should be treated with caution.
84  This method is frequently applied when analysing items on surveys that often use rating scales 
with a small number of response options. For more see (Kolenikov & Angeles, 2009; Uebersax, 2015).
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The empirical analysis in this study builds on a dataset containing details on all 
projects implemented within the framework of the JESSICA initiative in Poland during 
the 2007 – 2015 period85. This dataset was created on the basis of the information made 
available by the Marshall Offices of all regions implementing the JESSICA initiative 
and institutions acting as managers of the Urban Development Funds. In addition, 
data regarding projects were supplemented by the results of the examination of the 
other sources such as project descriptions, policy reports, official websites and field 
studies. Each of the experts invited to the survey were provided with full access to the 
database, so that they were able to carefully analyses and properly assess the projects 
by indicating an accurate score.
4.5  Results & Discussion
As outlined in the theoretical framework, the JESSICA initiative focuses on supporting 
sustainable urban development through revolving financial mechanism. This entails 
designing undertakings that, on the one hand, ensure a strong and long-term viability, 
whilst on the other, activate all relevant stakeholders to play a critical role in selecting 
and implementing operations that have to be regenerative for cities. In a nutshell, 
JESSICA has been seen as a tool that conveys the model of urban sustainability based 
on financial engineering in a real city-world. However, when looking at Figure 2, 
one may see that the overall assessment of projects implemented with the support of 
JEESICA, varies considerably according to both the five-evaluation dimensions and 
individual indicators. What is surprising is the fact that, even the financial dimension, 
originally foreseen as a key point of this instrument, was not highly assessed. This 
suggests that a certain number of projects have not been financially sustainable, 
both at the investment and the operational stages. A closer look at this dimension 
and its performance reveals that none of the indicators have reached the maximum 
achievable scoring result. This also relates to the “financial sustainability” that serves 
as some kind of financial collateral to balance project cash flows, including, and 
especially, the security for the repayment of JESSICA loans. As such, it should be seen 
as a necessary condition for being a JESSICA beneficiary. A reasonable explanation 
for this result may be that, according to experts, some projects have been completely 
lacking the profitability. In other words, some beneficiaries were not only not able 
to secure the loan repayment from their primary activities, but also from any other 
ones due to the non-commercial nature of those activities. Therefore, the coverage of 
lifelong operating costs and the reimbursement of the JESSICA loan had to be ensured 
by some external bodies, such as governing authorities86. 
85  N+2 rule was taken into account when considering the implementation of the projects.
86  This could partly include, for instance, public educational entities that, in Poland, are governed 
by self-government units or other public legal persons.
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As far as the economic dimension is concerned, most prominence is given to 
the two indicators that practically reached the maximum result—i.e. “economic 
efficiency” and “market needs”. These findings imply that, in principle, all projects 
were perfectly matched to the current needs and make a significant contribution to 
welfare by providing benefits for citizens. The three other indicators, in contrast, 
point to the average level of satisfaction with the economic impact of a project in 
particular urban areas. Considerably poor effects are especially observed when it 
comes to the creation of a new chain reaction and, through that, the stimulation of 
the local economy. 
Figure 2: Assessment of the JESSICA dimensions by projects, implemented in Poland in 2007-2015 
(results of the survey). 
Source: own elaboration.
The weakest characteristics out of all dimensions taken to assess the JESSICA projects 
seem to be those related to the social dimension. Apart from the “quality of life,” 
which received the highest score and shows a substantial impact on projects in this 
aspect, the other indicators are evaluated below expectations. The relatively large 
share of inconclusive responses, and wider scope of negative responses than positive 
ones, may prove that projects have exceptionally little impact (not to say negligible) 
in shaping social development in the face of the complex set of challenges described 
in IPFSUD. Regarding the spatial dimension, the results highlight that projects in 
principle, were quite well prepared and adequately fulfil the requirements described in 
strategic and planning documents. In turn with respect to the horizontal dimensions, 
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one may notice that the results provide a predominant proportion of inconclusive 
responses in comparison with the other possible ones. These results indicate that the 
implementation of JESSICA projects has not sufficiently respected the principles of an 
integrated approach, which are recognised as being of a particular challenge in the 
enhancement of sustainable urban development.
The most striking observation to emerge from the data analysis at this point is that 
many projects are not characterised by operating profitability (profit margin), and 
that their real added value derives mainly from specific benefits that the investment 
will generate for the society (understood in terms of economic efficiency). These are 
mostly projects for which financing in the form of JESSICA loans did not constitute 
public aid. They are deprived of a commercial element, and the profitability condition 
has been replaced by the project promoter’s creditworthiness. Moreover, the actions 
undertaken in projects related to the social dimension often had a complementary 
nature and were not an appropriate response to the real needs of the inhabitants. 
The actions in their scope concentrated mainly on issues such as, for instance, 
the improvement of security issues through the installation of video monitoring or 
reduction of social exclusion by adapting buildings/facilities to the needs of persons 
with disabilities. These effects should not be questioned. However, they result from 
legal regulations or generally applicable standards, which means that they would 
probably be implemented anyway.
As was discussed in the theoretical section, not all projects are expected to 
accomplish fully the individual assumptions of the JESSICA model to support 
sustainable investments in urban areas. Nonetheless, their activities should be 
adjusted to local needs as much as possible and pursue the goals of sustainable urban 
development. This is of primary importance. In order to assess the extent to which 
projects implemented under the JESSICA initiative have contributed to achieving 
its fundamental assumptions, we need the overall picture of projects pointing all 
aspects covered by the five dimensions. Therefore, following this line of argument, 
we applied a principal component analysis to determine the weight that was 
subsequently used to construct a composite indicator. It turned out that the variables 
are quite well represented by a single component (factor). The eigenvalue of this 
component amounted to 6.964, which accounts for 0.367 of the total variance in the 
dataset. This was deemed sufficient to explain the highest possible variation in the 
variable set. Thus, the variable loadings of the component were considered as optimal 
weights because no other set of weights could produce a set of components that are 
more successful in explaining the variation in the analysed variables. Finally, we 
constructed a composite indicator as an average value of data from four independent 
respondents87. The results, normalised to 100, are illustrated in Figure 3.
87  Such calculation was possible due to a strong correlation between the four individual composite 
indicators (0.89 on average).
194   Chapter II: Cohesion Policy Multidimensional View
Figure 3: Histogram of the composite indicator.
Source: own elaboration.
What clearly emerges from Figure 3 is a wide variety of JESSICA projects in terms 
of the value of the composite indicator. There are few projects that perfectly comply 
with JESSICA goals focused on sustainable urban development. Half of all projects 
meet the assumptions of this financial engineering instrument at a very high level, 
and make a significant contribution to achieving urban sustainability. Nevertheless, 
there are also a certain number of projects that were judged as partly unsatisfactory or 
unsatisfactory. This may be due to their scope of activities, which were often limited 
to one type of an operation and did not include components rendering positive 
externalities for urban citizens.
In order to provide additional depth to the research, further analysis is conducted 
at regional level to compare results between particular regions. Figure 4 presents the 
distribution of the value of the composite indicator in all regions that implemented 
JESSICA initiatives. First, it points to large differences between regions in the level of 
the composite indicator. The differences are statistically significant, which was proven 
by Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-squared = 112.08, df = 4, p-value < 2.2e-16. Additionally, 
we also used Dunn’s test of multiple comparisons to pinpoint which specific regions 
differs significantly from the others.
By doing so, we obtain the results among multiple pairwise comparisons after 
a Kruskal-Wallis test for stochastic dominance among the analysed regions. We 
can note from Table 2 that there are significant differences, particularly between 
all of the pairs of regions with the exception of two pairs: Mazowieckie-Pomorskie 
and Śląskie-Wielkopolskie. By analysing data in Figure 4 and Table 2, we acquire 
evidence that reveals that the best performer in terms of the composite indicator is 
the Zachodniopomorskie region. In turn, the worst performing region is the region of 
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Figure 4: Distribution of the value of the composite indicator in all Polish regions.
Source: own elaboration.
Pomorskie. The remaining three regions are in the middle of the scale (Figure 5). In 
all the regions, dispersion of the projects along the scale can be detected, meaning 
that there is room for improvement for future planning and implementation of similar 
projects. Moreover, the biggest difference in performance (with the highest value of 
Z-parameter), visible between the Pomorskie and Zachodniopomorskie, implies that 
the projects in the former region responded to the lowest extent to the assumptions 
of the JESSICA model aimed at supporting sustainable investments in urban areas. 
Whereas, the projects in the latter region are deemed to be the best performers. A 
reasonable explanation for these findings may be that, in Zachodniopomorskie, 
the main emphasis was placed on supporting fewer projects (compared to the other 
regions), but distinguished by a very complex range of activities. Those projects have 
offered a relatively broad portfolio of various services including social, cultural, and 
other services available to the public. Therefore, by performing the major share of 
commercial components in the projects, their promoters can achieve a sufficiently 
high profitability that not only guarantees return on investment, but also secure the 
costs relating to social aspects. In contrast, JESSICA funds in other regions were also 
allocated to projects with a very narrow scope of activities, executed mostly by public 
entities. They related, for instance, to upgrading the energy efficiency of buildings 
or establishing new or modernising existing leisure and recreation facilities. It is 
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obvious then, that in light of the assessment approach, they could not be highly rated 
due to responding positively to only a few indicators.
Table 2: Results of Dunn’s test of multiple comparisons.
No. Comparison Z P.unadj P.adj
1 Mazowieckie - Pomorskie 0.9451721 3.445710e-01 3.828567e-01
2 Mazowieckie - Śląskie -2.1461207 3.186335e-02 4.551907e-02
3 Pomorskie - Śląskie -3.2123554 1.316514e-03 4.388380e-03
4 Mazowieckie - Wielkopolskie -1.7618463 7.809528e-02 9.761910e-02
5 Pomorskie - wielkopolskie -2.9552644 3.124012e-03 7.810029e-03
6 Śląskie - Wielkopolskie 0.5920039 5.538480e-01 5.538480e-01
7 Mazowieckie - Zachodniopomorskie -4.2400152 2.235046e-05 1.117523e-04
8 Pomorskie - Zachodniopomorskie -5.3216630 1.028229e-07 1.028229e-06
9 Śląskie - Zachodniopomorskie -2.2021412 2.765533e-02 4.609222e-02
10 Wielkopolskie - Zachodniopomorskie -2.9206963 3.492501e-03 6.985003e-03
* p-values adjusted with the Benjamini-Hochberg method
Source: own elaboration
The next set of analysis reveals whether the type of projects (revenue-generating 
projects and non-revenue-generating projects) or the legal form of the beneficiary88 
vary by the value of the composite indicator. We wanted to find out if a particular 
type of project or legal form of beneficiaries could reflect an effect on the value of the 
composite indicator. With regards to the Kruskal-Wallis test, we found that there are 
significant differences between the examined groups: 
 – Type of projects v. composite indicator - chi-squared = 95.137, df = 1, p-value < 
2.2e-16;
 – Legal form of the beneficiary v. composite indicator - chi-squared = 48.789, df = 6, 
p-value = 8.219e-09. 
The results presented in Figure 5 and 6 are interesting in two ways. First, both the 
type of projects as well as the legal form of the beneficiary matter in determining 
the value of the composite indicator. Second, if the individual project was a revenue-
generating project, or if the project was implemented by the private entity, the value 
of the composite indicator is higher. Thus, projects that best reflect the priorities 
of the JESSICA initiative are those that are executed by private entities and possess 
capacities to generate revenues.
88  Research on revenue-generating projects and types of legal beneficiary of JESSICA was conducted 
by the authors previously. See: Musiałkowska and Idczak (2019; 2018a).
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The most striking result to emerge from the data is that only one third out of all 
projects (55 out of 161) were implemented by private entities, and in this respect, it 
should be noted that only one project was implemented under the form of PPP (in 
Pomorskie region). Interestingly, JESSICA was to be an incentive for the private sector 
to engage in relatively more risky projects oriented towards overcoming market failures 
in deprived urban areas. In practise however, experience shows that the majority of 
projects (almost two-thirds) were completed by entities acting in the widely defined 
social and public interest, and half of which do not generate any revenues. It is then 
clear that projects implemented by public institutions, with a rather narrow range of 
actions, and with limited capacities to ensure the repayment of JESSICA loans directly 
from their primary activates, could not be highly assessed in comparison to better 
performing projects.
Figure 5: Relations between type of project and value of composite indicator. 
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Figure 6: Relations between type of beneficiary and value of composite indicator.
Source: own elaboration.
The same procedure was conducted for the statistical link between the values of 
JESSICA projects, the size of the JESSICA loan, and the value of the composite 
indicator. Figure 7 demonstrates how the dependence between these variables is 
quite strong. Projects with high value and high size of JESSICA loans are characterised 
by a high level of the composite indicator. It means that those projects correspond in 
a better way to assumptions of JESSICA and provide more public benefits for society. 
Significantly, these findings are consistent with the results of the study carried out by 
Musiałkowska and Idczak (2019; 2018a) revealing the statistical link between project 
capacities to generate revenues and the value of JESSICA projects.
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Figure 7:  Relationship between the value of the composite indicator, the values of JESSICA projects, 
and the size of the JESSICA loan. 
Source: own elaboration.
In essence, it is critical to emphasise that, from the point of view of this research, 
projects that best match the assumptions of the JESSICA initiative according to the 
five-dimension-assessment-model are those with high value and implemented by 
private investors. However, that does not mean that projects with unsatisfactory 
performance deriving from our research should be regarded as less important. 
Especially, since many of them have had a crucial role in overcoming structural 
barriers and stimulating regenerative measures in less-favoured urban areas, and 
also in applying the principles of sustainable development that are fundamental 
for urban cohesion. But such projects, by their nature, do not seem inherent in the 
JESSICA funding model, in the strict meaning of this term. They do not join all the 
stakeholders to work together in the spirit of a partnership (preferably public-private 
partnership) to make more effective use of their area’s intrinsic potential. For such 
projects, JESSICA becomes an ordinary credit or loan (granted possibly on better 
funding terms) that can be repaid by means resulting from savings obtained through 
energy efficiency improvement measures, or simply from various external sources. 
Those projects do not involve private capital, and consequently do not generate 
capital backflows. In this sense, they do not contribute to the leverage effects and 
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thereby diminish the role of JESSICA as a potentially powerful instrument that can 
overcome existing market failures. 
In contrast, the projects scoring highly in the study fit perfectly into the framework 
of the JESSICA initiative. This means that JESSICA support was a strong incentive for 
mostly private investors by providing catalytic first-loss capital to facilitate urban 
development operations, whilst simultaneously mitigating financial risk. Those 
projects lend JESSICA its ability to engage private sector, and thus to leverage both into 
further investment, as well as competence and expertise, in project implementation 
and management. They enable JESSICA to be a real revolving-investment mechanism 
that recycles public financial resources in order to enhance and accelerate investments 
in more urban areas 
4.6  Conclusions
The JESSICA initiative is an ambitious attempt to contribute to sustainable development 
and the regeneration of European cities through the use of revolving mechanisms of 
EU cohesion policy structural funds. In this study, the Polish experiences presented 
the complexity of institutional structure (section 2), sustainable development (section 
3) and the results of the implementation of the initiative (section 5). We constructed 
our own model of assessment of JESSICA that is based on five contexts of sustainable 
development in urban areas: financial, economic, social, spatial and horizontal 
contexts. These were then transformed into dimensions of evaluation. The results 
show that not all dimensions were taken into account during the phase of appraisal 
and then the implementation of the projects. The most represented dimensions were 
the financial, economic and spatial dimensions. The social and horizontal dimensions 
were responsible for determining whether the projects bring positive externalities to 
the society. Integrated approach , that aimed at removal of the main developmental 
bottlenecks, and was absent in some of the projects. 
The approach of particular regions differed with regards to both institutional 
structure of the regional operational programmes that used the resources of 
JESSICA, and the results achieved. The Zachodniopomorskie region was the best 
performing region in terms of adjusting the projects’ requirements to the theoretical 
assumption of regeneration model. The Wielkopolskie, Mazowieckie and Śląskie 
regions were characterised by the projects of different quality (in terms of fulfilling 
the assumptions) but many of the projects can be assessed as partly successful when 
regeneration processes are analysed. The worst performer was the Pomorskie region. 
This indirectly shows the diversity of the approach of UDFs  towards the process of 
selecting projects. 
Another set of results show that there is a strong correlation between the type 
of project, in terms of generating revenues, and the assumptions of the model 
(represented by the value of composite indicator). In general, the projects that 
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generate revenue are good representatives of the JESSICA-type interventions. The 
same is true for projects led by private entities. These results can lead to quite clear 
policy recommendation with regard to regeneration and sustainable development 
projects. The projects of higher value, generating revenue and coordinated by private 
entities, bring more results in terms of all five dimensions that are responsible for 
assuring the complexity of urban development. Notwithstanding, we assume that 
the institutional quality matters when it comes to programme and selection criteria 
design. However, this aspect needs further investigation. 
Finally, more research is necessary to resolve some limitations facing this study. 
First, more in-depth investigation is needed on the range of activities of particular 
projects in order to precisely indicate what kind of actions respect the spirit of the 
JESSICA initiative adequately. Moreover, it is important to find the overall response 
to the question on why participation of private entities was not as prevalent in terms 
of number of beneficiaries, and why JESSICA has failed in establishing public-private 
partnerships.  
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